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In July 1995, the Bosnian Serb Army commanded by General Ratko Mladic attacked the enclave of Srebrenica, a UN \"safe area\" since 1993, and massacred about 8,000 Bosniac men. While the responsibility for the massacre itself lays clearly with the Serb political and military leadership, the question of the responsibility of various international organizations and national authorities for the fall of the enclave is still passionately discussed, and has given rise to various rumors and conspiracy theories. Follow-up investigations by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and by several commissions have dissipated most of these rumors and contributed to a better knowledge of the Srebrenica events and the part played by the main local and international actors. This volume represents the first systematic, comparative analysis of those investigations. It brings together analyses from both the external standpoint of academics and the inside perspective of various professionals who participated directly in the inquiries, including police officers, members of parliament, high-ranking civil servants, and other experts. Evaluating how institutions establish facts and ascribe responsibilities, this volume presents a historiographical and epistemological reflection on the very possibility of writing a history of the present time.

Over recent years, a number of legal decisions have been taken that represent real novelties in the field. They address state liability towards foreigners in a realm where immunity has long prevailed. Dutch courts have condemned the Dutch state for failure to protect Bosniacs after the fall of the enclave of Srebrenica in 1995. The novelty of these court decisions is most apparent when they are compared to the previous investigations and reports on the fall of the Srebrenica enclave, which had the intended or de facto effect of leaving aside state liability. This article focuses on this comparison. The decisions of the Dutch court represent a change with regard to a trend in which collective responsibility was reduced to a scarecrow argument, where state liability for genocide was limited to the obligation to address criminal responsibility, and where co-agency was a shield preventing the attribution of state responsibility. Not only do these court decisions sanction state liability, they also address the victims and even grant them reparations.

What would a European scale for international (criminal) justice consist of? The relevance of this question is far from obvious, since Anglophone scholars ignore it as much as research on the European Union overestimates it. According to the latter, this scale would take on significance through a policy of conditionality that leads to progress in relation to Europe and its ideals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) being a stepping stone in this process. However, this conception covers up the divisions, conflicts, and paradoxes that permeate the reception of this justice and internal tensions. The very idea of a European scale of justice is analyzed through the reception of the ICTY in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Both books deal with the effects of international criminal justice and, more broadly, transitional justice procedures in the former Yugoslavia. On pessimism (Jelena Subotic) and optimism (Lara Nettelfield) any relative, they are complementary in their testimonials and by their qualities and weaknesses. Exceeding a first wave of publications considered transitional justice on its policy statements rather than on its achievements, they jointly analyze the ownership, dissemination and local practices with international standards. Finally, both demanding greater contextualization and a new approach to assessment criteria of this justice that often by excess, have created the disproportionate expectations in respect of him and have overestimated the effects, harmful or beneficial. Adapted from the source document.

Alors que le Tribunal de Nuremberg n’avait pas traité spécifiquement des crimes sexuels ou du genre des victimes, depuis une vingtaine d’années, l’évolution du droit international, notamment pénal, a été marquée par une prise en compte de la dimension sexuée des crimes de guerre, des crimes contre l’humanité et des génocides. Les tribunaux pénaux internationaux pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY), celui pour le Rwanda (TPIR) et la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) ont porté une attention particulière aux violences sexuelles et aux femmes victimes de guerre. Pourtant les femmes ne sont pas dans une simple relation binaire aux lois de la guerre, en position de victimes (potentielles) ou d’actrices (moins probables) de leurs violations. Elles peuvent avoir d’autres rôles d’actrices de leur élaboration ou application, à titre d’enquêtrices, procureures, avocates ou juges, témoins ou expertes. Cet état de la recherche considérera d’abord les tribunaux internationaux comme producteur et médium de la recherche sur les femmes et les lois de la guerre. Il envisagera ensuite la diversité des figures féminines, sujets ou objets de ce droit et de cette justice : juristes, criminelles, victimes ou combattantes. Significativement, des questionnements semblables se retrouvent dans ces différents cas : la « féminité » est-elle un facteur explicatif spécifique ou finalement secondaire, un stéréotype à déconstruire ? Y a-t-il une continuité entre temps de paix et temps de guerre dans le rapport des femmes à la violence criminelle ? La limitation des rôles féminins est-elle le produit d’un droit international étatique ou l’expression plus large d’une domination masculine dans les pratiques guerrières ? While the Nuremberg Tribunal did not deal specifically with sex crimes or the gender of victims, over the last twenty years, the evolution of international law, especially regarding criminal offences, has been characterized by a consideration of the gendered dimension of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have paid particular attention to sexual violence and women victims of war. Yet women are not in a simple binary relationship to the laws of war, i.e. as (potential) victims, or (less likely) agents of their violations. They may play other roles in promoting their elaboration or application, as investigators, prosecutors, defense lawyers or judges, witnesses or experts. This overview of current research will first consider international tribunals as both producer and medium of research on women and the laws of war. It will then consider the diversity of female figures as subjects or objects of these laws and justice, i.e. lawyers, criminals, victims and combatants. Similar questions can be found in these different cases : is “femininity” a specific explanatory factor, or in the end a secondary one, a stereotype to be deconstructed? Is there continuity between peacetime and wartime in the relationship of women to violence? Is the limitation of women's roles the product of international law or the expression of a wider male domination in the waging of wars?

This article analyses how the ICTY has changed the way we talk about the war in the former Yugoslavia and about mass crimes. The often alleged Nuremberg legacy is misleading for assessing the ICTY’s significance, both in historiographical and in political terms. First, it led to disproportionate expectations towards the Hague Tribunal. Those expectations were all the greater since the ICTY ended up being in charge of settling political and international responsibility, even though it does not address such responsibilities. The expectation that the ICTY also should lead to liberal democracy is also misleading and neglects the Yugoslav European legacy in terms of international law and social practices. This Yugoslav legacy can be observed at the municipal level, which is particularly significant to assess the ICTY effects and significance: criminals and victims are mainly defined at this level. The Hague tribunal has been able to move away from the Nuremberg model by paying attention to local and regional factors in a less centralized vision of the organization of mass crimes. International justice can become a norm and mediation among members of the same municipality. Thus, international law may be that of ordinary people, governing relations between the citizen and the foreigner, but also between citizens of the same country. International law can be a domestic standard and point of reference. This is what is called here the “justice of peoples”.