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\"Descartes' enormously influential Meditations seeks to prove a number of theses: that God is a necessary existent; that our minds are equipped to track truth and avoid error; that the external world exists and provides us with information to preserve our embodiment; and that minds are immaterial substances. The work is a treasure-trove of views and arguments, but there are controversies about the details of the arguments and about how we are supposed to unpack the views themselves. This Companion offers a rich collection of new perspectives on the Meditations, showing how the work is structured literally as a meditation and how it fits into Descartes' larger philosophical system. Topics include Descartes' views on philosophical method, knowledge, scepticism, God, the nature of mind, free will, and the differences between reflective and embodied life. The volume will be valuable to those studying Descartes and early modern philosophy more generally\"-- Provided by publisher.

There is reason to believe – and reason to think that Descartes believes – that clear and distinct perceptions are not easy to come by. Indeed, much of Descartes’ corpus is a lamentation on the obstacles that are posed by embodiment and on the efforts that are required to work around it. So long as we are attached to a body, sensory distractions can keep us from having clear and distinct perceptions; they can also divert our attention from a clear and distinct perception that is underway. A seeming countercurrent in Descartes’ epistemology is the view that in order to really know something we must not only have clearly and distinctly perceived it, but we must also have a clear and distinct perception of divine veracity by which to block the hyperbolic worry that our minds might be deceived about matters that are most evident to us. Descartes holds that it is possible for a human mind to converge on truths that are wholly indubitable and “stable and likely to last”, though his views on embodiment suggest that nothing could ever be grasped quite so well. This paper argues that the Cartesian method for seeing hyperbolic doubt as an unmotivated confusion is not to have a clear and distinct perception of divine veracity ready at hand but to acquire an embodied habit of telling when a proposal (like hyperbolic doubt) is confused on its face. Il y a des raisons de croire - et de penser que Descartes croit - que des perceptions claires et distinctes ne sont pas faciles à trouver. En effet, une grande partie du corpus de Descartes est une lamentation sur les obstacles posés par l’incorporation et sur les efforts nécessaires pour la contourner. Tant que nous sommes attachés à un corps, les distractions sensorielles peuvent nous empêcher d'avoir des perceptions claires et distinctes ; ils peuvent également détourner notre attention d'une perception claire et distincte en cours. L’épistémologie de Descartes semble renfermer un contrepoids : il faut, pour connaître réellement quelque chose, non seulement l’avoir clairement et distinctement perçue, mais aussi avoir une perception claire et distincte de la véracité divine permettant de bloquer l’inquiétude hyperbolique que nos esprits puissent être trompés sur les sujets les plus évidents pour nous. Descartes soutient qu'il est possible qu'un esprit humain converge vers des vérités absolument indubitables et « stables et susceptibles de durer », bien que ses vues sur l'incorporation suggèrent que rien ne pourrait être aussi bien compris. Cet article soutient que la méthode cartésienne consistant à considérer le doute hyperbolique comme une confusion non motivée ne consiste pas à avoir immédiatement sous les yeux une perception claire et distincte de la véracité divine, mais à acquérir l’habitude incorporée de dire quand une proposition (comme le doute hyperbolique) présente une face confuse.

Il y a des raisons de croire - et de penser que Descartes croit - que des perceptions claires et distinctes ne sont pas faciles à trouver. En effet, une grande partie du corpus de Descartes est une lamentation sur les obstacles posés par l’incorporation et sur les efforts nécessaires pour la contourner. Tant que nous sommes attachés à un corps, les distractions sensorielles peuvent nous empêcher d'avoir des perceptions claires et distinctes ; ils peuvent également détourner notre attention d'une perception claire et distincte en cours. L’épistémologie de Descartes semble renfermer un contrepoids : il faut, pour connaître réellement quelque chose, non seulement l’avoir clairement et distinctement perçue, mais aussi avoir une perception claire et distincte de la véracité divine permettant de bloquer l’inquiétude hyperbolique que nos esprits puissent être trompés sur les sujets les plus évidents pour nous. Descartes soutient qu'il est possible qu'un esprit humain converge vers des vérités absolument indubitables et « stables et susceptibles de durer », bien que ses vues sur l'incorporation suggèrent que rien ne pourrait être aussi bien compris. Cet article soutient que la méthode cartésienne consistant à considérer le doute hyperbolique comme une confusion non motivée ne consiste pas à avoir immédiatement sous les yeux une perception claire et distincte de la véracité divine, mais à acquérir l’habitude incorporée de dire quand une proposition (comme le doute hyperbolique) présente une face confuse. There is reason to believe – and reason to think that Descartes believes – that clear and distinct perceptions are not easy to come by. Indeed, much of Descartes’ corpus is a lamentation on the obstacles that are posed by embodiment and on the efforts that are required to work around it. So long as we are attached to a body, sensory distractions can keep us from having clear and distinct perceptions; they can also divert our attention from a clear and distinct perception that is underway. A seeming countercurrent in Descartes’ epistemology is the view that in order to really know something we must not only have clearly and distinctly perceived it, but we must also have a clear and distinct perception of divine veracity by which to block the hyperbolic worry that our minds might be deceived about matters that are most evident to us. Descartes holds that it is possible for a human mind to converge on truths that are wholly indubitable and “stable and likely to last”, though his views on embodiment suggest that nothing could ever be grasped quite so well. This paper argues that the Cartesian method for seeing hyperbolic doubt as an unmotivated confusion is not to have a clear and distinct perception of divine veracity ready at hand but to acquire an embodied habit of telling when a proposal (like hyperbolic doubt) is confused on its face.

In a number a passages Descartes appears to insist that \"I am, I exist\" and its variants are wholly indubitable. These passages present an intractable problem of interpretation in the face of passages in which Descartes allows that any result is dubitable, \"I am, I exist\" included. Here I pull together a number of elements of Descartes' system to show how all of these passages hang together. If my analysis is correct, it tells us something about the perspective that Descartes himself thinks we should take in reading the \"Meditations\".

For Cudworth, God would be a drudge if He did each and every thing, and so the universe contains plastic natures. Malebranche argues that finite power is unintelligible and thus that God does do each and every thing. The supremacy of God is reflected in the range of His activity and also in the manner of His activity: He acts by general non-composite volitions. Malebranche (like Cudworth) is careful to adjust other aspects of his system to square with his position on causality, but his view that we are free and accountable for what we do will not be revised.

Descartes holds that God's will is immutable. It cannot be changed by God and, because He is supremely independent, it cannot be changed by anything else. Descartes' God acts by a single immutable will for all eternity, and there is no sense in which it is possible for Him to will or to have willed anything other than what He in fact wills. Passages in which Descartes might appear to be suggesting a different view are simply manifestations of his analytic method.

In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing is always a component of one's action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle's view to establish that there are actions in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility.