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Societies are increasingly multicultural and diverse, consisting of members who migrated from various other countries. However, immigrants and ethnic minorities often face discrimination in the form of fewer opportunities for labor and housing, as well as limitations on interactions in other social domains. Using mock email accounts with typical native-sounding and foreign-sounding names, we contacted 23,020 amateur football clubs in 22 European countries, asking to participate in a training session. Response rates differed across countries and were, on average, about 10% lower for foreign-sounding names. The present field experiment reveals discrimination against ethnic minority groups, uncovering organizational deficiencies in a system trusted to foster social interactions.

This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network externalities. In our model, two platforms compete with each other via a contest to dominate a certain market. If one platform wins the contest, it can serve the market for a certain duration as a monopolistic platform. Our paper shows that platform firms can compensate for cost disadvantages with network effects. A head start (e.g., technological advantage) does not guarantee future success for platform firms. Network effects and cost efficiency are decisive for future success. Interestingly, higher costs of a platform can induce higher platform profits in our dynamic model. Moreover, we find that a platform’s size and profit are not necessarily positively correlated. Our model also provides new insights with respect to the underlying causes for the emergence of market dominance. The combination of technological carry-over and network effects can explain a long-lasting dominance of a platform that benefits from a head start. The necessary preconditions for this emergence are convex costs, small network effects and high carry-over.

This paper analyzes how investments in professional European football clubs affect the market value of Chinese corporations. Twelve acquisition cases with complete stock return data are identified between 2009 and 2017. Applying traditional financial event study methodology, it appears that Chinese corporations, on average, do not earn abnormal returns as a result of their investments in professional European football clubs. However, as exceptions to this finding, a few corporations show significant positive or negative abnormal returns. This study also hints at an association between the change in market value of acquiring corporations, the relative transaction size, and their industry relatedness. These findings have important implications for corporate and football managers, current stock holders, and future investors.

This paper analyzes how investments in professional European football clubs affect the market value of Chinese corporations. Twelve acquisition cases with complete stock return data are identified between 2009 and 2017. Applying traditional financial event study methodology, it appears that Chinese corporations, on average, do not earn abnormal returns as a result of their investments in professional European football clubs. However, as exceptions to this finding, a few corporations show significant positive or negative abnormal returns. This study also hints at an association between the change in market value of acquiring corporations, the relative transaction size, and their industry relat-edness. These findings have important implications for corporate and football managers, current stock holders, and future investors.

This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of subsidies on player salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and welfare. Within this model, fan demand depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent. The results show that if a large-market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance and own team winning percentage, club profits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the small-market club is subsidized, a small subsidy increases competitive balance and player salaries of both clubs.

This article develops a contest model to compare social welfare in homogeneous leagues in which all clubs maximize identical objective functions with mixed leagues in which clubs maximize different objective functions. We show that homogeneous leagues in which all clubs are profit maximizers dominate all other leagues. Mixed leagues in which small-market clubs are profit maximizers and large-market clubs are win maximizers (type-I mixed leagues) are dominated by all other leagues. From a welfare perspective, large-market clubs win too often in (purely) win-maximizing and type-I mixed leagues; whereas, small-market clubs win too many games in (purely) profit-maximizing leagues and in mixed leagues in which large-market clubs are profit maximizers and small-market clubs are win maximizers (type-II mixed leagues). These results have important policy implications: Social welfare will increase if clubs are reorganized from non-profit member associations to profit-maximizing corporations. Moreover, we show that revenue sharing decreases (increases) social welfare in mixed (homogeneous) leagues.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to understand and explain why some professional sports organizations outsource their sponsorship-related activities to sports marketing agencies, whereas others purposely retain these activities in-house. Design/methodology/approach The paper applies transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource-based view (RBV) to outsourcing of sports sponsorship activities. It examines the extent determinants descending from these theories influence the sourcing choice of professional sports organizations. Findings This paper argues that determinants derived from TCE and the RBV are useful to understand the factors likely to influence an outsourcing decision and to analyze which sponsorship-related activities are more or less likely to be outsourced. However, these determinants are insufficient to shed light on why sports organizations arrive at different conclusions about their internal and external environments. With recourse to contingency theory, the authors propose two additional contingencies that affect the sourcing decision: a sport organization’s size and its degree of professionalism. This integrative conceptual framework improves the understanding of sports sponsorship outsourcing, makes several propositions, and paves the way for future empirical research in sports sponsorship. Originality/value This is the first paper to apply classical theoretical concepts to outsourcing sports sponsorship activities. As a conceptual paper, it hopes to stimulate further research on outsourcing in sports sponsorship and on the relationship between sports organizations and sports marketing agencies.

This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league based on contest theory and studies the welfare effect of gate revenue sharing. It derives two counterintuitive results. First, it challenges the “invariance proposition” by showing that revenue sharing reduces competitive balance and thus produces a more unbalanced league. Second, the paper concludes that a lower degree of competitive balance compared with the noncooperative league equilibrium yields a higher level of social welfare and club profits. Combining both results, it concludes that gate revenue sharing increases social welfare and club profits in our model. (JEL L83)

This paper develops a model of a cooperative enterprise and compares it to a vertically separated market. In our model of a multi-stage production process, agents can acquire costly knowledge to decrease production costs. Our model shows that the cooperative acquires less non-generalizable knowledge than the market, but more generalizable knowledge if the large member in the cooperative receives a sufficiently large share of the cooperative's profits. Additionally, we derive that the cooperative generates larger aggregate surplus than the market if the influence of generalizable knowledge on production costs is large.

Why did financial keiretsu develop in Japan, but not in Germany and the United States? Why is bank intermediation more dominant in Germany and Japan than in the United States? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each system? Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany and the United States answers these and related questions. Helmut Dietl explains capital market intermediation, holding companies, multidivisional organizations, financial keiretsu, and LBO associations as organizational responses to capital market inefficiencies. Country-specific responses are described as a consequence of country-specific financial regulations. Each regulatory regime results in specific capital market inefficiencies. Comparative capital market and corporate data highlight the major strengths and weaknesses of each system. This book provides a comprehensive and innovative analysis of German, Japanese and U.S. regulations.