Explore the vast range of titles available.

Growing recognition in both the psychological and management literature of the concept of \"good people\" has caused a paradigm shift in our understanding of wrongful behavior: Wrongdoings that were previously assumed to be based on conscious choice—that is, deliberate decisions—are often the product of intuitive processes that prevent people from recognizing the wrongfulness of their behavior. Several leading scholars have dubbed this process as an ethical \"blind spot.\" This study explores the main implications of the good people paradigm on the regulation of employees' conflicts of interest. In two experiments, we examined the efficacy of traditional deterrence- and morality-based interventions in encouraging people to maintain their professional integrity and objectivity at the cost of their own self-interest. Results demonstrate that while the manipulated conflict was likely to \"corrupt\" people under intuitive/automatic mindset (Experiment 1), explicit/deliberative mechanisms (both deterrence- and morality-based) had a much larger constraining effect overall on participants' judgment than did implicit measures, with no differences between deterrence and morality (Experiment 2). The findings demonstrate how little is needed to compromise the employees' ethical integrity, but they also suggest that a modest explicit/deliberative intervention can easily prevent much of the wrongdoing that may otherwise result.

Attitudes of public groups towards behavioral policy interventions (or nudges) can be important for both the policy makers who design and deploy nudges, and to researchers who try to understand when and why some nudges are supported while others are not. Until now, research on public attitudes towards nudges has focused on either state- or country-level comparisons, or on correlations with individual-level traits, and has neglected to study how different social groups (such as minorities) might view nudges. Using a large and representative sample, we tested the attitudes of two distinct minority groups in Israel (Israeli Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews), and discovered that nudges that operated against a minority group’s held social norms, promoting a more general societal goal not aligned with the group’s norms, were often less supported by minorities. Contrary to expectations, these differences could not be explained by differences in trust in the government applying these nudges. We discuss implications for public policy and for the research and applications of behavioral interventions.

Social enforcement is becoming a key feature of regulatory policy. Increasingly, statutes rely on individuals to report misconduct, yet the incentives they provide to encourage such enforcement vary significantly. Despite the clear policy benefits that flow from understanding the factors that facilitate social enforcement, i.e., the act of individual reporting of illegal behavior, the field remains largely understudied. Using a series of experimental surveys of a representative panel of over 2,000 employees, this Article compares the effect of different regulatory mechanisms-monetary rewards, protective rights, positive obligations, and liabilities-on individual motivation and behavior. By exploring the interplay between internal and external enforcement motivation, these experiments provide novel insights into the comparative advantages of legal mechanisms that incentivize compliance and social enforcement. At the policy-making level, the study offers important practical findings about the costs and benefits of different regulatory systems, including findings about inadvertent counterproductive effects of certain legal incentives. In particular, the findings indicate that in some cases offering monetary rewards to whistle-blowers will lead to less, rather than more, reporting of illegality. At the more theoretical level, the findings contribute to several strands of inquiry, including motivational crowding-out effects, framing biases, the existence of a \"holier-than-thou effect,\" and gender differences among social enforcers. Together, these findings portray a psychological schema that offers invaluable guidance for policy and regulatory design. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

The morality of killing in war, which has been the subject of debate among philosophers and legal scholars, focuses on two main approaches: the “traditional” and the “revisionist.” The traditional approach argues for symmetry: soldiers of both sides are liable to be killed, whether or not the war they fight is just; civilians are immune from being harmed whether or not they are responsible for the evil against which the just side fights. Recently this approach has been challenged by a revisionist viewpoint, which derives the morality of killing in war from facts concerning the responsibility of individuals for wrongful threats. Killing soldiers, who fight a just war, is morally impermissible, whereas in certain cases killing civilians who are involved in an unjust aggression is permissible. The present study uses an experimental survey to examine whether moral attitudes toward targeting individuals in war are shaped by the factors underlying this debate: the cause of the war, the status of the targeted individuals as soldiers or civilians, and their involvement in the war effort. Respondents comprised a representative sample of the Jewish population in Israel. Our findings reveal a complex interplay between the factors, demonstrating the relevance of each factor to moral judgments. Notably, participants did not consider decisions on the battlefield to be independent of the justification of the war, a result which is consistent with the revisionist approach. We discuss the potential consequences of our findings on the understanding of commonsense morality and on the law. We also suggest that concepts derived from the social-psychological literature concerning moral self-regulation may help explain some of our findings.

Law and economics scholarship suggests that, in appropriate cases, the law can improve people’s behavior by changing their preferences. For example, the law can curb discriminatory hiring practices by providing employers with information that might change their discriminatory preference. Supposedly, if employers no longer prefer one class of employees to another, they will simply stop discriminating, with no need for further legal intervention. The current Article aims to add some depth to this familiar analysis by introducing the insights of behavioral ethics into the law and economics literature on preference change. Behavioral ethics research shows that wrongdoing often originates from semi-deliberative or non-deliberative cognitive processes. These findings suggest that the process of preference change through the use of the law is markedly more complicated and nuanced than previously appreciated. For instance, even if an employer’s explicit discriminatory stance is changed, and the employer no longer consciously prefers one class of employees over another, discriminatory behavior might persist if it originates from semi-conscious, habitual, or non-deliberative decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, actual change in behavior might necessitate a close engagement with people’s level of moral awareness. We discuss the institutional and normative implications of these insights and evaluate their significance for the attempt to improve preferences through the different functions of the legal system.

Most companies use codes of conduct, ethics training, and regular communication to ensure that employees know about rules to follow to avoid misconduct. In the present research, we focused on the type of language used in codes of conduct and showed that impersonal language (e.g., “employees” or “members”) and personal, communal language (e.g., “we”) lead to different behaviors because they change how people perceive the group or organization of which they are a part. Using multiple methods, including lab- and field-based experiments (total N = 1,443), and a large data set of S&P 500 firms (i.e., publicly traded, large U.S. companies that are part of the S&P 500 stock market index), we robustly demonstrated that personal, communal language (compared with impersonal language) influences perceptions of a group’s warmth, which, in turn, increases levels of dishonesty among its members.

In designing a recycling policy, the regulator must choose among multiple instruments. Our study seeks to address the linkages between the choice of regulatory instruments and institutional frameworks, people's intrinsic motivation, and various attitudinal measures. We examined the behavioral repercussions of several instruments that are used widely in recycling regulation, using an experimental survey on a representative sample of the Israeli population (N = 1,800 participants). Our findings suggest that the design of recycling policies should be sensitive to the framing effects of varied regulatory instruments and to the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on the desirability and efficacy of the law. In particular, we point out the potential regulatory advantage of using deposit schemes over other instruments and of using private organizations as regulatory agents. Drawing on these findings, we discuss the potential value of using differentiated regulatory policies to provide incentives for recycling in societies characterized by broad heterogeneity in levels of intrinsic motivation.

This Article offers a novel analysis of the field of corporate governance by viewing it through the lens of behavioral ethics. It calls for both shifting the focus of corporate governance to a new set of loci of potential corporate wrongdoing and adding new tools to the corporate governance arsenal. Behavioral ethics scholarship emphasizes that the large share of wrongdoing is generated by \"good people\" whose intention is to act ethically. Their wrongdoing stems from \"bounded ethicality\"-various cognitive and motivational limitations in their ethical decision-making processes-that leads to biased decisions that seem legitimate. Bounded ethicality has important implications for a wide range of topics in corporate governance, like board structure, independent directors, regulation of institutional investors and proxy advisory firms, the business judgment rule, corporate liability, and intraboard fiduciary duties. In the legal domain, corporate law provides the most fertile ground for the application of behavioral ethics. It encapsulates many of the features that the behavioral ethics literature finds to confound the ethical judgment of good people, like principal-agent relations, group decisions, victim remoteness, vague directives, and subtle conflicts of interest. Behavioral ethics suggests a view of corporate law that is dramatically different than that portrayed by traditional legal and economic theorists. Not only does it suggest that wrongdoing can be committed by well-intentioned people who wish to do right, but also that the biases they display call for a radically different set of legal interventions than those advocated by standard economic theory. If standard theory views corporate agents as self-interest-maximizers, bounded ethicality perceives them as actors with varied and nuanced ethical motivations that could benefit from subtle legal reforms. This Article's assessment of corporate governance through the behavioral ethical lens proceeds in three stages. First, it exposes potential wrongdoing by good people that conventional corporate governance does not address. Second, it suggests novel corporate governance interventions supported by behavioral ethics to address wrongdoing by good people. Finally, it identifies existing interventions that, according to behavioral ethics analysis, may have unintended adverse effects on the behavior of well-meaning corporate officers and exacerbate wrongdoing instead of mitigating it.

Even people who think of themselves as being ethical (“good people”) may engage in corrupt actions. In fact, the situations that seem least problematic can sometimes cause good people to behave immorally. Behavioral ethics research has demonstrated that various unconscious and self-deceptive mental processes promote such behavior in those individuals. To reduce the frequency of misbehavior by normally well-intentioned individuals, policymakers need to be aware that classic approaches to limiting corruption sometimes increase the likelihood that good people will engage in misconduct. Regulators also need to expand their toolbox beyond formal ethical codes and financial incentives by adding preventive interventions that are based on behavioral ethics research.