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The encoding of sensory information in the human brain is thought to be optimised by two principal processes: 'prediction' uses stored information to guide the interpretation of forthcoming sensory events, and 'attention' prioritizes these events according to their behavioural relevance. Despite the ubiquitous contributions of attention and prediction to various aspects of perception and cognition, it remains unknown how they interact to modulate information processing in the brain. A recent extension of predictive coding theory suggests that attention optimises the expected precision of predictions by modulating the synaptic gain of prediction error units. Because prediction errors code for the difference between predictions and sensory signals, this model would suggest that attention increases the selectivity for mismatch information in the neural response to a surprising stimulus. Alternative predictive coding models propose that attention increases the activity of prediction (or 'representation') neurons and would therefore suggest that attention and prediction synergistically modulate selectivity for 'feature information' in the brain. Here, we applied forward encoding models to neural activity recorded via electroencephalography (EEG) as human observers performed a simple visual task to test for the effect of attention on both mismatch and feature information in the neural response to surprising stimuli. Participants attended or ignored a periodic stream of gratings, the orientations of which could be either predictable, surprising, or unpredictable. We found that surprising stimuli evoked neural responses that were encoded according to the difference between predicted and observed stimulus features, and that attention facilitated the encoding of this type of information in the brain. These findings advance our understanding of how attention and prediction modulate information processing in the brain, as well as support the theory that attention optimises precision expectations during hierarchical inference by increasing the gain of prediction errors.

Neurocomputational accounts of psychosis propose mechanisms for how information is integrated into a predictive model of the world, in attempts to understand the occurrence of altered perceptual experiences. Conflicting Bayesian theories postulate aberrations in either top-down or bottom-up processing. The top-down theory predicts an overreliance on prior beliefs or expectations resulting in aberrant perceptual experiences, whereas the bottom-up theory predicts an overreliance on current sensory information, as aberrant salience is directed towards objectively uninformative stimuli. This study empirically adjudicates between these models. We use a perceptual decision-making task in a neurotypical population with varying degrees of psychotic-like experiences. Bayesian modelling was used to compute individuals’ reliance on prior relative to sensory information. Across two datasets (discovery dataset n = 363; independent replication in validation dataset n = 782) we showed that psychotic-like experiences were associated with an overweighting of sensory information relative to prior expectations, which seem to be driven by decreased precision afforded to prior information. However, when prior information was more uncertain, participants with greater psychotic-like experiences encoded sensory information with greater noise. Greater psychotic-like experiences were associated with aberrant precision in the encoding both prior and likelihood information, which we suggest may be related to generally heightened perceptions of task instability. Our study lends empirical support to notions of both weaker bottom-up and weaker (rather than stronger) top-down perceptual processes, as well as aberrancies in belief updating that extend into the non-clinical continuum of psychosis.

The very earliest stages of sensory processing have the potential to alter how we perceive and respond to our environment. These initial processing circuits can incorporate subcortical regions, such as the thalamus and brainstem nuclei, which mediate complex interactions with the brain’s cortical processing hierarchy. These subcortical pathways, many of which we share with other animals, are not merely vestigial but appear to function as ‘shortcuts’ that ensure processing efficiency and preservation of vital life-preserving functions, such as harm avoidance, adaptive social interactions and efficient decision-making. Here, we propose that functional interactions between these higher-order and lower-order brain areas contribute to atypical sensory and cognitive processing that characterizes numerous neuropsychiatric disorders.Early processing in subcortical areas has been underemphasized in models of how perception and cognition are altered in psychiatric disorders. Here, McFadyen and colleagues review recent discoveries in how subcortical–cortical dynamics contribute to perception and higher-order cognition.

The Organization for Human Brain Mapping (OHBM) has been active in advocating for the instantiation of best practices in neuroimaging data acquisition, analysis, reporting and sharing of both data and analysis code to deal with issues in science related to reproducibility and replicability. Here we summarize recommendations for such practices in magnetoencephalographic (MEG) and electroencephalographic (EEG) research, recently developed by the OHBM neuroimaging community known by the abbreviated name of COBIDAS MEEG. We discuss the rationale for the guidelines and their general content, which encompass many topics under active discussion in the field. We highlight future opportunities and challenges to maximizing the sharing and exploitation of MEG and EEG data, and we also discuss how this ‘living’ set of guidelines will evolve to continually address new developments in neurophysiological assessment methods and multimodal integration of neurophysiological data with other data types.The Organization for Human Brain Mapping presents its best practices report for reproducible EEG and MEG research, highlighting issues and main recommendations in this Perspective.

Rapidly detecting salient information in our environments is critical for survival. Visual processing in subcortical areas like the pulvinar and amygdala has been shown to facilitate unconscious processing of salient stimuli. It is unknown, however, if and how these areas might interact with cortical regions to facilitate faster conscious perception of salient stimuli. Here we investigated these neural processes using 7T functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in concert with computational modelling while participants (n = 33) engaged in a breaking continuous flash suppression paradigm (bCFS) in which fearful and neutral faces are initially suppressed from conscious perception but then eventually ‘breakthrough’ into awareness. Participants reported faster breakthrough times for fearful faces compared with neutral faces. Drift‐diffusion modelling suggested that perceptual evidence was accumulated at a faster rate for fearful faces compared with neutral faces. For both neutral and fearful faces, faster response times were associated with greater activity in the amygdala (specifically within its subregions, including superficial, basolateral and amygdalo‐striatal transition area) and the insula. Faster rates of evidence accumulation coincided with greater activity in frontoparietal regions and occipital lobe, as well as the amygdala. A lower decision‐boundary correlated with activity in the insula and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), but not with the amygdala. Overall, our findings suggest that hastened perceptual awareness of salient stimuli recruits the amygdala and, more specifically, is driven by accelerated evidence accumulation in fronto‐parietal and visual areas. In sum, we have mapped distinct neural computations that accelerate perceptual awareness of visually suppressed faces. Overall, our findings suggest that hastened perceptual awareness of salient stimuli recruits the amygdala and, more specifically, is driven by accelerated evidence accumulation in fronto‐parietal and visual areas.

Bayesian inference suggests that perception is inferred from a weighted integration of prior contextual beliefs with current sensory evidence (likelihood) about the world around us. The perceived precision or uncertainty associated with prior and likelihood information is used to guide perceptual decision-making, such that more weight is placed on the source of information with greater precision. This provides a framework for understanding a spectrum of clinical transdiagnostic symptoms associated with aberrant perception, as well as individual differences in the general population. While behavioral paradigms are commonly used to characterize individual differences in perception as a stable characteristic, measurement reliability in these behavioral tasks is rarely assessed. To remedy this gap, we empirically evaluate the reliability of a perceptual decision-making task that quantifies individual differences in Bayesian belief updating in terms of the relative precision weighting afforded to prior and likelihood information (i.e., sensory weight). We analyzed data from participants ( n = 37) who performed this task twice. We found that the precision afforded to prior and likelihood information showed high internal consistency and good test–retest reliability (ICC = 0.73, 95% CI [0.53, 0.85]) when averaged across participants, as well as at the individual level using hierarchical modeling. Our results provide support for the assumption that Bayesian belief updating operates as a stable characteristic in perceptual decision-making. We discuss the utility and applicability of reliable perceptual decision-making paradigms as a measure of individual differences in the general population, as well as a diagnostic tool in psychiatric research.

We constantly look for patterns in the environment that allow us to learn its key regularities. These regularities are fundamental in enabling us to make predictions about what is likely to happen next. The physiological study of regularity extraction has focused primarily on repetitive sequence-based rules within the sensory environment, or on stimulus-outcome associations in the context of reward-based decision-making. Here we ask whether we implicitly encode non-sequential stochastic regularities, and detect violations therein. We addressed this question using a novel experimental design and both behavioural and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) metrics associated with responses to pure-tone sounds with frequencies sampled from a Gaussian distribution. We observed that sounds in the tail of the distribution evoked a larger response than those that fell at the centre. This response resembled the mismatch negativity (MMN) evoked by surprising or unlikely events in traditional oddball paradigms. Crucially, responses to physically identical outliers were greater when the distribution was narrower. These results show that humans implicitly keep track of the uncertainty induced by apparently random distributions of sensory events. Source reconstruction suggested that the statistical-context-sensitive responses arose in a temporo-parietal network, areas that have been associated with attention orientation to unexpected events. Our results demonstrate a very early neurophysiological marker of the brain's ability to implicitly encode complex statistical structure in the environment. We suggest that this sensitivity provides a computational basis for our ability to make perceptual inferences in noisy environments and to make decisions in an uncertain world.

The mismatch negativity (MMN) is an event related potential evoked by violations of regularity. Here, we present a model of the underlying neuronal dynamics based upon the idea that auditory cortex continuously updates a generative model to predict its sensory inputs. The MMN is then modelled as the superposition of the electric fields evoked by neuronal activity reporting prediction errors. The process by which auditory cortex generates predictions and resolves prediction errors was simulated using generalised (Bayesian) filtering--a biologically plausible scheme for probabilistic inference on the hidden states of hierarchical dynamical models. The resulting scheme generates realistic MMN waveforms, explains the qualitative effects of deviant probability and magnitude on the MMN - in terms of latency and amplitude--and makes quantitative predictions about the interactions between deviant probability and magnitude. This work advances a formal understanding of the MMN and--more generally--illustrates the potential for developing computationally informed dynamic causal models of empirical electromagnetic responses.

The mismatch negativity (MMN) is a differential brain response to violations of learned regularities. It has been used to demonstrate that the brain learns the statistical structure of its environment and predicts future sensory inputs. However, the algorithmic nature of these computations and the underlying neurobiological implementation remain controversial. This article introduces a mathematical framework with which competing ideas about the computational quantities indexed by MMN responses can be formalized and tested against single-trial EEG data. This framework was applied to five major theories of the MMN, comparing their ability to explain trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude. Three of these theories (predictive coding, model adjustment, and novelty detection) were formalized by linking the MMN to different manifestations of the same computational mechanism: approximate Bayesian inference according to the free-energy principle. We thereby propose a unifying view on three distinct theories of the MMN. The relative plausibility of each theory was assessed against empirical single-trial MMN amplitudes acquired from eight healthy volunteers in a roving oddball experiment. Models based on the free-energy principle provided more plausible explanations of trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude than models representing the two more traditional theories (change detection and adaptation). Our results suggest that the MMN reflects approximate Bayesian learning of sensory regularities, and that the MMN-generating process adjusts a probabilistic model of the environment according to prediction errors.

Numerous studies have found that the Bayesian framework, which formulates the optimal integration of the knowledge of the world (i.e. prior) and current sensory evidence (i.e. likelihood), captures human behaviours sufficiently well. However, there are debates regarding whether humans use precise but cognitively demanding Bayesian computations for behaviours. Across two studies, we trained participants to estimate hidden locations of a target drawn from priors with different levels of uncertainty. In each trial, scattered dots provided noisy likelihood information about the target location. Participants showed that they learned the priors and combined prior and likelihood information to infer target locations in a Bayes fashion. We then introduced a transfer condition presenting a trained prior and a likelihood that has never been put together during training. How well participants integrate this novel likelihood with their learned prior is an indicator of whether participants perform Bayesian computations. In one study, participants experienced the newly introduced likelihood, which was paired with a different prior, during training. Participants changed likelihood weighting following expected directions although the degrees of change were significantly lower than Bayes-optimal predictions. In another group, the novel likelihoods were never used during training. We found people integrated a new likelihood within (interpolation) better than the one outside (extrapolation) the range of their previous learning experience and they were quantitatively Bayes-suboptimal in both. We replicated the findings of both studies in a validation dataset. Our results showed that Bayesian behaviours may not always be achieved by a full Bayesian computation. Future studies can apply our approach to different tasks to enhance the understanding of decision-making mechanisms.