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"Erickson, Andrew S"
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Barriers, Springboards and Benchmarks: China Conceptualizes the Pacific “Island Chains”
US government reports describe Chinese-conceived “island chains” in the Western Pacific as narrow demarcations for Chinese “counter-intervention” operations to defeat US and allied forces in altercations over contested territorial claims. The sparse scholarship available does little to contest this excessively myopic assertion. Yet, further examination reveals meaningful differences that can greatly enhance an understanding of Chinese views of the “island chains” concept, and with it important aspects of China's efforts to develop as a maritime power. Long before China had a navy or naval strategists worthy of the name, the concept had originated and been developed for decades by previous great powers vying for Asia-Pacific influence. Today, China's own authoritative interpretations are flexible, nuanced and multifaceted – befitting the multiple and sometimes contradictory factors with which Beijing must contend in managing its meteoric maritime rise. These include the growing importance of sea lane security at increasing distances and levels of operational intensity. 美国政府报告把中国设想的西太平洋 “岛链” 概念描述为中国军队为在有关领土争端的 “反干涉”作战中试图打败美国和盟国部队而设立的狭窄的界线。寥寥无几的相关研究对这个过于短视的看法也没有提出不同意见。然而, 进一步的分析却发现此概念有迥然不同的含义。这些含义能大大增强我们对中国为发展成为一个海洋大国所做出的努力的理解。这个概念是在中国有一个现代的海军或海军战略家之前由其他有影响力的大国为争夺亚太地区的影响力而发展起来的。如今, 中国对此概念的权威解释显示出其灵活性, 微妙性和多面性。这些解释特征恰恰能与北京在管理其海上崛起过程中许多有时是相互矛盾的因素相适应。这些因素包括由于不断增大距离和活动强度所导致的海上通道安全日益增长的重要性。
Journal Article
Rebalancing U.S. forces : basing and forward presence in the Asia-Pacific
As the U.S. military presence in the Middle East winds down, Asia and the Pacific are receiving increased attention from the American national security community. The Obama administration has announced a \"rebalancing\" of the U.S. military posture in the region, in reaction primarily to the startling improvement in Chinese air and naval capabilities over the last decade or so. This timely study sets out to assess the implications of this shift for the long-established U.S. military presence in Asia and the Pacific. This presence is anchored in a complex basing infrastructure that scholars-and Americans generally-too often take for granted. In remedying this state of affairs, this volume offers a detailed survey and analysis of this infrastructure, its history, the political complications it has frequently given rise to, and its recent and likely future evolution. American seapower requires a robust constellation of bases to support global power projection. Given the rise of China and the emergence of the Asia-Pacific as the centre of global economic growth and strategic contention, nowhere is American basing access more important than in this region. Yet manifold political and military challenges, stemming not least of which from rapidly-improving Chinese long-range precision strike capabilities, complicate the future of American access and security here. This book addresses what will be needed to maintain the fundaments of U.S. seapower and force projection in the Asia-Pacific, and where the key trend lines are headed in that regard. This book demonstrates that U.S. Asia-Pacific basing and access is increasingly vital, yet increasingly vulnerable. It demands far more attention than the limited coverage it has received to date, and cannot be taken for granted. More must be done to preserve capabilities and access upon which American and allied security and prosperity depend.
eBook
U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations
This article examines the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and argues that it is both a relevant instrument of congressional oversight and an appropriate safeguard for U.S. policy in bilateral military relations with China.
Journal Article
PUTIN'S UKRAINE INVASION: Turbocharging Sino-Russian Collaboration in Energy, Maritime Security, and Beyond?
Putin’s war of choice in Ukraine will continue to send shock waves across the shores of maritime Asia for years, with unfolding impacts on ecosystems inhabited by oil barrels, gas pipelines, submarine technologies, jet engines, and basing access, within a context of a China-Russia relationship characterized over the centuries by cycles of fear, temporary bonds, and renewed division.
Journal Article
Demystifying China's Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate
China's limited transparency concerning its defence spending harms strategic trust, but foreign analysts often lose sight of important realities. Specific details remain unclear, but China's defence spending overall is no mystery – it supports PLA modernization and personnel development as well as its announced objectives of securing China's homeland and asserting control over contested territorial and maritime claims, with a focus on the Near Seas (the Yellow, East, and South China seas). This article offers greater context and perspective for Chinese and Western discussions of China's rise and concomitant military build-up through a nuanced and comprehensive assessment of its defence spending and military transparency.
Journal Article
AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
A major Chinese narrative regarding the South China Sea is one of unreciprocated restraint. But Chinese leaders have clearly had an ambitious long-term vision of some sort, backed by years of efforts, themselves based on long-standing claims encapsulated in an ambiguous nine-dash line enclosing virtually all of the South China Sea. Beijing's stance regarding South China Sea sovereignty issues is categorical and steadfast. In a position paper rejecting outright the Philippines' recent initiation of international arbitration regarding their bilateral dispute, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs states. Despite all its rhetoric, actions, developmental efforts, and apparent preparations, however, China has repeatedly declined to disclose the precise basis for, the precise nature of, or even the precise geographical parameters of its South China Sea claims. China's record on maritime sovereignty fuels this concern. The vast majority of nations agree that under international law a country with a coastline controls only economic resources in waters twelve to two hundred nautical miles out- and even less if facing a neighbor's coast less than four hundred nautical miles away.
Journal Article
SURGING SECOND SEA FORCE: China's Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond
China's armed forces are divided into three major organizations, each of which has a maritime subcomponent. The gray-hulled People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) claims a growing portion of the PLA's personnel and resources; the People's Armed Police (PAP) leads, and increasingly reflects the paramilitary character of, China's white-hulled maritime law-enforcement (MLE) forces, including the China Coast Guard (CCG); and the militia contains a growing proportion of sea-based units, the blue-hulled, PLA-controlled People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Each of China's three sea services is the world's largest in terms of ship numbers.
Journal Article