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112 result(s) for "Fuhrmann, Matthew"
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Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.
Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence
How can states signal their alliance commitments? Although scholars have developed sophisticated theoretical models of costly signaling in international relations, we know little about which specific policies leaders can implement to signal their commitments. This article addresses this question with respect to the extended deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. Can nuclear states deter attacks against their friends by simply announcing their defense commitments? Or must they deploy nuclear weapons on a protégé's territory before an alliance is seen as credible? Using a new dataset on foreign nuclear deployments from 1950 to 2000, our analysis reveals two main findings. First, formal alliances with nuclear states appear to carry significant deterrence benefits. Second, however, stationing nuclear weapons on a protégé's territory does not bolster these effects. The analysis yields new insights about the dynamics of \"hand-tying\" and \"sunk cost\" signals in international politics.
When Do Leaders Free-Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense
The logic of free-riding expects that individuals will underinvest in public goods, but people often behave in ways that are inconsistent with this prediction. Why do we observe variation in free-riding behavior? This study addresses this question by examining contributions to an important international public good—collective defense in military alliances. It develops a behavioral theory of free-riding in which the beliefs of world leaders are important for explaining investments in public goods. The argument holds that leaders with business experience make smaller contributions to collective defense because they are egoistic and more comfortable relying on a powerful allyfor their defense. An analysis of defense expenditures in 17 non-U.S. members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1952 to 2014 provides evidence consistent with the theory. The findings suggest that leaders with business experience are more likely than other heads of government to act as self-interested utility maximizers.
Exporting Mass Destruction? The Determinants of Dual-Use Trade
This study applies well-known arguments on the effect of conflict, alliances, and democracy on international trade to identify the determinants of dual-use trade. Dual-use commodities are those that can be used in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or in legitimate civilian applications. This article advances a theory suggesting that governments seeking to maximize the gains from dual-use trade will promote exports to countries where there are security guarantees and restrict exports to countries where security threats exist. Eight hypotheses are tested using data on licensed dual-use exports from the United States to 128 countries between 1991 and 2001. The results indicate that democracy has a positive and significant effect on dual-use exports, while WMD acquisition or pursuit does not necessarily reduce states' access to such commodities. The results vary slightly, based on how dual-use exports are measured. In conducting the first systematic analysis on the determinants of dual-use trade, this study contributes to scholarly understanding of WMD proliferation and research at the nexus of international trade and international security. In particular, it offers important prescriptions for when states are likely to transfer technology that could be used to build WMD. It also encourages further work that disaggregates trade data to examine relationships between particular types of trade and conflict, alliances, free trade agreements, and other political variables.
Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation
What are the consequences of drone proliferation for international security? Despite extensive discussions in the policy world concerning drone strikes for counterterrorism purposes, myths about the capabilities and implications of current-generation drones often outstrip reality. Understanding the impact of drones requires separating fact from fiction by examining their effects in six different contexts—counterterrorism, interstate conflict, crisis onset and deterrence, coercive diplomacy, domestic control and repression, and use by non-state actors for the purposes of terrorism. Although current-generation drones introduce some unique capabilities into conflicts, they are unlikely to produce the dire consequences that some analysts fear. In particular, drone proliferation carries potentially significant consequences for counterterrorism operations and domestic control in authoritarian regimes. Drones could also enhance monitoring in disputed territories, potentially leading to greater stability. Given their technical limitations, however, current-generation drones are unlikely to have a large impact on interstate warfare. Assessing the consequences of drone proliferation has important implications for a range of policy issues, including the management of regional disputes, the regulation of drone exports, and defense against potential terrorist attacks on the homeland.
Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance commitments in war
Leeds et al. (2000) report that military alliance commitments are honored in war around 75% of the time. We update and extend data on alliance reliability from 1816 to 2003. Our analysis reveals a lower compliance rate overall: 50%. We find a sharp disparity in alliance reliability before and after World War II. States honored their alliance commitments 66% of the time prior to 1945 but the compliance rate drops to 22% from 1945 to 2003. Moreover, the rates of fulfillment for defense pacts (41%) and nonaggression pacts (37%) are dramatically lower than offensive alliances (74%) and neutrality agreements (78%). These findings carry implications for the role of military alliances in world politics and highlight the need for more research to explain the differences that emerge before and after World War II.
Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. In particular, countries that receive peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to initiate weapons programs and successfully develop the bomb, especially when they are also faced with security threats. Statistical analysis based on a new data set of more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed from 1950 to 2000 lends strong support for this argument. Brief case studies of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs provide further evidence of the links between peaceful nuclear assistance and proliferation. The finding that supplier countries inadvertently raise the risks of nuclear proliferation poses challenges to the conventional wisdom. Indeed, the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation is surprisingly broad. Even assistance that is often viewed as innocuous, such as training nuclear scientists or providing research or power reactors, increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will spread. \"Proliferation-proof\" nuclear assistance does not exist. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs.
Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
How do international arms control treaties influence state policies? This article investigates this question by analyzing the efficacy of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite fierce debate over the last several decades, scholars still lack a full understanding of whether or not the treaty \"works.\" This debate persists, in part, because existing studies suffer from a key limitation: they are not designed to infer a causal connection between NPT membership and nuclear proliferation.Prior research cannot determine whether membership in the treaty restrains states from developing nuclear weapons or simply reflects existing preferences. To address this limitation, this article accounts for selection effects by using a measure of states' ex ante treaty commitment preferences. Our analysis of nuclear proliferation from 1970 to 2000 provides evidence that the NPT has played a key role in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Even after accounting for strategic selection into the treaty, NPT ratification is robustly associated with a lower likelihood of pursuing nuclear weapons. Our results not only matter for debates over the NPT and nonproliferation but also have broad implications for the study of how international institutions affect international politics.