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735 result(s) for "Cohen, Andrew L"
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Impaired reward prediction error encoding and striatal-midbrain connectivity in depression
Anhedonia (hyposensitivity to rewards) and negative bias (hypersensitivity to punishments) are core features of major depressive disorder (MDD), which could stem from abnormal reinforcement learning. Emerging evidence highlights blunted reward learning and reward prediction error (RPE) signaling in the striatum in MDD, although inconsistencies exist. Preclinical studies have clarified that ventral tegmental area (VTA) neurons encode RPE and habenular neurons encode punishment prediction error (PPE), which are then transmitted to the striatum and cortex to guide goal-directed behavior. However, few studies have probed striatal activation, and functional connectivity between VTA-striatum and VTA-habenula during reward and punishment learning respectively, in unmedicated MDD. To fill this gap, we acquired fMRI data from 25 unmedicated MDD and 26 healthy individuals during a monetary instrumental learning task and utilized a computational modeling approach to characterize underlying neural correlates of RPE and PPE. Relative to controls, MDD individuals showed impaired reward learning, blunted RPE signal in the striatum and overall reduced VTA-striatal connectivity to feedback. Critically, striatal RPE signal was increasingly blunted with more major depressive episodes (MDEs). No group differences emerged in PPE signals in the habenula and VTA or in connectivity between these regions. However, PPE signals in the habenula correlated positively with number of MDEs. These results highlight impaired reward learning, disrupted RPE signaling in the striatum (particularly among individuals with more lifetime MDEs) as well as reduced VTA-striatal connectivity in MDD. Collectively, these findings highlight reward-related learning deficits in MDD and their underlying pathophysiology.
A ’compensatory selection’ effect with standardized tests: Lack of correlation between test scores and success is evidence that test scores are predictive of success
We introduce the statistical concept of ’compensatory selection’, which arises when selecting a subset of applicants based on multiple predictors, such as when standardized test scores are used in combination with other predictors required in a school application (e.g., previous grades, references letters, and personal statements). Post-hoc analyses often fail to find a positive correlation between test scores and subsequent success, and this failure is sometimes taken as evidence against the predictive validity of the standardized test. The present analysis reveals that the failure to find a negative correlation indicates that the standardized test is in fact a valid predictor of success. This is due to compensation between predictors during selection: Some students are admitted despite a low test score because their application is exceptional in other respects, while other students are admitted primarily based on a high test score despite weakness in the rest of their application. This compensatory selection process introduces a negative correlation between test scores and other predictors among those admitted (a ’collider bias’ or ’Berkson’s paradox’ effect). If test scores are valid predictors of success, this negative correlation between the predictors counteracts the positive correlation between test scores and success that would have been observed if all applicants were admitted. If test scores are not predictive of success, but were nevertheless used in a compensatory selection process, there would be a spurious negative correlation between test scores and success (i.e., an admitted student with a weak application except for a high test score would be unlikely to succeed). The selection effect that is described here is fundamentally different from the well-known ’restricted range’ problem and can powerfully alter results even in situations that accept most applicants.
The Dilution Effect and Information Integration in Perceptual Decision Making
In cognitive science there is a seeming paradox: On the one hand, studies of human judgment and decision making have repeatedly shown that people systematically violate optimal behavior when integrating information from multiple sources. On the other hand, optimal models, often Bayesian, have been successful at accounting for information integration in fields such as categorization, memory, and perception. This apparent conflict could be due, in part, to different materials and designs that lead to differences in the nature of processing. Stimuli that require controlled integration of information, such as the quantitative or linguistic information (commonly found in judgment studies), may lead to suboptimal performance. In contrast, perceptual stimuli may lend themselves to automatic processing, resulting in integration that is closer to optimal. We tested this hypothesis with an experiment in which participants categorized faces based on resemblance to a family patriarch. The amount of evidence contained in the top and bottom halves of each test face was independently manipulated. These data allow us to investigate a canonical example of sub-optimal information integration from the judgment and decision making literature, the dilution effect. Splitting the top and bottom halves of a face, a manipulation meant to encourage controlled integration of information, produced farther from optimal behavior and larger dilution effects. The Multi-component Information Accumulation model, a hybrid optimal/averaging model of information integration, successfully accounts for key accuracy, response time, and dilution effects.
Failure to detect function word repetitions and omissions in reading: Are eye movements to blame?
We tested whether failure to notice repetitions of function words during reading (e.g., Amanda jumped off the the swing and landed on her feet .) is due to the eyes’ tendency to skip one of the instances of the word. Eye movements were recorded during reading of sentences with repetitions of the word the or repetitions of a noun, after which readers were asked whether an error was present. A repeated the was detected on 46% of trials overall. On trials on which both instances of the were fixated, detection was still only 66%. A repeated noun was detected on 90% of trials, with no significant effect of eye movement patterns. Detecting an omitted the also proved difficult, with eye movement patterns having only a small effect. Readers frequently overlook function word errors even when their eye movements provide maximal opportunity for noticing such errors, but they notice content word repetitions regardless of eye movement patterns. We propose that readers overlook function word errors because they attribute the apparent error to noise in the eye movement control system.
The effect of interruption on the decision-making process
Previous research has shown that interruptions can lead to delays and errors on the interrupted task. Such research, however, seldom considers whether interruptions cause a change in how information is processed. The central question of this research is to determine whether an interruption causes a processing change. We investigate this question in a decision-making paradigm well-suited for examining the decision-making process. Participants are asked to select from a set of risky gambles, each with multiple possible stochastic outcomes. The information gathering process is measured using a mouse-click paradigm. Consistent with past work, interruptions did incur a cost: An interruption increased the time and the amount of information needed to make a decision. Furthermore, after an interruption, participants did seem to partially "restart" the task. Importantly, however, there was no evidence that the information gathering pattern was changed by an interruption. There was also no overall cost to the interruption in terms of choice outcome. These results are consistent with the idea that participants recall a subset of pre-interruption information, which was then incorporated into post-interruption processing.
The comparison process as an account of variation in the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects
Context effects are changes in preference that occur when alternatives are added to a choice set. Models that account for context effects typically assume a within-dimension comparison process; however, the presentation format of a choice set can influence comparison strategies. The present study jointly tests the influence of presentation format on the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects in a within-subjects design. Participants completed a series of choices designed to elicit each of the three context effects, with either a by-alternative or by-dimension format. Whereas the by-alternative format elicited a standard similarity effect, but null attraction and reverse compromise effects, the by-dimension format elicited standard attraction and compromise effects, but a reverse similarity effect. These novel results are supported by a re-analysis of the eye-tracking data collected by Noguchi and Stewart ( Cognition , 132 (1), 44–56, 2014 ) and demonstrate that flexibility in the comparison process should be incorporated into theories of preferential choice.
Estimating the proportion of guilty suspects and posterior probability of guilt in lineups using signal-detection models
Background The majority of eyewitness lineup studies are laboratory-based. How well the conclusions of these studies, including the relationship between confidence and accuracy, generalize to real-world police lineups is an open question. Signal detection theory (SDT) has emerged as a powerful framework for analyzing lineups that allows comparison of witnesses’ memory accuracy under different types of identification procedures. Because the guilt or innocence of a real-world suspect is generally not known, however, it is further unknown precisely how the identification of a suspect should change our belief in their guilt. The probability of guilt after the suspect has been identified, the posterior probability of guilt (PPG), can only be meaningfully estimated if we know the proportion of lineups that include a guilty suspect, P(guilty). Recent work used SDT to estimate P(guilty) on a single empirical data set that shared an important property with real-world data; that is, no information about the guilt or innocence of the suspects was provided. Here we test the ability of the SDT model to recover P(guilty) on a wide range of pre-existing empirical data from more than 10,000 identification decisions. We then use simulations of the SDT model to determine the conditions under which the model succeeds and, where applicable, why it fails. Results For both empirical and simulated studies, the model was able to accurately estimate P(guilty) when the lineups were fair (the guilty and innocent suspects did not stand out) and identifications of both suspects and fillers occurred with a range of confidence levels. Simulations showed that the model can accurately recover P(guilty) given data that matches the model assumptions. The model failed to accurately estimate P(guilty) under conditions that violated its assumptions; for example, when the effective size of the lineup was reduced, either because the fillers were selected to be poor matches to the suspect or because the innocent suspect was more familiar than the guilty suspect. The model also underestimated P(guilty) when a weapon was shown. Conclusions Depending on lineup quality, estimation of P(guilty) and, relatedly, PPG, from the SDT model can range from poor to excellent. These results highlight the need to carefully consider how the similarity relations between fillers and suspects influence identifications.
Strategies for Using a Spatial Method to Promote Active Learning of Probability Concepts
We developed and tested strategies for using spatial representations to help students understand core probability concepts, including the multiplication rule for computing a joint probability from a marginal and conditional probability, interpreting an odds value as the ratio of two probabilities, and Bayesian inference. The general goal of these strategies is to promote active learning by introducing concepts in an intuitive spatial format and then encouraging students to try to discover the explicit equations associated with the spatial representations. We assessed the viability of the proposed active-learning approach with two exercises that tested undergraduates’ ability to specify mathematical equations after learning to use the spatial solution method. A majority of students succeeded in independently discovering fundamental mathematical concepts underlying probabilistic reasoning. For example, in the second exercise, 76% of students correctly multiplied marginal and conditional probabilities to find joint probabilities, 86% correctly divided joint probabilities to get an odds value, and 69% did both to achieve full Bayesian inference. Thus, we conclude that the spatial method is an effective way to promote active learning of probability equations.
Beliefs and Bayesian reasoning
We examine whether judgments of posterior probabilities in Bayesian reasoning problems are affected by reasoners’ beliefs about corresponding real-world probabilities. In an internet-based task, participants were asked to determine the probability that a hypothesis is true ( posterior probability , e.g., a person has a disease, given a positive medical test) based on relevant probabilities (e.g., that any person has the disease and the true and false positive rates of the test). We varied whether the correct posterior probability was close to, or far from, independent intuitive estimates of the corresponding ‘real-world’ probability. Responses were substantially closer to the correct posterior when this value was close to the intuitive estimate. A model in which the response is a weighted sum of the intuitive estimate and an additive combination of the probabilities provides an excellent account of the results.