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This article develops a non-cooperative game with managerial quantity-setting firms in which owners choose whether to delegate output and abatement decisions to managers through a contract based on emissions (conventionally denoted as ‘green’ delegation, GD) instead of sales (sales delegation, SD), and the government levies an emissions tax to incentivise firms’ emissions-reduction actions. First, it compares the Nash equilibrium outcomes between GD and SD and then contrasts them also with profit maximisation (PM). A plethora of Nash equilibria emerges, especially in the case GD versus PM (the ‘green delegation game’), depending on the public awareness toward environmental quality, ranging from the coordination game to the ‘green’ prisoner's dilemma. Second, though the contract under GD incentivises managers for emissions, the environmental damage is lower than under SD. This is because the optimal tax more than compensates the incentive for emissions. These findings suggest that designing GD contracts paradoxically favours environmental quality.

By analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms' cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Paretoinferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).

Recently, in their 2019 paper, Poyago-Theotoky and Yong consider a managerial Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities and emission taxes and propose an explicit environmental incentive in a managerial compensation contract. The authors compare several exogenous equilibria emerging in the symmetric sub-games in which the owner offers either the environmental delegation contract or the standard sales delegation contract: abatement and social welfare (resp. emission taxes) under environmental delegation are higher (resp. lower) than under sales delegation. The present work extends their model using a game-theoretic approach to analyse the asymmetric sub-games, in which only one firm adopts the environmental contract, and adds the contract decision stage. Results show that the environmental contract never emerges as the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this non-cooperative managerial decision game. Indeed, if the green R&D technology is efficient, the sales contract emerges as the unique Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, if the green R&D technology is inefficient, multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist (coordination game). Our findings offer direct policy implications.

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.

This article considers a product’s compatibility as a strategic variable in a Cournot duopoly with network consumption externalities. It develops a non-cooperative compatibility decision game (CDG) in which firms choose whether to let products be (in)compatible. With costless compatibility, the unique (Pareto-efficient) sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the CDG is universal compatibility. With quasi-fixed compatibility costs, the SPNE depends on whether product compatibility is an endogenous (i.e., a profit-maximising) or exogenous (i.e., given by technical constraints) variable. In the case of endogenous compatibility, the SPNE can vary from one unique to multiple regimes of (in)compatibility, such as the anti-prisoner’s dilemma (deadlock), prisoner’s dilemma, and coordination game. In the case of exogenous compatibility, the SPNE can become an anti-coordination game as well. The article also discusses the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE.

Using a simple Cournot duopoly model with differentiated products, this work studies the firms’ strategic choice of whether to adopt Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rules. The proposed game-theoretic approach shows that, depending on the degree of product differentiation and firms’ social concern, different equilibria arise: (1) all firms in the industry follow CSR rules, (2) all firms are profit-maximising (PM), (3) asymmetric equilibria are present (one CSR firm, one PM firm), and (4) multiple symmetric equilibria are present. Under Bertrand competition, universal PM is the unique equilibrium in which the social welfare is the least desirable: this implies that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, Bertrand may appear as welfare dominated by Cournot. This work can help to explain the widely observed phenomenon, in the real world, of different industries in which firms’ CSR behaviours are more or less commonly widespread.

This paper shows that, in a bilateral monopoly with consumer-friendly social concerns, only the downstream firm is always incentivized to adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) if it has decreasing returns to the input, leading to a Pareto-superior outcome in equilibrium. This occurrence differs from a standard linear bilateral monopoly in which, if the upstream (downstream) firm commits itself to CSR before the downstream (upstream) does, then both firms improve profits, while they do not deviate from pure profit-maximization if CSR levels are simultaneously chosen. Straightforward policy and empirical implications are offered, and this paper argues that the presence of CSR-type firms crucially depends on technology.

This article challenges the results of the ‘classical’ managerial delegation literature, where it is assumed that the weight of the managerial bonus only depends on the owner’s will tomaximise his own profits. By considering sales (S) (resp. relative profit (RP)) contracts, the received literature has found that (S, S) (resp. (RP, RP)) is the unique pure-strategy sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in a game that contrasts S (resp. RP) with pure profit maximisation (PM). This article shows that none of the previous results may hold when the owner negotiates about managerial compensation with his manager.

In a duopoly network industry with decentralised union wage setting, this paper studies the impact of the firms’ engagement in consumer-friendly corporate social responsibility (CSR) on profitability and welfare. It is shown that, regardless of whether the wage setting occurs prior to or after the choice of the CSR levels, being a CSR-type firm rather than a simple profit-maximiser can lead to larger profits and thus higher welfare for their owners/stakeholders. However, the welfare analysis reveals that there is always conflict of interest between the firms’ owners on the one side and consumers, unions, and society on the other side, with respect for the timing of the decision about CSR relative to that of the wage setting.

In a multiple-stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper analyzes whether firms' owners decide managerial incentive contracts sequentially or simultaneously. When firms compete in quantities, firms' owners can choose incentive contracts simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the unions' relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation. Instead, when firms compete in prices, firms' owners set incentive contracts sequentially with substitute goods and simultaneously with complement goods.