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result(s) for
"Diamantaras, Dimitrios"
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Generic Existence of Rational Expectations Lindahl Equilibria
This paper develops several versions of a concept of Rational Expectations Lindahl Equilibrium for economies with private and public goods and linear production, and proves the generic existence of fully revealing Rational Expectations Lindahl Equilibria using only the prices of the private goods as signals. This feature leads to the generic coincidence of all the versions of the equilibrium concept.
Journal Article
Generic Existence of Rational Expectations Lindahl Equilbria
The notion of Rational Expectations Lindahl Equilibrium is examined. It is shown that several possible forms of this concept are equivalent in a domain of public good economies in which fully revealing Rational Expectations Lindahl Equilibria exist. The most restrictive assumption employed is perhaps that the production unit is fully informed. This assumption introduces an undesirable asymmetry of information between the consumption and the production sector; however, its relaxation substantially complicates the analysis. In addition, the relaxation of this assumption is desirable independently of the presence of public goods in the economic model.
Journal Article
To Trade Or Not To Trade: Economies With A Variable Number Of Tradeables
We present a general equilibrium model that encompasses the endogenous selection and shadow-pricing of a set of tradeable commodities, with home-based and social production activities. In the model, a market system is a set of costly social institutions which embody the trade and production technologies available in the economy. Our equilibrium concept describes the pricing of market institutions, thus pricing the tradeability of a commodity. We obtain the existence and the decentralization of Pareto-efficient allocations. We discuss an example regarding the transition of a guild-based economy into a market-based economy.
Journal Article
On equity with public goods
Existence theorems for envy-free and efficient allocations are derived for economies with public goods. For economies with an arbitrary but finite number of private and public goods, an adaptation of the existence proof of Svensson for private good economies is used. For economies with one private and one public good, a case often studied in theory and applications, two more direct proofs are given, using different conditions and taking advantage of the particularly simple structure of the set of envy-free allocations in this case. These proofs are also shown to apply to the case of excludable public goods with congestion.
Journal Article
Platform Competition as Network Contestability
Recent research in industrial organisation has investigated the essential place that middlemen have in the networks that make up our global economy. In this paper we attempt to understand how such middlemen compete with each other through a game theoretic analysis using novel techniques from decision-making under ambiguity. We model a purposely abstract and reduced model of one middleman who pro- vides a two-sided platform, mediating surplus-creating interactions between two users. The middleman evaluates uncertain outcomes under positional ambiguity, taking into account the possibility of the emergence of an alternative middleman offering intermediary services to the two users. Surprisingly, we find many situations in which the middleman will purposely extract maximal gains from her position. Only if there is relatively low probability of devastating loss of business under competition, the middleman will adopt a more competitive attitude and extract less from her position.
Paper
The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
We extend the findings of Mas-Colell on valuation equilibria and the relationship of cost-share equilibria with the core. We allow for any finite number of private goods and a set of public projects without any structure. We show the two welfare theorems for valuation equilibrium, the inclusion of the set of cost-share equilibria in the core, and the nonequivalence of these two sets for an economy with a finite number of agents.
Journal Article
Linear cost sharing in economies with non-Samuelsonian public goods: Core equivalence
We consider an economy with non-Samuelsonian public goods and we focus on linear cost sharing. In a linear cost sharing equilibrium all agents in the economy optimize given a certain fixed cost share to be contributed towards the provision of public goods in the economy. Hence, each agent pays a certain fraction of the total establishment costs of public goods and these cost shares are common knowledge. We show that for a certain fixed contribution scheme the resulting linear cost share equilibria are equivalent to corresponding core allocations, in which the core is based on the integral of the individual cost shares. We also show that there is no equivalence of the Foley core with cost share equilibria, even in well-behaved large economies.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Journal Article