Explore the vast range of titles available.

Given the rapid rise of electric vehicles (EVs) worldwide, and the ambitious targets set for the near future, the management of large EV fleets must be seen as a priority. Specifically, we study a scenario where EV charging is managed through self-interested EV aggregators who compete in the day-ahead market in order to purchase the electricity needed to meet their clients' requirements. With the aim of reducing electricity costs and lowering the impact on electricity markets, a centralised bidding coordination framework has been proposed in the literature employing a coordinator. In order to improve privacy and limit the need for the coordinator, we propose a reformulation of the coordination framework as a decentralised algorithm, employing the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM). However, given the self-interested nature of the aggregators, they can deviate from the algorithm in order to reduce their energy costs. Hence, we study the strategic manipulation of the ADMM algorithm and, in doing so, describe and analyse different possible attack vectors and propose a mathematical framework to quantify and detect manipulation. Importantly, this detection framework is not limited to the considered EV scenario and can be applied to general ADMM algorithms. Finally, we test the proposed decentralised coordination and manipulation detection algorithms in realistic scenarios using real market and driver data from Spain. Our empirical results show that the decentralised algorithm's convergence to the optimal solution can be effectively disrupted by manipulative attacks achieving convergence to a different non-optimal solution which benefits the attacker. With respect to the detection algorithm, results indicate that it achieves very high accuracies and significantly outperforms a naive benchmark.

Ensuring the trustworthiness of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence is an important interdisciplinary endeavour. In this position paper, we argue that this endeavour will benefit from technical advancements in capturing various forms of responsibility, and we present a comprehensive research agenda to achieve this. In particular, we argue that ensuring the reliability of autonomous system can take advantage of technical approaches for quantifying degrees of responsibility and for coordinating tasks based on that. Moreover, we deem that, in certifying the legality of an AI system, formal and computationally implementable notions of responsibility , blame , accountability , and liability are applicable for addressing potential responsibility gaps (i.e. situations in which a group is responsible, but individuals’ responsibility may be unclear). This is a call to enable AI systems themselves, as well as those involved in the design, monitoring, and governance of AI systems, to represent and reason about who can be seen as responsible in prospect (e.g. for completing a task in future) and who can be seen as responsible retrospectively (e.g. for a failure that has already occurred). To that end, in this work, we show that across all stages of the design, development, and deployment of trustworthy autonomous systems (TAS), responsibility reasoning should play a key role. This position paper is the first step towards establishing a road map and research agenda on how the notion of responsibility can provide novel solution concepts for ensuring the reliability and legality of TAS and, as a result, enables an effective embedding of AI technologies into society.

Flying ad-hoc networks (FANETs) consist of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that rely on multi-hop routes for communication. These routes are particularly susceptible to grey hole attacks, necessitating swift and accurate defence to preserve the network’s quality of service. Grey hole attacks are a type of denial-of-service attack where malicious nodes selectively drop packets, disrupting the normal flow of data in the network. This paper introduces and motivates a novel dataset, FAN-GHETS24, designed for the fast classification of various grey hole attacks. The dataset is derived from sequences of packet interactions between UAVs within the network, generated through multiple simulations of FANETs. These sequences undergo post-processing via two methods: firstly, an anonymization procedure that replaces IP addresses with standard string variables, allowing for offline model training and deployment on any UAV; and secondly, the application of feature engineering techniques to format the data for machine learning model integration. The dataset’s utility is validated using a time series classification model which focuses on classifying grey hole attacks as quickly as possible.

Prediction markets are heralded as powerful forecasting tools, but models that describe them often fail to capture the full complexity of the underlying mechanisms that drive price dynamics. To address this issue, we propose a model in which agents belong to a social network, have an opinion about the probability of a particular event to occur, and bet on the prediction market accordingly. Agents update their opinions about the event by interacting with their neighbours in the network, following the Deffuant model of opinion dynamics. Our results suggest that a simple market model that takes into account opinion formation dynamics is capable of replicating the empirical properties of historical prediction market time series, including volatility clustering and fat-tailed distribution of returns. Interestingly, the best results are obtained when there is the right level of variance in the opinions of agents. Moreover, this paper provides a new way to indirectly validate opinion dynamics models against real data by using historical data obtained from PredictIt, which is an exchange platform whose data have never been used before to validate models of opinion diffusion.

Conflict resolution is essential to obtain cooperation in many scenarios such as politics and business, as well as our day to day life. The importance of conflict resolution has driven research in many fields like anthropology, social science, psychology, mathematics, biology and, more recently, in artificial intelligence. Computer science and artificial intelligence have, in turn, been inspired by theories and techniques from these disciplines, which has led to a variety of computational models and approaches, such as automated negotiation, group decision making, argumentation, preference aggregation, and human-machine interaction. To bring together the different research strands and disciplines in conflict resolution, the Workshop on Conflict Resolution in Decision Making (COREDEMA) was organized. This special issue benefited from the workshop series, and consists of significantly extended and revised selected papers from the ECAI 2016 COREDEMA workshop, as well as completely new contributions.

The industry related to electric vehicles (EVs) has seen a substantial increase in recent years, as such vehicles have the ability to significantly reduce total CO2 emissions and the related global warming effect. In this paper, we focus on the problem of allocating EVs to charging stations, scheduling and pricing their charging. Specifically, we developed a Mixed Integer Program (MIP) which executes offline and optimally allocates EVs to charging stations. On top, we propose two alternative mechanisms to price the electricity the EVs charge. The first mechanism is a typical fixed-price one, while the second is a variation of the Vickrey–Clark–Groves (VCG) mechanism. We also developed online solutions that incrementally call the MIP-based algorithm and solve it for branches of EVs. In all cases, the EVs’ aim is to minimize the price to pay and the impact on their driving schedule, acting as self-interested agents. We conducted a thorough empirical evaluation of our mechanisms and we observed that they had satisfactory scalability. Additionally, the VCG mechanism achieved an up to 2.2% improvement in terms of the number of vehicles that were charged compared to the fixed-price one and, in cases where the stations were congested, it calculated higher prices for the EVs and provided a higher profit for the stations, but lower utility to the EVs. However, in a theoretical evaluation, we proved that the variant of the VCG mechanism being proposed in this paper still guaranteed truthful reporting of the EVs’ preferences. In contrast, the fixed-price one was found to be vulnerable to agents’ strategic behavior as non-truthful EVs can charge instead of truthful ones. Finally, we observed the online algorithms to be, on average, at 95.6% of the offline ones in terms of the average number of serviced EVs.

Using observational data to infer the coupling structure or parameters in dynamical systems is important in many real-world applications. In this paper, we propose a framework of strategically influencing a dynamical process that generates observations with the aim of making hidden parameters more easily inferable. More specifically, we consider a model of networked agents who exchange opinions subject to voting dynamics. Agent dynamics are subject to peer influence and to the influence of two controllers. One of these controllers is treated as passive and we presume its influence is unknown. We then consider a scenario in which the other active controller attempts to infer the passive controller’s influence from observations. Moreover, we explore how the active controller can strategically deploy its own influence to manipulate the dynamics with the aim of accelerating the convergence of its estimates of the opponent. Along with benchmark cases we propose two heuristic algorithms for designing optimal influence allocations. We establish that the proposed algorithms accelerate the inference process by strategically interacting with the network dynamics. Investigating configurations in which optimal control is deployed. We first find that agents with higher degrees and larger opponent allocations are harder to predict. Second, even factoring in strategical allocations, opponent’s influence is typically the harder to predict the more degree-heterogeneous the social network.

Community Energy Markets (CEMs) enable trading opportunities between participants in a community to achieve savings and profits. However, the market design and the behaviour of participants are key factors that determine the success of such markets. To this end, this research presents a CEM model and conducts agent-based simulations to study the benefits of the CEM to consumers and prosumers. The proposed market structure is an hour-ahead periodic double auction. In particular, market rules are proposed that incentivise the provision of energy supply to the community and the investment in energy storage. Furthermore, a trading strategy is introduced that leverages energy flexibility created by the storage devices. Finally, as well as the hour-ahead market, we include a minute-by-minute balancing as part of the CEM’s energy exchange mechanism. The balancing approach is introduced to account for a community budget deficit caused by the time difference between supply and demand. The proposed market results in cost savings for consumers and profit for prosumers similar to existing approaches, while increasing the energy suppliers’ percentage of financial benefits from 50% to a range between 60–96% depending on the community configuration. Moreover, the market model accounts for uncertainties in supply and demand and suggests a methodology to overcome the community budget deficit.

We consider settings where owners of electric vehicles (EVs) participate in a market mechanism to charge their vehicles. Existing work on such mechanisms has typically assumed that participants are fully rational and can report their preferences accurately via some interface to the mechanism or to a software agent participating on their behalf. However, this may not be reasonable in settings with non-expert human end-users.Thus, our overarching aim in this paper is to determine experimentally if a fully expressive market interface that enables accurate preference reports is suitable for the EV charging domain, or, alternatively, if a simpler, restricted interface that reduces the space of possible options is preferable. In doing this, we measure the performance of an interface both in terms of how it helps participants maximise their utility and how it affects deliberation time. Our secondary objective is to contrast two different types of restricted interfaces that vary in how they restrict the space of preferences that can be reported. To enable this analysis, we develop a novel game that replicates key features of an abstract EV charging scenario. In two experiments with over 300 users, we show that restricting the users' preferences significantly reduces the time they spend deliberating (by up to half in some cases). An extensive usability survey confirms that this restriction is furthermore associated with a lower perceived cognitive burden on the users. More surprisingly, at the same time, using restricted interfaces leads to an increase in the users' performance compared to the fully expressive interface (by up to 70%). We also show that some restricted interfaces have the desirable effect of reducing the energy consumption of their users by up to 20% while achieving the same utility as other interfaces. Finally, we find that a reinforcement learning agent displays similar performance trends to human users, enabling a novel methodology for evaluating market interfaces.

Given recent requirements for ensuring the robustness of algorithmic trading strategies laid out in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II, this paper proposes a novel agent-based simulation for exploring algorithmic trading strategies. Five different types of agents are present in the market. The statistical properties of the simulated market are compared with equity market depth data from the Chi-X exchange and found to be significantly similar. The model is able to reproduce a number of stylised market properties including: clustered volatility, autocorrelation of returns, long memory in order flow, concave price impact and the presence of extreme price events. The results are found to be insensitive to reasonable parameter variations.