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Zoopolis offers a new agenda for the theory and practice of animal rights. Most animal rights theory focuses on the intrinsic capacities or interests of animals, and the moral status and moral rights that these intrinsic characteristics give rise to. Zoopolis shifts the debate from the real of moral theory and applied ethics to the realm of political theory, focusing on the relational obligations that arise from the varied ways that animals relate to human societies and institutions. Building on recent developments in the political theory of group-differentiated citizenship, Zoopolis introduces us to the genuine \"political animal.\" It argues that different types of animals stand in different relationships to human political communities. Domesticated animals should be seen as full members of human-animal mixed communities, participating in the cooperative project of shared citizenship. Wilderness animals, by contrast, form their own sovereign communities entitled to protection against colonization, invasion, domination, and other threats to self-determination. \"Liminal\" animals who are wild but live in the midst of human settlement (such as crows or raccoons) should be seen as \"denizens\", residents of our societies, but not fully included in rights and responsibilities of citizenship. To all of these animals we owe respect for their basic inviolable rights, but we inevitably and appropriately have very different relations with them, with different types of obligations. Humans and animals are inextricably bound in a complex web of relationships, and Zoopolis offers an original and profoundly affirmative vision of how to ground this complex web of relations on principles of justice and compassion.

For many years, the lives of animals used for research in Canadian universities have been hidden from public view due both to physical concealment (e.g., security procedures and impenetrable labs) and administrative concealment (non-disclosure of information). Their lives unfold out of sight both physically and discursively, unavailable to the Canadian public for ethical consideration and democratic oversight. Recently, in response to calls by the public to end this secrecy, Canadian universities and the Canadian Council on Animal Care have embraced the language of “transparency” and have begun releasing documentation about animal research practices and procedures. This paper argues that this new “transparency” acts as its own kind of concealment practice, obscuring and displacing meaningful information while constructing highly selective ways of seeing animals in science, and manufacturing acquiescence/consent on the part of the public.

An increasing number of theorists are challenging the idea that only humans can engage in politics and propose that humans must learn how to do politics with animals. But what does it mean to do politics with animals? We consider several recent developments at the frontiers of social inquiry that are relevant, including (1) proposals for the institutional representation of animals’ interests in human political decision-making processes; (2) growing ethological evidence for animals’ own capacities for language, culture, and collective decision-making; and (3) new theoretical accounts of political agency and community that emphasize its embodied, emplaced, and interdependent nature. Each illuminates potential futures for animal politics and for just human-animal relations.

Many theorists of the 'political turn' in animal rights theory emphasize the need for animals' interests to be considered in political decision-making processes, but deny that this requires self-representation and participation by animals themselves. I argue that participation by domesticated animals in co-authoring our shared world is indeed required, and explore two ways to proceed: 1) by enabling animal voice within the existing geography of human-animal roles and relationships; and 2) by freeing animals into a revitalized public commons ('animal agora') where citizens encounter one another in spontaneous, unpredictable encounters in spaces that they can re-shape together.

For many people \"animal rights\" suggests campaigns against factory farms, vivisection or other aspects of our woeful treatment of animals. Zoopolis moves beyond this familiar terrain, focusing not on what we must stop doing to animals, but on how we can establish positive and just relationships with different types of animals.

Many commentators—including some animal rights theorists—have argued that non-human animals cannot be seen as members of the demos because they lack the critical capacities for self-rule and moral agency which are required for citizenship. We argue that this worry is based on mistaken ideas about both citizenship, on the one hand, and animals, on the other. Citizenship requires self-restraint and responsiveness to shared norms, but these capacities should not be understood in an unduly intellectualized or idealized way. Recent studies of moral behaviour show that civil relations between citizens are largely grounded, not in rational reflection and assent to moral propositions but in intuitive, unreflective and habituated behaviours which are themselves rooted in a range of pro-social emotions (empathy, love) and dispositions (co-operation, altruism, reciprocity, conflict resolution). Fifty years of ethological research have demonstrated that many social animals—particularly domesticated animals—share the sorts of dispositions and capacities underlying everyday civility. Once we broaden our conception of citizenship to include a richer account of the bases of civic relations, it becomes clear that domesticated animals and humans can be co-creators of a shared moral and political world. We have nothing to fear, and much to gain, by welcoming their membership in the demos. Plusieurs commentateurs—incluant certains théoriciens des droits des animaux—ont soutenu que les animaux non humains ne peuvent pas être considérés comme des membres du démos parce qu'il leur manque les capacités critiques d'autonomie et d'agentivité morale qui seraient essentielles à la citoyenneté. Nous soutenons que cette inquiétude est fondée sur des idées erronées à propos de la citoyenneté, d'une part, et à propos des animaux, d'autre part. La citoyenneté requiert la maîtrise de soi et la sensibilité aux normes partagées, mais ces capacités ne devraient pas être comprises en un sens indûment intellectualisé ou idéalisé. De récentes études sur l'agentivité morale montrent que les relations civilisées entre les citoyens sont largement fondées, non pas dans la réflexion rationnelle et l'assentiment à des propositions morales, mais dans des comportements intuitifs, irréfléchis et habituels qui s'enracinent dans une gamme d'émotions prosociales (l'empathie, l'amour) et de dispositions prosociales (coopération, altruisme, réciprocité, résolution de conflits). Cinquante ans de recherches éthologiques ont démontré que plusieurs animaux sociaux—particulièrement les animaux domestiques—partagent le type de dispositions et de capacités rendant possible le civisme quotidien. Une fois que nous élargissons notre conception de la citoyenneté pour inclure une compréhension plus riche des bases des relations civiques, il devient évident que les animaux domestiques et les humains peuvent être les co-créateurs d'un monde moral et politique commun. Nous n'avons rien à craindre, et beaucoup à gagner, à les accueillir comme membres du démos.

Sue Donaldson, Janneke Vink, and Jean-Paul Gagnon discuss the problem of anthropocentric democratic theory and the preconditions needed to realize a (corrective) interspecies democracy. Donaldson proposes the formal involvement of nonhuman animals in political institutions—a revolutionary task; Vink argues for changes to the law that would cover nonhuman animals with inviolable political rights; and Gagnon advises a personal change to dietary choices (veganism) and ethical orientations (do no harm). Together, the three proposals point to a future position where humans can participate in a multispecies world in which nonhuman others are freed from our tyrannical grasp.

Citizenship has been at the core of struggles by historically excluded groups for respect and inclusion. Can citizenship be extended even further to domesticated animals? We begin this article by sketching an argument for why justice requires the extension of citizenship to domesticated animals, above and beyond compassionate care, stewardship or universal basic rights. We then consider two objections to this argument. Some animal rights theorists worry that extending citizenship to domesticated animals, while it may sound progressive, would in fact be bad for animals, providing yet another basis for policing their behaviour to fit human needs and interests. Critics of animal rights, on the other hand, worry that the inclusion of 'unruly' beasts would be bad for democracy, eroding its core values and principles. We attempt to show that both objections are misplaced, and that animal citizenship would both promote justice for animals and deepen fundamental democratic dispositions and values.