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180 result(s) for "Garver, Eugene"
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CHARMIDES AND THE VIRTUE OF OPACITY: AN EARLY CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL
[...]this is a feature not unique to the Charmides but developed here in an unusual way-Critias is Socrates' double, enacting what are thought to be unique features of Socrates, so that the reader is forced into a more finegrained understanding of both the Socratic project and the nature of sôphrosyne.11 Charmides and Critias are often thought to be inappropriate interlocutors for a discussion of sôphrosyné, given what we know about their historical performances. Once Socrates asks them for definitions of sôphrosyné, Charmides and Critias are challenged to distinguish mores from morals, being superior because one is rich and well-born versus superior because of virtue. Because of his youth, Charmides is not troubled by a conflation of the two, but Critias sees further and realizes that there is a problem here, and so he tries to formulate a kind of selfknowledge that occludes the relation of self, and self-knowledge, to others. \"If sôphrosyné is present in you, you must have some opinion about it (doxazein). Because it is necessary, I suppose, that if it really resides in you, it provides a sense (aisthésin) of its presence, by means of which you would form an opinion not only that you have it but of what sort it is. Criticis takes the conversation over from Charmides. Because it is Critias and not Charmides who talks with Socrates, opinions about temperance no longer indicate anything about whether the person with the opinion is himself temperate.
Aristotle's politics
\"Man is a political animal,\" Aristotle asserts near the beginning of the Politics. In this novel reading of one of the foundational texts of political philosophy, Eugene Garver traces the surprising implications of Aristotle's claim and explores the treatise's relevance to ongoing political concerns. Often dismissed as overly grounded in Aristotle's specific moment in time, in fact the Politics challenges contemporary understandings of human action and allows us to better see ourselves today. Close examination of Aristotle's treatise, Garver finds, reveals a significant, practical role for philosophy to play in politics. Philosophers present arguments about issues—such as the right and the good, justice and modes of governance, the relation between the good person and the good citizen, and the character of a good life—that politicians must then make appealing to their fellow citizens. Completing Garver's trilogy on Aristotle's unique vision, Aristotle's Politics yields new ways of thinking about ethics and politics, ancient and modern.
Aristotle’s Rhetoric on rhetoric’s definition and limits
Since the art of rhetoric cannot be defined by a scientific definition by genus and differentia, Aristotle instead explicates rhetoric by setting it off from four competitors: (1) the so-called art of the handbook writers, who neglected the enthymeme, (2) scientific argument that sometimes occurs when one is trying to argue rhetorically but hits on a principle, (3) the atechnoi which the orator has merely to use, not invent, and (4) the arts of style and delivery which are subordinate to an art of argument. In addition to these four boundaries of rhetoric, there are four others that Aristotle might be expected to use to delimit rhetoric, but which he does not. First, proofs and apparent proofs are equally within the province of rhetoric. This lead, second, to the most surprising distinction Aristotle does not draw, that between rhetoric and dialectic. They are distinct, but he doesn’t use their differences to delimit rhetoric. Third, Aristotle has nothing to say about the relation that so engaged Plato between rhetoric and phronêsis, practical wisdom. The sophists who claimed to teach virtue assimilated rhetorical facility to practical wisdom, but Aristotle has no interest in engaging them on this point. And last, while Book III makes comparisons between the style of oratory and that of tragedy, and contains cross-references to the Poetics, he never tries to find the nature of rhetoric through a comparison to poetics.
EUTHYPHRO PROSECUTES A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION
Socrates encounters Euthyphro as both are on their way to court, Socrates as a defendant against charges of blasphemy and Euthyphro as a prosecutor of his father for negligently causing the death of a slave-a human rights violation. While I argue that piety and pollution supply a productive way of thinking about human rights crime and punishment, Euthyphro is a very troubling model for the human rights prosecutor, since he is an almost paradigmatically unattractive character. Reading the Euthyphro leads to appropriately troubling and ambivalent feelings about contemporary human rights prosecutions.
Why Can't We All Just Get Along: The Reasonable vs. the Rational According to Spinoza
Spinoza presents a picture of the good human life in which being rational and being reasonable or sociable are mutually supporting: the philosopher makes the best citizen, and citizenship is the best route to philosophy and adequate ideas. Crucial to this mutual implication are the roles of religion and politics in promoting obedience. It is through obedience that people can become \"of one mind and one body\" in the absence of adequate ideas, through the presence of shared empowering imaginations and emotions.
Confronting Aristotle's Ethics
What is the good life? Posing this question today would likely elicit very different answers. Some might say that the good life means doing good—improving one’s community and the lives of others. Others might respond that it means doing well—cultivating one’s own abilities in a meaningful way. But for Aristotle these two distinct ideas—doing good and doing well—were one and the same and could be realized in a single life. In Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics, Eugene Garver examines how we can draw this conclusion from Aristotle's works, while also studying how this conception of the good life relates to contemporary ideas ofmorality. The key to Aristotle’s views on ethics, argues Garver, lies in the Metaphysics or, more specifically, in his thoughts on activities, actions, and capacities. For Aristotle, Garver shows, it is only possible to be truly active when acting for the common good, and it is only possible to be truly happy when active to the extent of one’s own powers. But does this mean we should aspire to Aristotle’s impossibly demanding vision of the good life? In a word, no. Garver stresses the enormous gap between life in Aristotle’s time and ours. As a result, this book will be a welcome rumination on not only Aristotle, but the relationship between the individual and society in everyday life.
Classical Rhetoric and Contemporary Law : A Critical Reader: A Critical Reader
Pairs passages from works of classical rhetoric with contemporary legal rulings to highlight and analyze their deep and abiding connections in matters of persuasionClassical Rhetoric and Contemporary Law: A Critical Reader is a rich work that analyzes the interplay between ancient rhetorical traditions and modern legal practice, reestablishing the lost connections between law and classical rhetoric. From Isocrates’s Panegyricus in 380 BCE to the landmark US Supreme Court case Trump v. Hawaii in 2018, and from Antiphon’s fifth century BCE First Tetralogy to 1995’s O. J. Simpson trial, the volume draws on an array of sources to illuminate how ancient rhetorical insights may even today challenge and enrich our grasp of contemporary legal principles.The collection opens with a brisk review of the historical development of rhetoric. The second part examines a pair of rhetorical theorists whose works frame the period across which classical rhetoric declined as a mode of thought. A contemporary appellate case contrasts with the work of Giambattista Vico, an eighteenth-century professor of rhetoric who warned of the separation of law from rhetoric. The analysis of the work of twentieth-century scholars Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrects-Tyteca shows that where Cartesian rationality fails, the humanistic tradition of rhetoric allows the law to respond to the needs of justice. In the third part, ten case studies bring together a classical rhetorical theorist with a contemporary court case, demonstrating the abiding relevance of the classical tradition to contemporary jurisprudence.With its cross-disciplinary appeal, Classical Rhetoric and Contemporary Law encompasses the work of legal, rhetorical, English, and communication scholars alike, catalyzing interactive exploration into the profound ways ancient rhetorical insights continue to shape our comprehension of today’s legal landscape.CONTRIBUTORSVasileios Adamidis / Elizabeth C. Britt / Kirsten K. Davis / David A. Frank / Michael Gagarin / Eugene Garver / Mark A. Hannah / Catherine L. Langford / Brian N. Larson / Craig A. Meyer / Francis J. Mootz III / Susan E. Provenzano / Nick J. Sciullo / Kristen K. Tiscione / Laura A. Webb
Aristotle on the Kinds of Rhetoric
One of the few features of Aristotelian rhetoric that his successors have noticed and developed is his three kinds, deliberative, judicial and epideictic. I want to look at what function the division of rhetoric into three kinds serves in his own argument. Dialectic has no kinds, and most speeches do not fall within any of the three kinds of rhetoric. These kinds are three ways in which argument leads to a judgment. Outside them, persuasion is no longer subordinate to politics. It is only within them that Aristotle's claims that the best and most rational argument will carry the day will be anything more than a pious hope. Outside them, the art of rhetoric will be nothing but cleverness, an ability to reach whatever end the speaker starts with. The three kinds show us rhetoric's possibilities.