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What does woman mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex term or as a gender term. Recently, Jennifer Saul has put forward a contextualist view, according to which woman can have different meanings in different contexts. The main motivation this view seems to involve moral and political considerations, namely, that this view can do justice to the claims of trans women. Unfortunately, Saul argues, on further reflection the contextualist view fails to do justice to those moral and political claims that motivated the view in the first place. In this article I argue that there is a version of the contextualist view that can indeed capture those moral and political aims, and in addition, I use this case to illustrate an important and more general claim, namely, that moral and political considerations can be relevant to the descriptive project of finding out what certain politically significant terms actually mean.

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017).

Xyleborus sp beetles are types of ambrosia beetles invasive to the United States and recently also to Mexico. The beetle can carry a fungus responsible for the Laurel Wilt, a vascular lethal disease that can host over 300 tree species, including redbay and avocado. This problem has a great economic and environmental impact. Indeed, synthetic chemists have recently attempted to develop new neonicotinoids. This is also due to severe drug resistance to “classic” insecticides. In this research, a series of neonicotinoids analogs were synthesized, characterized, and evaluated against Xyleborus sp. Most of the target compounds showed good to excellent insecticidal activity. Generally, the cyclic compounds also showed better activity in comparison with open-chain compounds. Compounds R-13, 23, S-29, and 43 showed a mortality percent of up to 73% after 12 h of exposure. These results highlight the enantioenriched compounds with absolute R configuration. The docking results correlated with experimental data which showed both cation-π interactions in relation to the aromatic ring and hydrogen bonds between the search cavity 3C79 and the novel molecules. The results suggest that these sorts of interactions are responsible for high insecticidal activity.

The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the conceivability argument against physicalism. However, David Chalmers has recently presented a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy, and he has argued that no version of the strategy can succeed. In this paper, I examine the dilemma, and I argue that there is a way out of it. I conclude that Chalmers has not posed any serious problem for the phenomenal concept strategy to succeed in blocking the conceivability argument. In doing so, my aim is not only to show that Chalmers's argument has not refuted the phenomenal concept strategy, but also to clarify what any version of the strategy should achieve in order to be successful.

Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with another influential argument in philosophy of mind, namely, the actor argument against behaviourism, can help to show why recent objections to the zombie argument fail. In this note I want to argue that the zombie argument and the actor argument have important differences, and, because of that, Stoljar's objections to some recent critiques of the zombie argument are not successful.

In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson's defence of the a priori entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a priori entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as 'water covers 60% of the Earth surface', which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the paper I distinguish two versions of ascriptivism: reductive versus non-reductive ascriptivism. According to reductive ascriptivism, competent users of a concept have the ability to infer truths involving such concept from lower-level truths, whereas according to non-reductive ascriptivism, all that is required in order to be a competent user of a concept is to be able to infer truths involving that concept from other truths, which need not be lower-level truths. I argue, first, that the a priori entailment thesis is committed to reductive ascriptivism, and secondly, that reductive ascriptivism is problematic because it trivializes the notion of a priori knowledge. Therefore, I conclude that Chalmers and Jackson have not presented a convincing case for the claim that microphysical truths entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths a priori, especially when we understand this claim in the sense that is relevant for their argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness.

En este trabajo examino la cuestión de si la caracterización del fisicismo que se presupone en algunos importantes argumentos en su contra, a saber, los denominados argumentos de la concebibilidad, es o no una buena caracterización. Para ello, la comparo con algunas caracterizaciones alternativas, muestro cómo esta nueva caracterización puede resolver algunos problemas que sufren otras definiciones del fisicismo, y la defiendo de ciertas objeciones. La conclusión final es que cualquier argumento en contra del fisicismo caracterizado de esa manera constituirá también un argumento en contra del fisicismo tal y como lo concebimos intuitivamente. In this paper I examine the question of whether the characterization of physicalism that is presupposed by some influential anti-physicalist arguments, namely conceivability arguments, is a good characterization of physicalism or not. I compare this characterization with some alternatives, showing how it can overcome certain problems, and defend it against several objections. I conclude that any arguments against physicalism characterized in this way are genuine arguments against physicalism, as intuitively conceived.

(1) Finite Element Analysis (FEA) has become a common method when studying fossils. As computer systems and tools advance, new software like Fossils is developed to make FE analyses more efficient. (2) However, the preparation of input data for analysis remains time‐consuming. In particular, surface mesh cleaning and the selection of groups of nodes for the boundary conditions (muscle forces and prescribed displacements) usually require graphical programs that are either not well adapted to this task or require an expensive license. (3) To address this, we introduce BFEX (Blender Finite Element eXporter), a Blender add‐on that simplifies model creation for FEA with Fossils. (4) This approach helps streamline the entire process, making it more user‐friendly. We introduce BFEX, a Blender add‐on for building Finite Elements Analysis for Fossils software. This approach streamlines the process of creating and visualizing FE models.

In situ anionic homo- and copolymerization of caprolactam (CL) and laurolactam (LL) with sodium montmorillonite clay (NaMMT) was carried out using two different initiators, sodium caprolactamate (CLNa) and caprolactam magnesium bromide (CLMgBr). Degree of conversion and final molecular weight were used to assess the advancement and efficiency of the polymerization reaction and X-ray diffraction and electron microscopy were used to evaluate the sodium montmorillonite clay intercalation/exfoliation. The use of CLNa as initiator produced a higher conversion degree and molecular weight than the use of CLMgBr. Through DSC, it was observed that CLNa and CLMgBr tended to produce random and block copolymer structures, respectively, and either random or block, this eventually has an effect on the clay dispersion within the polymer matrix. In all cases, increasing the LL content produced a decrease in the conversion degree and in the molecular weight of the resulting polymer.

Are sexual orientations freely chosen? The idea that someone’s sexual orientation is not a choice is very influential in the mainstream LGBT political movement. But do we have good reasons to believe it is not a choice? Going against the orthodoxy, William Wilkerson has recently argued that sexual orientation is partly constituted by our interpretations of our own sexual desires, and we choose these interpretations, so sexual orientation is partly constituted by choice. In this paper I aim to examine the question of whether our interpretations of our own sexual desires are constitutive of our sexual orientations. I will argue that whereas Wilkerson’s argument for the claim that sexual orientations are in part constituted by our chosen interpretations of our sexual desires is not sound, there are good reasons for endorsing a weaker claim, namely, that there are different but equally apt descriptions of the same sexual desires, depending on which concepts we have.