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The current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is the first to apply whole-genome sequencing near to real time, with over 2 million severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) whole-genome sequences generated and shared through the GISAID platform. This genomic resource informed public health decision-making throughout the pandemic; it also allowed detection of mutations that might affect virulence, pathogenesis, host range or immune escape as well as the effectiveness of SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics and therapeutics. However, genotype-to-phenotype predictions cannot be performed at the rapid pace of genomic sequencing. To prepare for the next phase of the pandemic, a systematic approach is needed to link global genomic surveillance and timely assessment of the phenotypic characteristics of novel variants, which will support the development and updating of diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics and nonpharmaceutical interventions. This Review summarizes the current knowledge on key viral mutations and variants and looks to the next phase of surveillance of the evolving pandemic. This Review summarizes the current knowledge on key viral mutations and variants and looks to the next phase of pandemic surveillance with a focus on genotype-to-phenotype characterization.

Acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) is a fatal complication of influenza infection. In this Review we provide an integrated model for its pathogenesis. ARDS involves damage to the epithelial–endothelial barrier, fluid leakage into the alveolar lumen, and respiratory insufficiency. The most important part of the epithelial–endothelial barrier is the alveolar epithelium, strengthened by tight junctions. Influenza virus targets these epithelial cells, reducing sodium pump activity, damaging tight junctions, and killing infected cells. Infected epithelial cells produce cytokines that attract leucocytes—neutrophils and macrophages—and activate adjacent endothelial cells. Activated endothelial cells and infiltrated leucocytes stimulate further infiltration, and leucocytes induce production of reactive oxygen species and nitric oxide that damage the barrier. Activated macrophages also cause direct apoptosis of epithelial cells. This model for influenza-induced ARDS differs from the classic model, which is centred on endothelial damage, and provides a rationale for therapeutic intervention to moderate host response in influenza-induced ARDS.

SARS-CoV-2, a coronavirus that emerged in late 2019, has spread rapidly worldwide, and information about the modes of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 among humans is critical to apply appropriate infection control measures and to slow its spread. Here we show that SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted efficiently via direct contact and via the air (via respiratory droplets and/or aerosols) between ferrets, 1 to 3 days and 3 to 7 days after exposure respectively. The pattern of virus shedding in the direct contact and indirect recipient ferrets is similar to that of the inoculated ferrets and infectious virus is isolated from all positive animals, showing that ferrets are productively infected via either route. This study provides experimental evidence of robust transmission of SARS-CoV-2 via the air, supporting the implementation of community-level social distancing measures currently applied in many countries in the world and informing decisions on infection control measures in healthcare settings. SARS-CoV-2 has rapidly spread globally and animal models to study transmission are needed. Here, Richard et al. show efficient transmission of SARS-CoV-2 between ferrets via direct contact and via the air, through respiratory droplets and/or aerosols.

SARS-CoV-2 emerged in late 2019 and caused a pandemic, whereas the closely related SARS-CoV was contained rapidly in 2003. Here, an experimental set-up is used to study transmission of SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 through the air between ferrets over more than a meter distance. Both viruses cause a robust productive respiratory tract infection resulting in transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to two of four indirect recipient ferrets and SARS-CoV to all four. A control pandemic A/H1N1 influenza virus also transmits efficiently. Serological assays confirm all virus transmission events. Although the experiments do not discriminate between transmission via small aerosols, large droplets and fomites, these results demonstrate that SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 can remain infectious while traveling through the air. Efficient virus transmission between ferrets is in agreement with frequent SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in mink farms. Although the evidence for virus transmission via the air between humans under natural conditions is absent or weak for SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2, ferrets may represent a sensitive model to study interventions aimed at preventing virus transmission. Some epidemiological data suggests that SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted through the air over longer distances. Here, Kutter et al. show in the ferret model that SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV can be transmitted through the air over more than a meter distance, however, data should be interpreted with care, as ferrets are likely more susceptible to coronavirus infections.

On June 24, 2012, a 60-year-old man died of progressive respiratory infection in Saudi Arabia. A novel coronavirus was identified as a potential cause of this severe illness. Subsequently, a second patient was reported to have severe illness associated with this coronavirus. Coronaviruses are enveloped, single-stranded, positive-sense RNA viruses that are phenotypically and genotypically diverse. 1 Coronaviruses are widespread in bats around the world but can be found in many other species as well, including birds, cats, dogs, pigs, mice, horses, whales, and humans. 1 They may cause respiratory, enteric, hepatic, or neurologic diseases, with variable severity in various animal species. In humans, four respiratory coronaviruses — human coronaviruses (HCoV) 229E, OC43, NL63, and HKU1 — are known to be endemic. In addition, in 2003 a previously unknown coronavirus caused an outbreak of SARS in humans. 2 – 4 The diversity of coronaviruses is facilitated by . . .

Human influenza A viruses are known to be transmitted via the air from person to person. It is unknown from which anatomical site of the respiratory tract influenza A virus transmission occurs. Here, pairs of genetically tagged and untagged influenza A/H1N1, A/H3N2 and A/H5N1 viruses that are transmissible via the air are used to co-infect donor ferrets via the intranasal and intratracheal routes to cause an upper and lower respiratory tract infection, respectively. In all transmission cases, we observe that the viruses in the recipient ferrets are of the same genotype as the viruses inoculated intranasally, demonstrating that they are expelled from the upper respiratory tract of ferrets rather than from trachea or the lower airways. Moreover, influenza A viruses that are transmissible via the air preferentially infect ferret and human nasal respiratory epithelium. These results indicate that virus replication in the upper respiratory tract, the nasal respiratory epithelium in particular, of donors is a driver for transmission of influenza A viruses via the air. Here, the authors perform simultaneous inoculation of genetically tagged influenza A virus in ferrets and show that airborne transmissible viruses are preferentially transmitted from the upper respiratory tract, which correlates with high replication ability in the ferret and human nasal respiratory epithelium.

Wild birds may spread the H5N8 virus In November and December 2014, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5 subtype originating from China were detected in poultry and wild birds in various countries of Asia and Europe, and, for the first time, in North America. These incursions of newly emerging HPAI H5 viruses constitute a threat to animal and potentially human health and raise questions about the routes of transmission.

The outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza of the H5N1 subtype in Asia, which has subsequently spread to Russia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, has put increased focus on the role of wild birds in the persistence of influenza viruses. The ecology, epidemiology, genetics, and evolution of pathogens cannot be fully understood without taking into account the ecology of their hosts. Here, we review our current knowledge on global patterns of influenza virus infections in wild birds, discuss these patterns in the context of host ecology and in particular birds' behavior, and identify some important gaps in our current knowledge.

Although extensive data exist on avian influenza in wild birds in North America, limited information is available from elsewhere, including Europe. Here, molecular diagnostic tools were employed for high-throughput surveillance of migratory birds, as an alternative to classical labor-intensive methods of virus isolation in eggs. This study included 36,809 samples from 323 bird species belonging to 18 orders, of which only 25 species of three orders were positive for influenza A virus. Information on species, locations, and timing is provided for all samples tested. Seven previously unknown host species for avian influenza virus were identified: barnacle goose, bean goose, brent goose, pink-footed goose, bewick's swan, common gull, and guillemot. Dabbling ducks were more frequently infected than other ducks and Anseriformes; this distinction was probably related to bird behavior rather than population sizes. Waders did not appear to play a role in the epidemiology of avian influenza in Europe, in contrast to the Americas. The high virus prevalence in ducks in Europe in spring as compared with North America could explain the differences in virus-host ecology between these continents. Most influenza A virus subtypes were detected in ducks, but H13 and H16 subtypes were detected primarily in gulls. Viruses of subtype H6 were more promiscuous in host range than other subtypes. Temporal and spatial variation in influenza virus prevalence in wild birds was observed, with influenza A virus prevalence varying by sampling location; this is probably related to migration patterns from northeast to southwest and a higher prevalence farther north along the flyways. We discuss the ecology and epidemiology of avian influenza A virus in wild birds in relation to host ecology and compare our results with published studies. These data are useful for designing new surveillance programs and are particularly relevant due to increased interest in avian influenza in wild birds.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 virus can cause morbidity and mortality in humans but thus far has not acquired the ability to be transmitted by aerosol or respiratory droplet (\"airbome transmission\") between humans. To address the concern that the virus could acquire this ability under natural conditions, we genetically modified A/H5N1 virus by site-directed mutagenesis and subsequent serial passage in ferrets. The genetically modified A/H5N1 virus acquired mutations during passage in ferrets, ultimately becoming airborne transmissible in ferrets. None of the recipient ferrets died after airborne infection with the mutant A/H5N1 viruses. Four amino acid substitutions in the host receptor-binding protein hemagglutinin, and one in the polymerase complex protein basic polymerase 2, were consistently present in airborne-transmitted viruses. The transmissible viruses were sensitive to the antiviral drug oseltamivir and reacted well with antisera raised against H5 influenza vaccine strains. Thus, avian A/H5N1 influenza viruses can acquire the capacity for airborne transmission between mammals without recombination in an intermediate host and therefore constitute a risk for human pandemic influenza.