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Tyler Doggett considers the problem of Threat from Projectile and Threat to Bystander, I have claimed that Bystander and Projectile differ in the following way: If you don't kill Projectile, Projectile is going to kill you, and you are not liable to be killed. By contrast, Bystander is not going to kill you but is merely letting you die. This is just a difference between Projectile and Bystander. On its own, the fact that they differ fails to imply it is permissible to kill Projectile but not Bystander.However, when conjoined with this thesis it does imply that: It is permissible to kill X if and because (i) X is going to kill Victim and (ii) Victim is not liable to be killed.By design, the thesis only gives a sufficient condition for permissible, defensive killing. Yet it is still too strong.It falsely implies that it is permissible for Victim to kill X in a case in which X is going to kill Victim, Victim is not liable, but Victim could avoid being killed just by walking away.

Even if saving a few is a permissible outcome, it might be that doing so is permissible only after fliping a coin or holding a lottery. The alternative to a requirement to save the many needn't just be that one is permitted to out and save the few or many.

Leibniz believes that if there are corporeal substances, they have substantial forms, believes there are substantial forms, and believes there is a close connection between the first two claims. Why does he believe there is this close connection? This paper answers that question and draws out its bearing on the realism/idealism debate.

Imaginative immersion refers to a phenomenon in which one loses oneself in make-believe. Susanna Schellenberg says that the best explanation of imaginative immersion involves a radical revision to cognitive architecture. Instead of there being an attitude of belief and a distinct attitude of imagination, there should only be one attitude that represents a continuum between belief and imagination. We argue otherwise. Although imaginative immersion is a crucial data point for theorizing about the imagination, positing a continuum between belief and imagination is neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining the phenomenon. In addition, arguing against Schellenberg’s account reveals important but underappreciated lessons for theorizing about the imagination and for interpreting boxological representations of the mind.

We argue that beside belief, desire, and imagination, a novel mental state, i-desire, is needed to explain pretend behavior and emotional responses to things you are imagining.

We argue that beside belief, desire, and imagination, a novel mental state, i-desire, is needed to explain pretend behavior and emotional responses to things you are imagining.