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Many households in low- and middle-income countries cook with inefficient biomass-burning stoves, which cause high levels of household air pollution and threaten long-term health. Although clean stoves and fuels are available, uptake and consistent use has been low. Using observations and in-depth interviews, we assessed the attitudes, preferences, and beliefs about traditional versus liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) stoves in rural Puno, Peru. A total of 31 in-depth interviews were conducted with primary cooks and their families, health workers, community leaders, and improved stove contractors. Six in-home observations of meal preparation were also conducted. Six major barriers to consistent use of clean stoves were identified: (1) perceived differences in food taste and nutrition by stove type; (2) cooking niches filled by different stoves; (3) social norms related to cooking practices; (4) safety concerns; (5) comparative costs of using different stoves; and (6) lack of awareness and concern about long-term health risks. These findings suggest that to successfully reduce household air pollution, clean cooking programs and policies must consider the many factors influencing adoption beyond health, such as cost, taste, fears, and cultural traditions. These factors could be incorporated into community-based and national efforts to scale-up sustained and exclusive adoption of clean cooking.

To assess the extent of arsenic contamination of groundwater and surface water in Peru and, to evaluate the accuracy of the Arsenic Econo-Quick(™) (EQ) kit for measuring water arsenic concentrations in the field. Water samples were collected from 151 water sources in 12 districts of Peru, and arsenic concentrations were measured in the laboratory using inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry. The EQ field kit was validated by comparing a subset of 139 water samples analysed by laboratory measurements and the EQ kit. In 86% (96/111) of the groundwater samples, arsenic exceeded the 10 µg/l arsenic concentration guideline given by the World Health Organization (WHO) for drinking water. In 56% (62/111) of the samples, it exceeded the Bangladeshi threshold of 50 µg/l; the mean concentration being 54.5 µg/l (range: 0.1-93.1). In the Juliaca and Caracoto districts, in 96% (27/28) of groundwater samples arsenic was above the WHO guideline; and in water samples collected from the section of the Rímac river running through Lima, all had arsenic concentrations exceeding the WHO limit. When validated against laboratory values, the EQ kit correctly identified arsenic contamination relative to the guideline in 95% (106/111) of groundwater and in 68% (19/28) of surface water samples. In several districts of Peru, drinking water shows widespread arsenic contamination, exceeding the WHO arsenic guideline. This poses a public health threat requiring further investigation and action. For groundwater samples, the EQ kit performed well relative to the WHO arsenic limit and therefore could provide a vital tool for water arsenic surveillance.

We study beliefs and actions in a repeated normal-form game. Using a level- k model of limited strategic reasoning and allowing for other-regarding preferences, we classify action and belief choices with regard to their strategic sophistication and study their development over time. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure, feedback about actions in the previous period and random matching, we run treatments (i) with fixed matching, (ii) without information about the other player’s payoffs, and (iii) without feedback about previous play. In all treatments with feedback, we observe more strategic play (increasing by 15 percent) and higher-level beliefs (increasing by 18 percent) over time. Without feedback, neither beliefs nor actions reach significantly higher levels of reasoning (with increases of 2 percentage points for actions and 6 percentage points for beliefs). The levels of reasoning reflected in actions and beliefs are highly consistent, but less so for types with lower levels of reasoning.

Subjective beliefs are crucial for economic inference, yet behavior can challenge the elicitation. We propose that belief elicitation should be incentive compatible not only theoretically but also in a de facto behavioral sense. To demonstrate, we show that the binarized scoring rule, a state-of-the-art elicitation, violates two weak conditions for behavioral incentive compatibility: (i) within the elicitation, information on the incentives increases deviations from truthful reporting; and (ii) in a pure choice over the set of incentives, most deviate from the theorized maximizer. Moreover, we document that deviations are systematic and center-biased, and that the elicited beliefs substantially distort inference.

Cardiovascular disease is the leading cause of mortality following kidney transplantation. Heart failure affects 17–21% of patients with chronic kidney disease and increases along with time receiving dialysis. The Seattle Heart Failure Model (SHFM) is a validated mortality risk model for heart failure patients that incorporates clinical, therapeutic, and laboratory parameters but does not include measures of kidney function. We applied the SHFM to patients with end-stage renal disease (ESRD) who were being evaluated for kidney transplantation to determine if the model was associated with post-transplant mortality. This retrospective single-center study analyzed survival among 360 adult deceased-donor kidney transplant recipients. Cox regression was used to model post-transplant patient survival. Our findings indicated that a 1.0-point increase in the adapted SHFM score was significantly associated with post-transplant mortality (HR 1.76, 95% CI = 1.10–2.83, p = 0.02), independently of the Kidney Donor Profile Index and Estimated Post-Transplant Survival. Individual covariates of the SHFM were evaluated in univariate analyses, and age, sodium, cholesterol, and lymphocyte count were significantly related to mortality. This study provides preliminary evidence that an adapted SHFM score could be a useful tool in evaluating mortality risk post-transplant in patients with ESRD.

Incentive compatibility is core to mechanism design. The success of auctions, matching algorithms, and voting systems all hinge on the ability to select incentives that make it in the individual's interest to reveal their type. But how do we test whether a mechanism that is designed to be incentive compatible is actually so in practice, particularly when faced with boundedly rational agents with nonstandard preferences? We review the many experimental tests that have been designed to assess behavioral incentive compatibility, separating them into two categories: indirect tests that evaluate behavior within the mechanism, and direct tests that assess how participants respond to the mechanism's incentives. Using belief elicitation as a running example, we show that the most popular elicitations are not behaviorally incentive compatible. In fact, the incentives used under these elicitations discourage rather than encourage truthful revelation.

With the help of a simple model, we show that the hindsight bias can lead to inefficient delegation decisions. This prediction is tested experimentally. In an online experiment that was conducted during the FIFA World Cup 2010, participants were asked to predict a number of outcomes of the ongoing World Cup and had to recall their assessments after the outcomes had been realized. Their answers were used to construct individual measures of the hindsight bias. The participants also had to make choices in a delegation game. Our data confirm that hindsight-biased subjects more frequently fail to delegate optimally than subjects whom we have classified as not hindsight biased.

With the help of a simple model, we show that the hindsight bias can lead to inefficient delegation decisions. This prediction is tested experimentally. In an online experiment that was conducted during the FIFA World Cup 2010, participants were asked to predict a number of outcomes of the ongoing World Cup and had to recall their assessments after the outcomes had been realized. Their answers were used to construct individual measures of the hindsight bias. The participants also had to make choices in a delegation game. Our data confirm that hindsight-biased subjects more frequently fail to delegate optimally than subjects whom we have classified as not hindsight biased. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2087 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, judgment and decision making .

Metodos Se recogieron muestras de agua de 151 suministros de agua en 12 distritos de Peru, y se midieron las concentraciones de arsenico en el laboratorio por medio de una espectrometrfa de masas de plasma con acoplamiento inductivo. El kit de campo EQ se valido mediante la comparacion de un subconjunto de 139 muestras de agua analizadas por mediciones de laboratorio y el kit EQ.

We study truth telling within the current state-of-the-art mechanism for belief elicitation and examine how information on incentives affects reports on a known objective prior. We find that transparent information on incentives gives rise to error rates in excess of 40 percent, and that only 15 percent of participants consistently report the truth. False reports are conservative and appear to result from a biased perception of the BSR incentives. While attempts to debias are somewhat successful, the highest degree of truth telling occurs when information on quantitative incentives is withheld. Perversely the mechanism’s incentives are shown to decrease truthful reporting.