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Two assumptions in this analysis of baseball salary arbitration are that (1) players and clubs, to serve their interests in pre-arbitration negotiation, submit final offers to maximize and minimize, respectively, the expected value of the arbitrator's decision, and (2) arbitrators whose decisions are predictably biased are not appointed to settle player disputes, because such arbitrators are vetoed by one or the other side. These assumptions allow the authors to estimate the effects of several variables on arbitrators' decisions in 1984-91 cases. They find statistically significant effects for four variables that the industry's collective bargaining agreement identifies as matters arbitrators should consider-the player's performance during the previous season, the length and consistency of the player's career performance, previous compensation, and the club's recent performance-and for one variable not mentioned in that agreement-player position.

A flexible accelerator adjustment mechanism incorporates technical progress and expected output growth and is assumed to be globally optimal for capital investment. The major extension of previous research is the utilization of the associated labor demand function. The continuous form of the flexible accelerator adjustment. Parameters are estimated for labor and capital demand functions implied by this globally optimal flexible accelerator model and for a Cobb-Douglas long-run production function. Results include estimates of rates of technical progress and expected output growth, the speed of adjustment of capital, and an adjustment cost parameter. Estimates of the elasticities of output with respect to both labor and capital are between 0 and 1 without imposing constant returns to scale.

A method is developed to estimate income and substitution effects not necessitating variation in an exogenous nonwage income variable. A family labor supply model is developed which includes asset accumulation and produces labor supply functions not dependent on asset income. Asset income is not treated as exogenous nonwage income in the equations, and the model is overidentified, irrelevant of the existence of exogenous nonwage income. The model permits substitution and income effects estimation in the existence of insufficient variation in exogenous nonwage income barring asset income. Empirical results support the model only for younger families with children, the estimated substitution effects being small. It is suggested the husband and wife possess little sensitivity to income compensated changes in wage rates.

This study examines arbitrators' treatment of external law in 106 cases decided between January 1980 and June 1985 in which at least one of the parties had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. The author finds that although approximately half of the arbitrators cited external law in their opinions-more than would be assumed from the literature-most of these arbitrators engaged in only cursory or conclusory consideration of relevant external law. Other findings are that few arbitrators explicitly refused to consider external law, and the rate of arbitral consideration of external law did not change in response to a 1984 NLRB decision that made it more likely that the NLRB would defer to an arbitrator's decision.