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"Frydman, Carola"
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Rising Through the Ranks: The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Executives, 1936–2003
I present new stylized facts on the market for managers over the twentieth century, utilizing a novel data set on managerial careers. From the 1930s to the mid-1970s, the level of executive pay, inequality among executives across and within firms, and mobility were low. These patterns have reversed since then. I document that an increase in the importance of general managerial human capital can account for this change. The level of general skills, measured by the type of education and occupational mobility of managers, correlate with higher pay and turnover. Other factors may have also contributed to these changes, but the labor market for managers has likely played an important role.
This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.
Journal Article
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005
We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new dataset of top officers of large firms from 1936 to 2005. The median real value of compensation was remarkably flat from the late 1940s to the 1970s, revealing a weak relationship between pay and aggregate firm growth. By contrast, this correlation was much stronger in the past thirty years. This historical perspective also suggests that compensation arrangements have often helped to align managerial incentives with those of shareholders because executive wealth was sensitive to firm performance for most of our sample. These new facts pose a challenge to several common explanations for the rise in executive pay since the 1980s.
Journal Article
CEO Compensation
This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a competitive market for managerial talent. We describe and discuss the empirical evidence on the evolution of CEO pay and on the relationship between pay and firm performance since the 1930s. Our review suggests that both managerial power and competitive market forces are important determinants of CEO pay, but that neither approach is fully consistent with the available evidence. We briefly discuss promising directions for future research.
Journal Article
Rising Through the Ranks: The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Executives, 1936-2003
I present new stylized facts on the market for managers over the twentieth century, utilizing a novel data set on managerial careers. From the 1930s to the mid1970s, the level of executive pay, inequality among executives across and within firms, and mobility were low. These patterns have reversed since then. I document that an increase in the importance of general managerial human capital can account for this change. The level of general skills, measured by the type of education and occupational mobility of managers, correlate with higher pay and turnover. Other factors may have also contributed to these changes, but the labor market for managers has likely played an important role.
Journal Article
Investment Banks as Corporate Monitors in the Early Twentieth Century United States
We study the effect of financial relationships on firms' investment decisions and access to external finance. In the early twentieth century, securities underwriters commonly held directorships with American corporations. Section 10 of the Clayton Antitrust Act prohibited bankers from serving on the boards of railroads for which they underwrote securities. We find that following the implementation of Section 10, railroads with strong preexisting relationships with underwriters saw declines in their investment rates, valuations, and leverage, and increases in their costs of external funds. Reassuringly, we do not observe similar effects among industrials and utilities, which were not subject to Section 10. Our results are consistent with underwriters on corporate boards acting as delegated monitors, and highlight the potential for regulations intended to address conflicts of interest to disrupt valuable information flows.
Journal Article
The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Executives across the Twentieth Century
Another significant trend in managerial compensation has been a marked transformation in the structure of pay over the sample period: stock option grants and other forms of incentive pay have been growing shares of total compensation ever since the 1950s. Earlier in the twentieth century corporate executives faced exceedingly high marginal personal income tax rates, which created an incentive for firms to search for alternative ways to remunerate top executives.
Journal Article
Economic Effects of Runs on Early “Shadow Banks”: Trust Companies and the Impact of the Panic of 1907
We study the effects of a contraction in financial intermediation on nonfinancial firms. The Panic of 1907 originated in the shadow banks of the time, New York’s trust companies. The runs were caused by a shock unrelated to the trust companies’ nonfinancial corporate clients. In the years following the panic, corporations affiliated with the worst-affected trusts made fewer capital investments, paid lower dividends, and suffered lower profitability and higher borrowing costs relative to firms without such connections. The shock to New York’s trust companies accounted for at least 18.4 percent of the decline in corporate investment in the United States in 1908.
Journal Article
Human capital in history : the American record
America's expansion to one of the richest nations in the world was partly due to a steady increase in labor productivity, which in turn depends upon the invention and deployment of new technologies and on investments in both human and physical capital. The accumulation of human capital—the knowledge and skill of workers—has featured prominently in American economic leadership over the past two centuries.
Human Capital in History brings together contributions from leading researchers in economic history, labor economics, the economics of education, and related fields. Building on Claudia Goldin's landmark research on the labor history of the United States, the authors consider the roles of education and technology in contributing to American economic growth and well-being, the experience of women in the workforce, and how trends in marriage and family affected broader economic outcomes. The volume provides important new insights on the forces that affect the accumulation of human capital.
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