Explore the vast range of titles available.

'John Feffer is our 21st-century Jack London' - Mike Davis In a post-Trump world, the right is still very much in power. Significantly more than half the world’s population currently lives under some form of right-wing populist or authoritarian rule. Today’s autocrats are, at first glance, a diverse band of brothers. But religious, economic, social and environmental differences aside, there is one thing that unites them - their hatred of the liberal, globalised world. This unity is their strength, and through control of government, civil society and the digital world they are working together across borders to stamp out the left. In comparison, the liberal left commands only a few disconnected islands - Iceland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, Spain and Uruguay. So far they have been on the defensive, campaigning on local issues in their own countries. This narrow focus underestimates the resilience and global connectivity of the right. In this book, John Feffer speaks to the world’s leading activists to show how international leftist campaigns must come together if they are to combat the rising tide of the right. A global Green New Deal, progressive trans-European movements, grassroots campaigning on international issues with new and improved language and storytelling are all needed if we are to pull the planet back from the edge of catastrophe. This book is both a warning and an inspiration to activists terrified by the strengthening wall of far-right power.

يتناول الكتاب الكثير من الدراسات وقصص النجاح التي تمثل الدليل الأكبر على ما أنجزه الممثلون الدوليون وشركاؤهم في الأقاليم المختلفة وتحركهم جميعا على قلب رجل واحد من أجل فتح آفاق جديدة للعلاقات الاقتصادية واحترام حقوق الإنسان وإيجاد ثقافة جديدة يكون الإنسان محورها. يبدأ الكتاب بالحديث عن الموارد وكيف أنها تذهب لمن يقاوم من أجلها ويحدثنا عن جلب العولمة إلى الوطن والاستجابة للديون في إفريقيا وبراءات الاختراع والنباتات وكيفية حماية الأمم النامية لمواردها ويحدثنا عن بذور التغيير في البوسنة والهرسك وغير ذلك من المحاور الهامة.

Donald Trump's America First philosophy stresses the importance of sovereignty in international relations, bringing US policy at least rhetorically in line with that of North Korea. Rising nationalism in China and Japan has also sharpened an already existing debate on sovereignty in the region involving territorial issues and history questions. The issue has come to a head around North Korea's claim to a sovereign right to a nuclear weapons program. The current status quo, in which North Korea remains an unofficial member of the nuclear club and the international community continues to pressure it into rolling back its nuclear program, could persist. But the change in the underlying philosophy in US policy suggests that this status quo has become increasingly unstable. War could disrupt the status quo, most likely as a result of miscalculation or misinterpretation. There are three potential nonmilitary exits from this status quo. One possible solution would be the normalization of the sovereign status of all the countries in the region. A second scenario involves a modest \"smudging\" of sovereignty, for example, the \"freeze for a freeze\" proposal supported by both China and Russia. In the third scenario, the countries of the region address the multilateralism gap by forging cooperation on a common threat-climate change-that reframes sovereignty and initiates a \"virtuous circle of engagement.\"

An introduction to a special issue on, \"An Arms Race in Northeast Asia,\" notes that while most countries were decreasing military spending in the 1990s, defense budgets were dramatically increased in Northeast Asia. South Korea & China expanded military spending by 19 percent between 1989 & 1994. Scholars from China, Japan, South Korea, & the US analyze the implications of military spending & whether it represents an arms race. Even though China became the second leading military spender (behind the US) in 2008 & Russia increased military spending in the last decade, it is argued that great power rivalry is no longer the main propellant. Rather, this new kind of arms race is driven by such internal & external factors as a desire for prestige; keeping up with new technologies; & the challenge of interoperability. An overview of the economics of military spending is followed by an analysis of the Japanese model which adheres to an informal military spending cap of one percent of gross domestic product. The impact of the Six Party Talks is discussed. Adapted from the source document.

In the early 1990s, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the world was anticipating a “peace dividend” from the end of the cold war. In one part of the world, however, military spending was not slowing down. “Asia is in the midst of its most peaceful period of the 20th century,” The Economist editorialized in 1993, “yet its nations are continuing to arm themselves at an alarming rate.”1 A similar assessment came from Newsweek: “East Asia’s arms race already makes it one of the few places where defense budgets are rising—and the current drive to modernize local navies and air forces will look tame if North Korea is permitted to develop nuclear weapons.”2 The arms spending in Asia attracted media attention in the early 1990s in large part because it was seemingly anomalous. The rest of the world was scaling back or, at least, considering doing so. In Northeast Asia, between 1989 and 1994, both South Korea and China increased their military spending by double digits—19 percent—while Japan increased expenditures by a more modest 9 percent. The countries of Southeast Asia—Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—were on a spending spree. In contrast, Russia decreased spending during that period rather dramatically (because of the collapse of its economy). And the United States, a Pacific power tied to Northeast Asia through bilateral alliances, reduced spending by 21 percent.3 Jump forward to a comparable five-year period between 2001 and 2006. During those years, no major periodicals proclaimed an arms race in Asia. Most news coverage of security issues focused on North Korea’s nuclear program and the difficulties in the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Yet, for Northeast Asia at least, the military budget increases were more dramatic at that time than in the early 1990s. South Korea increased spending by 20 percent and was prepared to make even larger increases as part of its Defense 2020 program. China increased spending by 85 percent, Russia by 47 percent, and the United States by 48 percent. Of the participants in the Six Party Talks aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear program and building a regional security system, only Japan showed any restraint during this period. Tokyo shrunk its military budget by 1 percent. One major reason that these military budget increases in Northeast Asia were not headline-worthy in the first decade of the 21st century—even though these increases surpassed those of a comparable period in the 1990s—is that this time they were not anomalous. Global military expenditures were rising rapidly as part of an overall 45 percent increase in the decade between 1999 and 2008. Recovery from the global financial crisis of the late 1990s, the impact of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, the uptick in military exports, and the surge in military spending after September 11, 2001 have all contributed to making the last decade a boom time for military contractors. Northeast Asian countries were simply doing what virtually all other countries were doing: spending more on their militaries under the innocuous label of “modernization.” The increased military spending in Northeast Asia is unarguable. But does it constitute an arms race in the region? This special issue of Asian Perspective brings together scholars from China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States to scrutinize the reasons for the upward trajectory of military spending in the region, its implications for Asian security, and whether the region is on the brink of an arms race, a new era of peace and stability, or some ambiguous state in between. KCI Citation Count: 1

State of the Union 1994 assesses the Clinton administration's first year in office and lays out progressive policy alternatives in the realms of foreign and domestic affairs. It charts the course of the nation in fourteen critical areas, giving readers a solid basis of information on which to compare trends historically and internationally and to make reasoned judgments about where the United States is and ought to be headed. Original essays by well-known policy advisers and analysts focus on the theme of gauging the health of the nation. Each essay employs charts, graphs, figures, and tables to document America's standing. An introductory essay explores the themes, trends, and values underlying the volume, and a closing roundtable discussion reflects on the politics of setting agendas and achieving goals, especially those that run counter to conventional wisdom. Sponsored by the prominent Washington think tank, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), State of the Union 1994 seeks to enlarge the national public policy debate and to promote fresh policy directions in an effort to achieve \"a more perfect union.\" It offers specific recommendations-such as a \"global New Deal\" for trade, a single-payer health-care system, a national jobs program, and a streamlined, reorganized national security establishment-in creating a valuable resource of policy ideas that work.

He was a wealthy businessman who suddenly decided to run for president. Nobody in the political elite took him seriously. After all, as an outsider, he’d never been successful in politics. Plus, he trafficked in outlandish conspiracy theories, which led him to say the craziest things. Given these handicaps, there was no way he could beat the established parties and their candidates to become president. But Stan Tymiński surprised everyone. Long before Donald Trump scored his electoral upset in the United States, Tymiński upended politics in Poland in 1990. As a successful entrepreneur in Canada, Tymiński had made millions.¹ He

Not long after the outbreak of the coronavirus in Europe in early 2020, the former liberal and current prime minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán quickly displayed his skills as a political opportunist. As cases started to multiply in nearby Italy, Orbán moved to take advantage of the crisis to advance his own political agenda. Since becoming prime minister for the second time in 2010, he’d been steadily remaking Hungary, a small Central European nation with a population of 10 million, into a more homogenous, more illiberal, and more vertically organized country. He’d defied the European Union on several occasions, all

Kaleb Cole is an extremist version of Steve Bannon—with guns. Cole is the leader of the Atomwaffen Division (AWD) in Washington state. A white supremacist group with cells in 20 U.S. states, the AWD is dedicated to precipitating a global race war, drawing its inspiration from such sources as Nazism and cult leader Charles Manson.¹ In December 2018, Cole embarked on a 25-day tour of Europe. In Poland, he visited Auschwitz where he took a selfie with an Atomwaffen flag. In Ukraine, he attended a neo-Nazi music festival. His trip was also focused on creating a global network of