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This article analyzes the contested relationship between two practices of intervention on behalf of human rights victims, \"humanitarian\" military interventions and judicial interventions through international criminal tribunals. While both practices have come to be viewed as complementary instruments in the liberal interventionist \"toolbox,\" their historical evolution was marked by tensions and controversies. To understand both the source of these frictions and how they could be (partly) overcome, the article draws attention to historical and contemporary processes of norm hybridization, that is, to discursive and institutional shifts that have merged different, pre-existing normative ideas into new, complex normative arrangements.

International Relations theorists have recently paid increasing attention to the hierarchical nature of international society, that is, to its built-in structural inequalities. In this article, we focus on one thus far neglected aspect of global social stratification by highlighting the role that international institutions play in both reproducing and transforming inequalities among states and other global subjects. We argue that this focus on institutions can advance our understanding of the processes through which global inequalities are maintained and changed, and that institutionalist research can in turn benefit from shifting its attention from the predominant cooperation paradigm to capturing the manifold ‘inequality’ effects of institutionalised interactions in world politics. We illustrate this shift of perspective with a dual case study of the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions banning anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions.

Since the adoption of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the order founded on the treaty has evolved into an increasingly fragmented regime complex. Fragmentation has resulted from forum-shifting initiated both at the top and at the bottom of the nuclear hierarchy: both the United States, with varying partners, and coalitions of small-and medium-sized non-nuclear states have repeatedly moved rule-making on nuclear issues to fora outside the NPT, adding partly conflicting institutions to the complex. To understand this dynamic, I propose a sociological perspective that highlights states’ positional struggles in a multidimensionally stratified international society. Drawing on Bourdieusian global fields theory, I argue that both dominant and weak states use forum-shifting to manipulate exchange rates between different (material, institutional and social) forms of capital they possess. Thus, they seek to protect their positions in global hierarchies within and beyond the nuclear field when they perceive these hierarchies as being challenged by material or institutional power shifts.

Since entering office, US president Trump has reversed key multilateral achievements of his predecessors, initiating a new US retreat from multilateral cooperation. For other governments wishing to preserve and deepen existing global agreements, this has posed the question of whether and how multilateral cooperation can work without the leadership and support of the dominant global power. International relations scholars have already debated the possibility of “nonhegemonic cooperation” in earlier periods marked by US unilateralism. This article draws on these previous analyses to evaluate the current prospects and limits of a “multilateralism minus one” in three key global policy areas: nuclear arms control, climate change, and trade.

IR scholars have recently paid increasing attention to unequal institutional orders in world politics, arguing that global governance institutions are deeply shaped by power inequalities among states. Yet, the literature still suffers from conceptual limitations and from a shortage of empirical work. The article addresses these shortcomings through a study of the historical evolution of global arms control institutions since 1945. It shows that in this important policy area, the global institutional order has not been marked by a recent trend toward deeper inequality, as many writings on unequal institutions suggest. Instead, the analysis reveals a pattern of institutional mutation whereby specific forms of institutional inequality are recurrently replaced and supplemented by new forms. This process, the article argues, is driven by states' efforts to adapt the regime to a changing material and normative environment within the constraints of past institutional legacies.

Abstract Since entering office, US president Trump has reversed key multilateral achievements of his predecessors, initiating a new US retreat from multilateral cooperation. For other governments wishing to preserve and deepen existing global agreements, this has posed the question of whether and how multilateral cooperation can work without the leadership and support of the dominant global power. International relations scholars have already debated the possibility of \"nonhegemonic cooperation\" in earlier periods marked by US unilateralism. This article draws on these previous analyses to evaluate the current prospects and limits of a \"multilateralism minus one\" in three key global policy areas: nuclear arms control, climate change, and trade.

Unlike other articles on the International Criminal Court (ICC) that focus on the question of the court’s future effectiveness, this article seeks to explain the creation of the court and its institutional design as established in its statute. It applies theoretical arguments from the rationalist and constructivist literature on international institutions to the ICC case; and demonstrates how both theoretical perspectives can be combined in different ways. The ICC’s establishment can be explained with rationalist arguments focusing on cooperation problems and transaction cost, yet a constructivist view can ‘deepen’ the argument by explaining the perception of problems, and provide an alternative argument focusing on legitimacy concerns. Regarding institutional design, rationalist theory helps identify a tradeoff between a weak court backed by the US and a strong court without US support; a complementary constructivist approach can explain why states opted for the latter.

The unilateralist policies of US President Trump pose a challenge to supporters of global multilateral cooperation - but one that is not entirely unparalleled. Not for the first time in history, European and other governments are faced with the question of how and under what conditions a “multilateralism minus one” can be realized. Accordingly, International Relations scholars have long debated the possibility and effectiveness of “non-hegemonic cooperation”. In this article, we draw on these previous analyses to shed light on what states supportive of multilateralism could and should do to advance global governance in areas such as UN peacekeeping, arms control, and climate policy.

The unilateralist policies of US President Trump pose a challenge to supporters of global multilateral cooperation – but one that is not entirely unparalleled. Not for the first time in history, European and other governments are faced with the question of how and under what conditions a \"multilateralism minus one\" can be realized. Accordingly, International Relations scholars have long debated the possibility and effectiveness of \"non-hegemonic cooperation\". In this article, we draw on these previous analyses to shed light on what states supportive of multilateralism could and should do to advance global governance in areas such as UN peacekeeping, arms control, and climate policy.