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More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience—as suggested by backward induction—remains inconclusive. This article provides a meta-analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game. We describe forces that affect initial play (formation of cooperation) and unraveling (breakdown of cooperation). First, contrary to the backward induction prediction, the parameters of the repeated game have a significant effect on initial cooperation. We identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation—as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of always defect—to account for an important part of this effect. Second, despite these initial differences, the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations. Importantly, despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies, this article establishes a systematic pattern of behavior: subjects converge to use threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round; conditional on establishing cooperation, the first defection round moves earlier with experience. Simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights into the long-term dynamics and the forces that slow down the unraveling of cooperation.

This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.

We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their demands, creates incentives for all players to build reputations for being hard bargainers. The data are qualitatively consistent with the theory, as subjects mimic induced types. Furthermore, we find evidence for the presence of complementary types, whose initial demands acquiesce to induced behavioural demands. However, there are quantitative deviations from the theory: subjects make aggressive demands too often and participate in longer conflicts before reaching agreements. Overall, the results suggest that the Abreu and Gul (2000) model can be used to gain insights to bargaining behavior, particularly in environments where the process underlying obstinate play is well established.

In this chapter, we discuss econometric techniques for analyzing experimental data in the growing field of behavioral operations management. We first briefly highlight past and current practices from 70 experimental papers published in Management Science, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management and Production and Operations Management between 2005 and 2015. We then highlight some important issues on the interplay between experimental design and econometric analysis – in particular, randomization techniques, within versus between subjects and power analysis. The rest of the chapter discusses the most common statistical tests, regression and panel data techniques as well as structural modeling.

Chapter 1 presents two sets of laboratory experiments aimed at understanding what role, if any, commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their demands, creates incentives for all players to build reputations for being hard bargainers. The data are qualitatively consistent with the theory, as subjects mimic induced types. Furthermore, there is evidence for the emergence of complementary types, whose initial demands acquiesce to induced obstinate demands. However, there are important quantitative deviations from the theory: subjects are inclined to make aggressive demands too often, and participate in excessively long conflicts before reaching agreements. With the aim of understanding the role renegotiation concerns might play in supporting cooperative equilibria, chapter 2 presents the results from implementing a repeated partnership game with a simple public imperfect monitoring environment in the laboratory. By manipulating the actions available to subjects, as well as the availability of communication before play of the stage game, the experimental design systematically varies the possibilities for renegotiation concerns across a 2×3 design. The data are qualitatively consistent with the predictions of renegotiation-proofness. In particular, a significant number of subjects reduce their level of cooperation in response to the addition of renegotiation concerns. However, there is little evidence that subjects are willing to use a punishment action other than the one shot Nash action, when the predictions of renegotiation-proofness demand it. The third chapter is a short note that demonstrates how introducing member-session specific incomplete information to the standard multilateral bargaining environment of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) can produce many results believed to occur in bargaining situations: delays, non-minimum winning coalitions and reduced levels of proposer power.

This paper experimentally investigates excessive risk taking in contest schemes by implementing a novel stopping task based on Seel and Strack (2013). In this stylized setting, managers with contest payoffs have an incentive to delay halting projects with a negative expectation, with the induced inefficiency being highest for a moderately negative drift. The experiment systematically varies the negative drift (between-subjects) and the payoff incentives (within-subject). We find evidence for excessive risk taking in all our treatment conditions, with the non-monotonicity at least as problematic as predicted. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, this aggregate pattern of behaviour is seen even without contest incentives. Further analysis suggests that many subjects display behaviour consistent with some intrinsic motivation for taking risk. This intrinsic motive and the strategic motive for excessive risk taking reinforce the non-monotonicity. The experiment uncovers a behavioural nuance where contest incentives crowd out an intrinsic inclination to gamble.

Most negotiations involve risks that are only resolved ex-post and often these risks are not incurred equally by the parties involved. We experimentally investigate bargaining situations where a residual claimant is exposed to ex-post risk, whereas a fixedpayoff player is not. We find that residual claimants extract a risk premium, which increases in risk exposure and that this premium is sometimes high enough to make it beneficial to bargain over a risky rather than a risk-less pie. In contrast to predictions of a benchmark model, it is the comparatively less risk averse residual claimants who benefit the most and this is driven by fixed-payoff player's adoption of weak bargaining strategies when the pie is risky. It is also the less risk averse who, when given the choice, choose to bargain over a riskier distribution. We also show that as risk increases, conflict about what constitutes a fair compensation for risk exposure is enhanced, which increases bargaining frictions.

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player, while the other player receives the residual from a random pie realization after subtracting the fixed payment. Contrary to the intuition that risk exposure is detrimental, we show that residual claimants are able to extract a risk premium, which is increasing in risk exposure. In some cases the premium is so high that it is advantageous to bargain over a risky pie rather than a risk-less pie. Contrary to theory, the comparatively less risk adverse residual claimants benefit the most. Moreover, bargaining frictions increase as risk increases, and we document more frequent disagreements as risk increases. When given the chance to choose a less or more risky distribution over which to bargain, residual claimants tend to choose the more risky distribution only when there is the possibility of an equal-split ex-post. Our results suggest that theoretical bargaining models require some separation between the determinants of bargaining power and fair compensation for risk exposure.

Mcl-1 is a member of the Bcl-2 family of proteins that promotes cell survival by preventing induction of apoptosis in many cancers. High expression of Mcl-1 causes tumorigenesis and resistance to anticancer therapies highlighting the potential of Mcl-1 inhibitors as anticancer drugs. Here, we describe AZD5991, a rationally designed macrocyclic molecule with high selectivity and affinity for Mcl-1 currently in clinical development. Our studies demonstrate that AZD5991 binds directly to Mcl-1 and induces rapid apoptosis in cancer cells, most notably myeloma and acute myeloid leukemia, by activating the Bak-dependent mitochondrial apoptotic pathway. AZD5991 shows potent antitumor activity in vivo with complete tumor regression in several models of multiple myeloma and acute myeloid leukemia after a single tolerated dose as monotherapy or in combination with bortezomib or venetoclax. Based on these promising data, a Phase I clinical trial has been launched for evaluation of AZD5991 in patients with hematological malignancies (NCT03218683). High expression of Mcl-1 promotes tumorigenesis and resistance to anticancer therapies. Here they report a macrocyclic molecule with high selectivity and affinity for Mcl-1 that exhibits potent anti-tumor effects as single agent and in combination with bortezomib or venetoclax in preclinical models of multiple myeloma and acute myeloid leukemia.

In response to infections and irritants, the respiratory epithelium releases the alarmin interleukin (IL)-33 to elicit a rapid immune response. However, little is known about the regulation of IL-33 following its release. Here we report that the biological activity of IL-33 at its receptor ST2 is rapidly terminated in the extracellular environment by the formation of two disulphide bridges, resulting in an extensive conformational change that disrupts the ST2 binding site. Both reduced (active) and disulphide bonded (inactive) forms of IL-33 can be detected in lung lavage samples from mice challenged with Alternaria extract and in sputum from patients with moderate–severe asthma. We propose that this mechanism for the rapid inactivation of secreted IL-33 constitutes a ‘molecular clock’ that limits the range and duration of ST2-dependent immunological responses to airway stimuli. Other IL-1 family members are also susceptible to cysteine oxidation changes that could regulate their activity and systemic exposure through a similar mechanism. IL-33, released by epithelial cells in response to stress, is a potent activator of inflammation. Here Cohen et al . show that secreted IL-33 is rapidly inactivated by disulfide bond formation that prevents binding to its receptor, and that IL-33-related cytokines are susceptible to similar oxidation.