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‘Peace Without Consensus’ demonstrates that the rise of Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was not ‘inevitable’. Rather, it argues that critics who blame Northern Ireland's power-sharing institutions for the electoral triumph of the political ‘extremes’ in 2003 have not fully considered how the US, British and Irish governments contributed to this outcome. Through interviews with key US, British and Irish officials this groundbreaking analysis, which represents the first examination of the Bush administration's vital role in the peace process, demonstrates that Washington and Dublin were considering a deal between the DUP and Sinn Féin as early as 2002. Profiled in the Guardian, the Observer, BBC Radio Four, the Irish Independent and in Henry McDonald's ‘Gunsmoke and Mirrors’, Mary-Alice C. Clancy's theoretically informed and empirically grounded book presents new and salient lessons for other regions embroiled in conflict and should be read by all those interested in Northern Ireland's peace process and US foreign policy.

The following introduction reviews the gaps in extant International Relations theory regarding foreign intervention in ethnic and ethnonational conflicts, proposing ways in which Rationalist and Constructivist approaches to International Relations could contribute to our understanding of such phenomena. The introduction then provides an overview of the special issue's five articles, which draw upon evidence from Africa, the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Basque Country to highlight the benefits and drawbacks of third-party intervention in ethnic and ethnonational conflicts. In doing so, they highlight many of the most salient issues affecting the practice of intervention and peacebuilding today.

Since the signing of the Belfast, or Good Friday, Agreement in 1998, a veritable cottage industry has emerged seeking to export Northern Ireland’s “lessons.” One of the most frequently cited lessons is the role of “internationalization”¹ in conflict resolution and the importance of aligning international influence.² The lesson’s import, however, is open to dispute. On the one hand, the international dimension is liable to be distorted by those seeking to secure their own legacy in Northern Ireland.³ On the other hand, some have sought to downplay its importance, arguing that British, Irish, and American officials’ disputes are carefully choreographed ruses.⁴

This chapter demonstrates that McDowell and Reiss's more forceful approaches were not appreciated in London or in some quarters in Dublin. It shows that Reiss and McDowell's emphasis upon policing and IRA criminality helped to bring about the conditions that allowed Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to share power in 2007. The DUP's opening move appeared to narrow Sinn Fein's room for prevarication, and it appeared to be further reduced by the Irish government's greater public concern over increased paramilitary activity, the gravity of which was later outlined in the IMC's inaugural report. The British government's approach to ongoing criminality, however, was less robust than McDowell's. Moreover, Sinn Fein's current position was also continuing to reap dividends: in Northern Ireland the party gained a seat in the European Parliament (EP) and its Dublin candidate, Mary Lou McDonald, was also elected to the EP in June. This chapter demonstrates that McDowell and Reiss's more forceful approaches were not appreciated in London or in some quarters in Dublin. It shows that Reiss and McDowell's emphasis upon policing and IRA criminality helped to bring about the conditions that allowed Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to share power in 2007. The DUP's opening move appeared to narrow Sinn Fein's room for prevarication, and it appeared to be further reduced by the Irish government's greater public concern over increased paramilitary activity, the gravity of which was later outlined in the IMC's inaugural report. The British government's approach to ongoing criminality, however, was less robust than McDowell's. Moreover, Sinn Fein's current position was also continuing to reap dividends: in Northern Ireland the party gained a seat in the European Parliament (EP) and its Dublin candidate, Mary Lou McDonald, was also elected to the EP in June.

This conclusion presents some closing thoughts of the concepts discussed in the preceding chapters of this book. The book demonstrates that blaming the Belfast Agreement's consociational institutions for the rise and eventual triumph of Northern Ireland's political 'extremes' is problematic. Attempting to normatively blame, or to empirically explain the trajectory of post-Agreement politics via the consociational model alone is reductionist as it fails to acknowledge both the dynamic created by the peace and political processes' internationalisation and the Agreement's centripetal potential. The book also demonstrates Irish officials placed the SDLP under 'huge pressure' not to endorse the police until an inclusive deal that Sinn Fein could accept was available; similarly, British and Irish concerns the republican leadership's internal and external stability often thwarted Trimble's attempts to force IRA decommissioning. This conclusion presents some closing thoughts of the concepts discussed in the preceding chapters of this book. The book demonstrates that blaming the Belfast Agreement's consociational institutions for the rise and eventual triumph of Northern Ireland's political 'extremes' is problematic. Attempting to normatively blame, or to empirically explain the trajectory of post-Agreement politics via the consociational model alone is reductionist as it fails to acknowledge both the dynamic created by the peace and political processes' internationalisation and the Agreement's centripetal potential. The book also demonstrates Irish officials placed the SDLP under 'huge pressure' not to endorse the police until an inclusive deal that Sinn Fein could accept was available; similarly, British and Irish concerns the republican leadership's internal and external stability often thwarted Trimble's attempts to force IRA decommissioning.

This chapter shows that the new US administration, and its reaction to alleged IRA misadventures in Colombia and 9/11, opened up the possibility of such a fundamental shift occurring. In spite of the recognition that 'ordinary unionism' was becoming alienated from the Agreement on 18 January, Powell engaged in negotiations with republicans the very next day, and soon thereafter he offered an unqualified promise to revise policing legislation after a review if the republican leadership would endorse the police. In order to get the SDLP to endorse policing, the two governments offered the party reviews of murders where security collusion was suspected by the Canadian jurist Peter Cory. According to Powell, however, the Irish government put the party under 'huge pressure' not to endorse the police until an inclusive deal that Sinn Fein could accept was available, a move that the SDLP\" Seamus Mallon characterised as unforgivable. This chapter shows that the new US administration, and its reaction to alleged IRA misadventures in Colombia and 9/11, opened up the possibility of such a fundamental shift occurring. In spite of the recognition that 'ordinary unionism' was becoming alienated from the Agreement on 18 January, Powell engaged in negotiations with republicans the very next day, and soon thereafter he offered an unqualified promise to revise policing legislation after a review if the republican leadership would endorse the police. In order to get the SDLP to endorse policing, the two governments offered the party reviews of murders where security collusion was suspected by the Canadian jurist Peter Cory. According to Powell, however, the Irish government put the party under 'huge pressure' not to endorse the police until an inclusive deal that Sinn Fein could accept was available, a move that the SDLP\" Seamus Mallon characterised as unforgivable.

This chapter reviews the factors that led to Northern Ireland's creation in 1921. It demonstrates that Northern Ireland's character, rather than being preordained, was the product of a number of exogenous and endogenous factors' interaction. The chapter examines the Northern Ireland conflict's assumed origins. It provides an overview of the theory most closely associated with the conflict's regulation, consociationalism. The chapter shows that consociationalists' centripetalist defences of the Belfast Agreement similarly cannot be fully understood without reference to external actors' perceptions, calculations and actions. It demonstrates the vital, yet somewhat neglected, role of the British, Irish and US governments in determining Northern Ireland's political trajectory in the post-Agreement era. The method of conflict management most closely associated with these agreements has been a form of power-sharing known as consociationalism, although whether or not consociationalism has been a consistent goal of the two governments is a matter of debate. This chapter reviews the factors that led to Northern Ireland's creation in 1921. It demonstrates that Northern Ireland's character, rather than being preordained, was the product of a number of exogenous and endogenous factors' interaction. The chapter examines the Northern Ireland conflict's assumed origins. It provides an overview of the theory most closely associated with the conflict's regulation, consociationalism. The chapter shows that consociationalists' centripetalist defences of the Belfast Agreement similarly cannot be fully understood without reference to external actors' perceptions, calculations and actions. It demonstrates the vital, yet somewhat neglected, role of the British, Irish and US governments in determining Northern Ireland's political trajectory in the post-Agreement era. The method of conflict management most closely associated with these agreements has been a form of power-sharing known as consociationalism, although whether or not consociationalism has been a consistent goal of the two governments is a matter of debate.

This introduction presents an overview of key concepts covered in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book explains how the British, Irish and US governments achieved Sinn Fein-DUP deal. It focuses on the Belfast Agreement's exogenous actors and demonstrates that the Belfast Agreement's consociational institutions are neither inherently centrifugal or centripetal; rather, such outcomes are heavily dependent upon the incentives and disincentives provided by exogenous actors to share power. The book argues that the operation of consociationalism in Northern Ireland can not be understood without reference to the way in which external actors facilitate, uphold and/or enervate power-sharing settlements. It examines the 'high politics' of the Sunningdale the Anglo-Irish Agreements. The book presents the peace and political processes that preceded the Belfast Agreement. The peace process involves facilitating paramilitaries - primarily the Irish Republican Army (IRA)-transition from violence to peaceful means. This introduction presents an overview of key concepts covered in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book explains how the British, Irish and US governments achieved Sinn Fein-DUP deal. It focuses on the Belfast Agreement's exogenous actors and demonstrates that the Belfast Agreement's consociational institutions are neither inherently centrifugal or centripetal; rather, such outcomes are heavily dependent upon the incentives and disincentives provided by exogenous actors to share power. The book argues that the operation of consociationalism in Northern Ireland can not be understood without reference to the way in which external actors facilitate, uphold and/or enervate power-sharing settlements. It examines the 'high politics' of the Sunningdale the Anglo-Irish Agreements. The book presents the peace and political processes that preceded the Belfast Agreement. The peace process involves facilitating paramilitaries - primarily the Irish Republican Army (IRA)-transition from violence to peaceful means.

This chapter outlines the impact of the peace and political processes' internationalisation through an examination of its 'high politics', albeit broadly construed. It examines the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements through the lens of 'high politics' casts doubt upon Lijphart's analysis of the former's failure, and O'Leary's interpretation of the intent of the latter's framers. In terms of Sunningdale, a 'high politics' analysis demonstrates British officials' failure to accurately interpret the divisions within unionism. In addition to providing a lifeline for the republicans, electoral politics also provided a good deal of justification for the republican movement's decision to curtail its armed campaign over the course of the peace process. Similarly, a 'high politics' examination of the Sunningdale Agreement and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) renders a unified interpretation of its framer's intent difficult. Therefore, any account of post-Agreement politics which did not give due weight to the roles of special advisers and civil servants would suffer from serious defects. This chapter outlines the impact of the peace and political processes' internationalisation through an examination of its 'high politics', albeit broadly construed. It examines the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements through the lens of 'high politics' casts doubt upon Lijphart's analysis of the former's failure, and O'Leary's interpretation of the intent of the latter's framers. In terms of Sunningdale, a 'high politics' analysis demonstrates British officials' failure to accurately interpret the divisions within unionism. In addition to providing a lifeline for the republicans, electoral politics also provided a good deal of justification for the republican movement's decision to curtail its armed campaign over the course of the peace process. Similarly, a 'high politics' examination of the Sunningdale Agreement and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) renders a unified interpretation of its framer's intent difficult. Therefore, any account of post-Agreement politics which did not give due weight to the roles of special advisers and civil servants would suffer from serious defects.