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"Crane, Tim"
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Aspects of Psychologism
Aspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view.
How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of mind and consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane believes, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. A central claim of Crane's psychologism is that intentionality--the \"aboutness\" or \"directedness\" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. In addition, Crane responds to proponents of materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the claim that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way.
Philosophers must take more seriously the findings of psychology and phenomenology, Crane contends. An investigation of mental phenomena from this broader viewpoint opens up philosophy to a more realistic and plausible account of the mind's nature.
eBook
The meaning of belief : religion from an atheist's point of view /
Contemporary debate about religion seems to be going nowhere. Atheists persist with their arguments, many plausible and some unanswerable, but these make no impact on religious believers. Defenders of religion find atheists equally unwilling to cede ground. The Meaning of Belief offers a way out of this stalemate. An atheist himself, Tim Crane writes that there is a fundamental flaw with most atheists' basic approach: religion is not what they think it is. Atheists tend to treat religion as a kind of primitive cosmology, as the sort of explanation of the universe that science offers. They conclude that religious believers are irrational, superstitious, and bigoted. But this view of religion is almost entirely inaccurate. Crane offers an alternative account based on two ideas. The first is the idea of a religious impulse: the sense people have of something transcending the world of ordinary experience, even if it cannot be explicitly articulated. The second is the idea of identification: the fact that religion involves belonging to a specific social group and participating in practices that reinforce the bonds of belonging. Once these ideas are properly understood, the inadequacy of atheists' conventional conception of religion emerges. The Meaning of Belief does not assess the truth or falsehood of religion. Rather, it looks at the meaning of religious belief and offers a way of understanding it that both makes sense of current debate and also suggests what more intellectually responsible and practically effective attitudes atheists might take to the phenomenon of religion.-- Provided by publisher
Book
Aspects of Psychologism
Aspects of Psychologismis a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view. How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane contends, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. Crane's claim is that intentionality--the \"aboutness\" or \"directedness\" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. He criticizes materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the position that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way, opening up philosophy to a more realistic account of the mind's nature.
eBook
الذهن الآلة : مقدمة فلسفية للأذهان والآلات والتمثيل الذهني
العقل .. أو بالاحرى الذهن، قوة فريدة كامنة وفاعلة فى دماغ الإنسان، جعلته تاج الخليقة وبطل الرواية الكونية .. فما كنهها ؟ ما طبيعتها ؟ ما مجراها ؟ ما التفكير ؟ كيف يستطيع الذهن البشرى أن يتمثل العالم الخارجي ؟ وهل هو نوع من الآلات ؟ هذه أسئلة تبحثها فلسفة الذهن التي ترسمت واستقلت مؤخراً كفلسفة أولى بحق، أصلها ثابت فى الأسس المنطقية، وفروعها في السماء تتوغل في آفاق المعرفة واللغة والميتافيزيقا والمنطلقات السيكولوجية والعصبية .. ثم أصبح الذهن من ناحية والحاسوب من ناحية أخرى يمثلان معاً إشكالية فلسفية ملحة لا تنفصم عراها، وهذا كتاب تمهيدى شامل ذائع الصيت، يصحبنا فى رحلة ممتعة تستكشف أبعاد فلسفة الذهن التى يفرضها فرضاً عصر الحاسوب وثورة المعلومات والاتصالات.
Book
Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?
It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i. e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content.
Journal Article
الذهن الآلة : مقدمة فلسفية للأذهان والآلات والتمثيل الذهني
هذا كتاب (الذهن الالة) تمهيدى شامل ذائع الصيت، يصحبنا فى رحلة ممتعة تستكشف أبعاد فلسفة الذهن التى يفرضها فرضا عصر الحاسوب وثورة المعلومات والاتصالات ؛ لعقل .. أو بالاحرى الذهن، قوة فريدة كامنة وفاعلة فى دماغ الإنسان، جعلته تاج الخليقة وبطل الرواية الكونية .. فما كنهها ؟ ما طبيعتها ؟ ما مجراها ؟ ما التفكير ؟ كيف يستطيع الذهن البشرى أن يتمثل العالم الخارجي ؟ وهل هو نوع من الآلات ؟ هذه أسئلة تبحثها فلسفة الذهن التي ترسمت واستقلت مؤخرا كفلسفة أولى بحق، أصلها ثابت فى الأسس المنطقية، وفروعها فى السماء تتوغل فى آفاق المعرفة واللغة والميتافيزيقا والمنطلقات السيكولوجية والعصبية .. ثم أصبح الذهن من ناحية والحاسوب من ناحية أخرى يمثلان معا إشكالية فلسفية ملحة لا تنفصم عراها.
Book
I—The Presidential Address
What is the relationship between unconscious and conscious intentionality? Contemporary philosophy of mind treats the contents of conscious intentional mental states as the same kind of thing as the contents of unconscious mental states. According to the standard view that beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes, for example, the contents of these states are propositions, whether or not the states are conscious or unconscious. I dispute this way of thinking of conscious and unconscious content, and propose an alternative, which helps to explain why the various mental things that are called unconscious deserve that label.
Journal Article
Sainsbury on Thinking about an Object (Sainsbury sobre pensar acerca de un objeto)
R.M. Sainsbury's account of reference has many compelling and attractive features. But it has the undesirable consequence that sentences of the form \"x is thinking about y\" can never be true when y is replaced by a non-referring term. Of the two obvious ways to deal with this problem within Sainsbury's framework, I reject one (the analysis of thinking about as a propositional attitude) and endorse the other (treating \"thinks about\" as akin to an intensional transitive verb). This endorsement is also within the spirit of Sainsbury's account of reference. /// La explicación que ofrece R.M. Sainsbury de la referencia tiene muchas características convincentes y atractivas, pero tiene la consecuencia indeseable de que oraciones de la forma \"x está pensando acerca de y\" nunca pueden ser verdaderas cuando se reemplaza y con un término no referencial. De las dos maneras obvias de tratar este problema dentro del marco teórico de Sainsbury, rechazo una (el análisis de pensar acerca de como una actitud proposicional) y acepto la otra (que trata \"pensar acerca de\" como semejante a un verbo intensional transitivo). Aceptar esta última también cae dentro del espíritu de la explicación de la referencia ofrecida por Sainsbury.
Journal Article
Philosophy, Logic, Science, History
Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of \"normal science.\"
Journal Article