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العقل البيولوجي
يتناول هذا الكتاب أسئلة ويجيب عليها مثل هل يتشكل العقل بالجينات أم بالبيئة؟ وإذا كانت الصفات العقلية قد نشأت نتيجة للتكيفات التي تمت عبر آلآف السنين كما يزعم علماء النفس التطوريون فكيف يمكن اختبار ذلك الزعم؟ يجيب هذا الكتاب العقل البيولوجي مدخل فلسفي أغوار هذه الأسئلة وغيرها مستخدما البيولوجيا والفلسفة لتعريف وتقييم طبيعة العقل وبناء على الأركان الأربعة الأساسية للبيولوجيا التطورية والبيولوجيا الجزئية والوراثة وعلم الأعصاب والطب الحيوي والطب النفسي.
Book
Functions and Populations: Sharpening the Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function
The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I revise GSE by articulating a notion of population that is fit for purpose and showing that its selection is not arbitrary but flows from the realist commitments of the selected effects theory.
Journal Article
A Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function
I present and defend the generalized selected effects (GSE) theory of function. According to GSE, the function of a trait consists in the activity that contributed to its bearer’s differential reproduction, or differential retention, within a population. Unlike the traditional selected effects (SE) theory, it does not require that the functional trait helped its bearer reproduce; differential retention is enough. Although the core theory has been presented previously, I go significantly beyond those presentations by providing a new argument for GSE and defending it from a recent objection. I also sketch its implications for teleosemantics and philosophy of medicine.
Journal Article
There Are No Ahistorical Theories of Function
Theories of function are conventionally divided up into historical and ahistorical ones. Proponents of ahistorical theories often cite the ahistoricity of their accounts as a major virtue. Here, I argue that none of the mainstream \"ahistorical\" accounts are actually ahistorical. All of them refer, implicitly or explicitly, to history. In Boorse's goal-contribution account, history is latent in the idea of statistical typicality. In the propensity theory, history is implicit in the idea of a species' natural habitat. In the causal role theory, history is required for making sense of dysfunction. I elaborate some consequences for the functions debate.
Journal Article
The origin of the coding metaphor in neuroscience
To assess Brette's proposal to expunge “coding” from the neuroscientist's lexicon, we must consider its origins. The coding metaphor is due largely to British nerve physiologist Edgar Adrian. I suggest two ways that the coding metaphor fueled his research. I conclude that the debate today should not be about the “truth” of the metaphor but about its continuing utility.
Journal Article
Do transposable elements have functions of their very own?
Philosophers who study the problem of biological function often begin their deliberations by reflecting on the functions of parts of animals, or the behavior of animals. Applying theories of biological function to unconventional or borderline cases can help us to better evaluate and refine those theories. This is the case when we consider whether parts of transposable elements (TEs)—bits of “selfish” DNA that move about within a host genome—have functions of their own, that is, whether the parts of TEs have the function of helping the TE move about within the genome. Here I argue that whether or not the parts of TEs have functions depends crucially on whether collections of TEs form “populations,” by which I mean, here, a group of individuals of the same type that impact one another’s chances of persistence or multiplication, by impacting one another’s access to a shared resource. I think there is suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence that some TEs have functions of their own. Considering the problem of TE functionality, then, has value both for philosophy and for biology.
Journal Article
How to Be a Function Pluralist
I distinguish two forms of pluralism about biological functions, between-discipline pluralism and within-discipline pluralism. Between-discipline pluralism holds that different theories of function are appropriate for different subdisciplines of biology and psychology (for example, that the selected effects theory of function is appropriate for some branches of evolutionary biology, and the causal role theory is appropriate for disciplines such as molecular biology, neuroscience, or psychology). I provide reasons for rejecting this view. Instead, I recommend within-discipline pluralism, which emphasizes the plurality of function concepts at play within any given subdiscipline of biology and psychology.
1 Introduction2 Different Disciplines, Different Functions3 Two Arguments for Between-Discipline Pluralism4 Two Objections against the Arguments for Between-Discipline Pluralism5 A Survey of Function-Bestowing Selection Processes6 Conclusion
Journal Article
Madness and Idiocy: Reframing a Basic Problem of Philosophy of Psychiatry
A basic question of philosophy of psychiatry is “what is madness (mental illness, mental disorder…)?” Contemporary thinkers err by framing the problem as one of defining madness in contrast with sanity. For the Late Modern theorist of madness, the problem was not one of defining madness in contrast with sanity, but in contrast with “idiocy”—the apparent diminution or abolition of one’s reasoning power. This altered reading of the problem has an important consequence. For what distinguishes madness from idiocy is not the failure, absence, or lack of reason, but its presence—albeit in a perverse and mutated form. For the Late Modern theorist, madness was always, by its very nature, infused with reason. This “infusion” of madness by reason has two consequences for philosophy of psychiatry today: it reframes the project of defining “mental disorder,” and it provides intellectual scaffolding for the emerging movement known as Mad Pride, mad resistance, or mad activism.
Journal Article
The Functional Sense of Mechanism
This article presents a distinct sense of ‘mechanism’, which I call the functional sense of mechanism. According to this sense, mechanisms serve functions, and this fact places substantive restrictions on the kinds of system activities ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. On this view, there are no mechanisms for pathology; pathologies result from disrupting mechanisms for functions. Second, on this sense, natural selection is probably not a mechanism for evolution because it does not serve a function. After distinguishing this sense from similar explications of ‘mechanism’, I argue that it is ubiquitous in biology and has valuable epistemic benefits.
Journal Article