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This essay sharpens and refreshes the multi-case theory-building approach, sometimes termed The “Eisenhardt Method.” The Method’s singular aim is theory building, especially with multiple cases and theoretical logic. Its defining features (e.g. research questions without obvious answers, careful case selection, well-identified constructs and relationships, theoretical arguments, boundary conditions) reflect this aim. I begin with the influence of the 1980s, including grounded theorizing and case logic. Relying on exemplars, I illustrate the Method’s defining features. I also address common misconceptions (e.g. types of data, number of cases, performance emphasis). These miss the Method’s essence and imply a rigid template that does not exist. Instead, the Method’s relatively few defining features enable a wide variety of research possibilities. I conclude with what I would write today like a richer palette of research choices, more emphasis on time, and flexible philosophy of science. Yet the core message of theory building would remain.

Research Summary Despite a wealth of research on competitive and cooperative strategy, gaps remain with respect to how firms successfully navigate cooperation and competition over time. This is especially true in ecosystems, in which firms depend on one another to collectively provide components and create value for consumers. Through an in‐depth multiple case study of five firms in the U.S. residential solar industry from 2007 to 2014, we induct a theoretical framework that explains how firms navigate nascent ecosystems over time. We identify three strategies, each with a distinct balance of cooperation and competition, as well as unique advantages, disadvantages, and required capabilities. Overall, we contribute to research on ecosystem strategy, crystallize the pivotal role of bottlenecks, and shed light on the dynamic interplay of cooperation and competition. Managerial Summary Competition and cooperation are fundamental to strategy, and often closely intertwined. But how firms navigate and balance cooperation and competition over time, especially in ecosystems where firms depend on one another to deliver value to consumers, is unclear. In this article, we conduct an in‐depth multiple‐case study of five firms in the U.S. residential solar industry to examine how firms can successfully navigate nascent ecosystems over time. We identify three distinct strategies, each with a distinct balance of cooperation and competition, and examine the unique advantages, disadvantages, and required capabilities of each. In doing so, we also contribute novel insights into the evolution of ecosystems and bottlenecks.

Prior research has advanced several explanations for entrepreneurial success in nascent markets but leaves a key imperative unexplored: the business model. By studying five ventures in a nascent financial-technology market, we develop a novel theoretical framework for understanding how entrepreneurs effectively design business models: parallel play. Similar to parallel play by preschoolers, entrepreneurs engaged in parallel play interweave action, cognition, and timing to accelerate learning about a novel world. Specifically, they (1) borrow from peers and focus on established substitutes for their services or products, (2) test assumptions, then commit to a broad business-model template, and (3) pause before elaborating the activity system. The insights from our framework contribute to research on optimal distinctiveness and to the learning and evolutionary-adjustment literatures. More broadly, we blend organization theory with a fresh theoretical lens—business-model processes—to highlight how organizations actually work and create value.

Drawing on institutional theory, we examine how the institutional logics—taken-for granted norms, structures, and practices—of different types of funding partners influence young firms and their search for innovations. We test our hypotheses in a longitudinal study of a complete population of ventures in the minimally invasive surgical device industry in the U.S., supplemented by interviews with industry informants. We find that types of funding partners vary significantly from one another: they all provide resources, but their institutional logics differ. Venture capitalists (VCs) pick young firms with significant patented technologies and help firms launch products, and high-status VCs strengthen both the patenting and product innovations of young firms. Corporate venture capitalists and government agencies also select patent-intensive firms but are less effective than VCs in helping ventures during the relationship because, though these partners often have impressive technical and commercial resources for innovation, their institutional logics constrain how effectively young firms can access their resources. Relative to other types of funding partners, VCs have a closer advisor relationship with the venture; greater power, influence, and access to resources; better-paced and more-motivating milestones; and better understanding of the commercialization process. Our results extend the institutional logics literature to interorganizational relationships and suggest that the choice among types of funding partners may have unanticipated effects on firms' innovation beyond the financial resources gained through the relationship.

Research summary: Governments in emerging economies often use institutional intermediaries to promote entrepreneurship, and bridge the void between ventures and public funding. While prior literature describes what institutional intermediaries do, it leaves open how intermediaries support different types of entrepreneurs. By comparing science park and non-science park firms in Beijing and across China, we distinguish which entrepreneurs benefit from certification versus capability-building through the introduction of two new constructs: skill adequacy and context relevance. Broadly, our study adds insights at the nexus of emerging economies and entrepreneurship research, and to the tie formation and institutional intermediaries literatures. Managerial summary: A key dilemma facing entrepreneurs is how to finance their ventures. While entrepreneurs in developed economies can seek VC or angel investment, entrepreneurs in emerging economies often need to pursue potential government funding opportunities. Our study highlights three strategies for acquiring government funding. Well-connected entrepreneurs can leverage their political ties to acquire such funding. Less-connected entrepreneurs can leverage science parks that in emerging markets are designed to help governments to identify promising ventures. For returnees whose ample experience abroad may not fit with local ways of doing business, gaining science park admission can certify quality and so ease the path to government funding. For technically skilled local entrepreneurs who lack business skills, science parks can help build such skills, which then ease the path to government funding.

Using computational and mathematical modeling, this study explores the tension between too little and too much structure that is shaped by the core tradeoff between efficiency and flexibility in dynamic environments. Our aim is to develop a more precise theory of the fundamental relationships among structure, performance, and environment. We find that the structure-performance relationship is unexpectedly asymmetric, in that it is better to err on the side of too much structure, and that different environmental dynamism dimensions (i.e., velocity, complexity, ambiguity, and unpredictability) have unique effects on performance. Increasing unpredictability decreases optimal structure and narrows its range from a wide to a narrow set of effective strategies. We also find that a strategy of simple rules, which combines improvisation with low-to-moderately structured rules to execute a variety of opportunities, is viable in many environments but essential in some. This sharpens the boundary condition between the strategic logics of positioning and opportunity. And juxtaposing the structural challenges of adaptation for entrepreneurial vs. established organizations, we find that entrepreneurial organizations should quickly add structure in all environments, while established organizations are better off seeking predictable environments unless they can devote sufficient attention to managing a dissipative equilibrium of structure (i.e., edge of chaos) in unpredictable environments.

Organizational boundaries are a central phenomenon, yet despite their significance, research is dominated by transaction cost economics and related exchange-efficiency perspectives. While useful, it is time to engage in a broader view. Our purpose is to provide a deeper understanding of organizational boundaries. First, we develop four boundary conceptions (efficiency, power, competence, and identity) and their distinctive features including organizational and environmental assumptions, unique conception of boundaries, theoretical arguments, empirical validity, contributions, and limitations. Efficiency takes a legal-ownership view of atomistic boundary decisions. In contrast, the power conception emphasizes the sphere of influence of the organization, while competence focuses on the resource portfolio and its related configuration, and identity centers on the often unconscious mind-set by which organizational members understand \"who we are.\" We also indicate relationships, both coevolutionary and synergistic, among the conceptions. Second, we juxtapose these conceptions with the current literature to create a springboard for a renewed research agenda. This agenda includes greater focus on nonefficiency perspectives, relationships (not competition) among boundary conceptions, studies that take the normative implication of theories more seriously, and problem-driven research on contemporary boundary issues such as contract employment and business ecosystems.

The question of whether corporations add value beyond that created by individual businesses has engendered much debate in recent years. Some of this debate has focused on the pros and cons of related vs. unrelated diversification. A standard explanation of the benefits of related diversification has to do with the ability to obtain intra-temporal economies of scope from contemporaneous sharing of resources by related businesses within the firm. In contrast, this paper deals with inter-temporal economies of scope that firms achieve by redeploying resources and capabilities between related businesses over time, as firms exit some markets while entering others. The transfer of resources due to market exit distinguishes our treatment of inter-temporal economies of scope from standard intra-temporal economies of scope. In addition, these inter-temporal economies can benefit from a decentralized and modular organizational structure. This ability to obtain inter-temporal economies of scope via organizational modularity and recombination suggests that corporations do not necessarily need a high degree of coordination between business units in order to benefit from a strategy of related diversification.

In contrast to the prior acquisitions literature, which has emphasized the buyer's perspective, we examine the seller's perspective. This has important implications for understanding both the acquisition process and, more broadly, corporate governance in successful firms. Using a multiple-case, inductive study of 12 technology-based ventures, we find that acquisition occurs when sellers are pushed toward acquisition by difficult, albeit natural strategic hurdles, such as a chief executive search or funding round, and by strong personal motivations for sale, such as past failures and investments by friends. Sellers are also more likely to be pulled toward acquisition by attractive buyers that offer synergistic combination potential and organizational rapport, factors usually associated with the long-term interests of buyers. We reframe acquisition as courtship and corporate governance as a syndicate, indicating joint decision making with some common goals, and explore the generalizability of these views for private versus public firms and other contingencies. Together, courtship and syndicate suggest a behaviorally informed account of organization that belies the rhetoric of price and self-interest.