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This essay seeks to make a contribution to scholarship on the relation between Canguilhem and Foucault through the concept of milieu. It argues that Canguilhem's work on the milieu was inspired by Uexkull and became the eventual means by which Foucault was able to theorize biopower. For both Foucault and Canguilhem, culture is to be understood as an extension of biology, constituting a ＂semantic milieu.＂ Though indebted to Canguilhem in this respect, Foucault's theorization of biopower breaks with his understanding of society. The essay exemplifies this via a discussion of regulation and cybernetics, where Canguilhem is found to oppose the very possibility of a cybernetic society and Foucault is said to allow for one via his notion of governmentality. While Canguilhem turns out to be committed to a more humanist ideal of free will, in his theorization of biopower and governmentality, Foucault turns out to be more interested in analyzing the way freedom is deployed in liberal societies as an instrument of control.

Abstract This article explores the relation between biological life and political life, placing it in the context of the ancient Greek distinction between the life of the home (the oikos) and the realm of politics (the polis). In contrast with the oikos, the life of the polis was characterized by attempts to exclude from its sphere both the constraints of necessity that oblige human action to conform to the exigencies of survival as well as the violence that accompanies this pursuit. Although this exclusion has never been successful, the question of how to achieve it lies at the heart of the oldest philosophical reflections on politics and, in a more concealed fashion, remains central to our political concerns today. Invoking the work of Giorgio Agamben, this article explores the earliest discussions concerning the question \"what is political life?\" to show why so much depends upon how we answer this question.

DeCaroli offers a presentation of Giorgio Agamben's analysis of the example. De Caroli then expands his discussion of the exemplary by tracing its usage back through 18th-century aesthetics, notably to the writings of Renaissance scholar Guarino da Verona. DeCaroli shows how the example has occupied a critical position within Western thought, particularly with respect to historical and aesthetic analysis.

Hannah Arendt's death in December of 1975 cut short the third volume of her book The Life of the Mind. However, a series of thirteen lectures on Kant given at the New School for Social Research mirrored the first two published volumes of The Life of the Mind entitled \"Thinking\" & \"Willing.\" Since the third volume of Arendt's work was to be entitled \"Judging,\" the author takes Arendt's lectures on judgement to form a third installment to The Life of the Mind. The author finds that Arendt's analysis of Kant's discussion of exemplarity & judgment can be used to form a concrete political philosophy that stands on its own. Adapted from the source document.

[...]criminal justice has focused almost exclusively on the unmitigated responsibility of the offender, resulting in a harsher punishments and a deepening disconnection from those who break the law, together with the belief that society has no role to play in working toward their future success.

By the end of the eighteenth century philosophy had generally accepted aesthetics and history as legitimate spheres of inquiry and in both cases, though perhaps more definitively in the case of aesthetics, had established them as philosophical sub-disciplines. My research is focused on this point of transition and concerns the complex influence that aesthetic and historical questions had on the discipline of philosophy. I argue that the role of the example is of particular importance here. Be it in the form of a beautiful object or an historical event, the example, which is neither a concept nor a precept, is attributed a normative status. It is this normative dimension of the example which lies at the heart of philosophy's engagement with aesthetics and history insofar as it is a critical, though little discussed, component of judgments of taste. I argue that the example (in German Bei-spiel, that which “plays-beside”, and in Greek para-deigma, that which “shows-beside”) manifests a complex relationship to itself insofar as that which is exemplary represents both the form of a rule, i.e., that which is to be complied with, and an instance of adherence to that rule, ie., that which has already thoroughly complied. This dual aspect of the example is not only referenced by Kant in both his writings on aesthetics and history, but surfaces repeatedly in eighteenth-century theories of artistic beauty, taste and education where it is supplemented by the concept of imitation which is invoked as the principle means of achieving beauty in art. Here too there is a deeply related and somewhat ambiguous relationship at work, as illustrated in Johann Winckelmann's seemingly contradictory statement, “The only way for us to become great, or, if this be possible, inimitable [unnachahmlich], is to imitate the ancients [die Nachahmung der Alten].” I argue that both of these terms—example and imitation—touch upon the same philosophical problem, the problem of reconciling the singularity of discrete presentations with the universality of an ideal form or rule. The inexorably empirical aspect of both aesthetics and historiography, i.e., their engagement with irreducibly singular objects or events, draws this problem to the surface. My project sets out to describe the scope of this problem as in appears in selected texts on philosophical aesthetics and art history during the latter half of the eighteenth century, specifically in the writings of Winckelmann, Goethe, Herder, Kant and Hegel.