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Measures of health care quality were compared between 246 hospitals that were acquired by another hospital or health system during 2009–2013 and 1986 control hospitals that were not acquired. A composite measure of patient-reported experience worsened slightly in acquired hospitals relative to control hospitals. There were no significant changes in mortality or readmission rates.

This paper examines hospital responses to changes in diagnosis-specific prices by exploiting a 1988 policy reform that generated large price changes for 43 percent of Medicare admissions. I find hospitals responded primarily by \"upcoding\" patients to diagnosis codes with the largest price increases. This response was particularly strong among far-profit hospitals. I find little evidence hospitals increased the volume of admissions differentially for diagnoses subject to the largest price increases, despite the financial incentive to do so. Neither did they increase intensity or quality of care in these diagnoses, suggesting hospitals do not compete for patients at the diagnosis level.

Falling Insulin Prices — What Just Happened?Recently, more than 100 years after insulin was developed, manufacturers announced price reductions for insulin products. Pressure to reduce prices had long been building, so why would they act now?

A Radical Treatment for Insulin PricingA private, nonprofit company recently announced that it intends to bypass the traditional supply chain and sell interchangeable biosimilar insulin products at substantially reduced prices.

To gauge the competitiveness of the group health insurance industry, I investigate whether health insurers charge higher premiums, ceteris paribus, to more profitable firms. Such \"direct price discrimination\" is feasible only in imperfectly competitive settings. Using a proprietary national database of health plans offered by a sample of large, multisite firms from 1998–2005, I find firms with positive profit shocks subsequently face higher premium growth, even for the same health plans. Moreover, within a given firm, those sites located in concentrated insurance markets experience the greatest premium increases. The findings suggest health care insurers are exercising market power in an increasing number of geographic markets.

The hospital industry has consolidated substantially during the past two decades and at an accelerated pace since 2010. Multiple studies have shown that hospital mergers have led to higher prices for commercially insured patients, but research about effects on quality of care is limited. Using Medicare claims and Hospital Compare data from 2007 through 2016 on performance on four measures of quality of care (a composite of clinical-process measures, a composite of patient-experience measures, mortality, and the rate of readmission after discharge) and data on hospital mergers and acquisitions occurring from 2009 through 2013, we conducted difference-in-differences analyses comparing changes in the performance of acquired hospitals from the time before acquisition to the time after acquisition with concurrent changes for control hospitals that did not have a change in ownership. The study sample included 246 acquired hospitals and 1986 control hospitals. Being acquired was associated with a modest differential decline in performance on the patient-experience measure (adjusted differential change, -0.17 SD; 95% confidence interval [CI], -0.26 to -0.07; P = 0.002; the change was analogous to a fall from the 50th to the 41st percentile) and no significant differential change in 30-day readmission rates (-0.10 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.53 to 0.34; P = 0.72) or in 30-day mortality (-0.03 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.20 to 0.14; P = 0.72). Acquired hospitals had a significant differential improvement in performance on the clinical-process measure (0.22 SD; 95% CI, 0.05 to 0.38; P = 0.03), but this could not be attributed conclusively to a change in ownership because differential improvement occurred before acquisition. Hospital acquisition by another hospital or hospital system was associated with modestly worse patient experiences and no significant changes in readmission or mortality rates. Effects on process measures of quality were inconclusive. (Funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.).

There is abundant literature on efforts to reduce opioid prescriptions and misuse, but comparatively little on the treatment provided to people with opioid use disorder (OUD). Using claims data representing 12-15 million nonelderly adults covered through commercial group insurance during the period 2008-17, we explored rates of OUD diagnoses, treatment patterns, and spending. We found three key patterns: The rate of diagnosed OUD nearly doubled during 2008-17, and the distribution has shifted toward older age groups; the likelihood that diagnosed patients will receive any treatment has declined, particularly among those ages forty-five and older, because of a reduction in the use of medication-assisted treatment (MAT) and despite clinical evidence demonstrating its efficacy; and treatment spending is lower for patients who choose MAT. These patterns suggest that policies supporting the use of MAT are critical to addressing the undertreatment of OUD among the commercially insured and that further research to assess the cost-effectiveness of treatment with versus without medication is needed.

Medicare's Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) has been credited with lowering risk-adjusted readmission rates for targeted conditions at general acute care hospitals. However, these reductions appear to be illusory or overstated. This is because a concurrent change in electronic transaction standards allowed hospitals to document a larger number of diagnoses per claim, which had the effect of reducing risk-adjusted patient readmission rates. Prior studies of the HRRP relied upon control groups' having lower baseline readmission rates, which could falsely create the appearance that readmission rates are changing more in the treatment than in the control group. Accounting for the revised standards reduced the decline in risk-adjusted readmission rates for targeted conditions by 48 percent. After further adjusting for differences in pre-HRRP readmission rates across samples, we found that declines for targeted conditions at general acute care hospitals were statistically indistinguishable from declines in two control samples. Either the HRRP had no effect on readmissions, or it led to a systemwide reduction in readmissions that was roughly half as large as prior estimates have suggested.

Anecdotal reports and systematic research highlight the prevalence of narrow-network plans on the Affordable Care Act's health insurance Marketplaces. At the same time, Marketplace premiums in the period 2014-16 were much lower than projected by the Congressional Budget Office in 2009. Using detailed data on the breadth of both hospital and physician networks, we studied the prevalence of narrow networks and quantified the association between network breadth and premiums. Controlling for many potentially confounding factors, we found that a plan with narrow physician and hospital networks was 16 percent cheaper than a plan with broad networks for both, and that narrowing the breadth of just one type of network was associated with a 6-9 percent decrease in premiums. Narrow-network plans also have a sizable impact on federal outlays, as they depress the premium of the second-lowest-price silver plan, to which subsidy amounts are linked. Holding all else constant, we estimate that federal subsidies would have been 10.8 percent higher in 2014 had Marketplaces required all plans to offer broad provider networks. Narrow networks are a promising source of potential savings for other segments of the commercial insurance market.

The proposed $70 billion deal between CVS and Aetna would be a vertical merger that could heighten competition. By offering a new value proposition, the new company would aim to stay relevant despite encroachment by e-tailers and reduce total spending for care.