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92 result(s) for "Geuss, Raymond"
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Reality and its dreams
\"This book tries to argue for both of two theses that some have thought are incompatible, one negative, the other positive. To start with the negative thesis, the book opposes the 'normative turn' in political philosophy: the idea that the right approach to politics is to start from thinking abstractly about our own normative views and apply them to judging political structures, decisions, and events. Rather, the book argues, the study of politics should be focused on the historically and sociologically contextualized sphere of real politics. The second, and positive thesis, is that opposition to the 'normative turn' need not mean the end of utopianism, although that utopianism needs to be re-understood. The utopian impulse is not an attempt to describe a perfect society, but an impulse to think the impossible in politics. That is, it is an attempt to articulate deep-seated desires that cannot be realized under current conditions and to imagine how structures and forms of action that now seem invariant can be changed.\"--Provided by publisher.
Changing the subject : philosophy from Socrates to Adorno
Ask a question and it is reasonable to expect an answer or a confession of ignorance. But a philosopher may defy expectations. Confronted by a standard question arising from a normal way of viewing the world, a philosopher may reply that the question is misguided, that to continue asking it is, at the extreme, to get trapped in a delusive hall of mirrors. According to Raymond Geuss, this attempt to bypass or undercut conventional ways of thinking, to escape from the hall of mirrors, represents philosophy at its best and most characteristic. To illustrate, Geuss explores the ideas of twelve philosophers who broke dramatically with prevailing wisdom, from Socrates and Plato in the ancient world to Wittgenstein and Adorno in our own. The result is a striking account of some of the most innovative and important philosophers in Western history and an indirect manifesto for how to pursue philosophy today. Geuss cautions that philosophers' attempts to break from convention do not necessarily make the world a better place. Montaigne's ideas may have been benign, but the fate of the views developed by, for instance, Augustine, Hobbes, and Nietzsche has been more varied. But in the act of provoking people to think differently, philosophers make clear that we are not fated to live within the often stifling systems of thought that we inherit. We can change the subject. A work of exceptional range, power, and originality, Changing the Subject manifests the precise virtues of philosophy that it identifies and defends.-- Provided by publisher
Does Philosophy Need to Know Its History?
The point of doing the history of philosophy is to confront that which is completely foreign to us and seems unassimilable, in the hope of thereby getting some distance from our own form of life, and of learning to treat what is alien on its own terms. This is more difficult to do than might first seem to be the case, because of our almost irresistable tendency to assimilate that which is radically different to that which seems familiar to us. In history, one of the major forms this takes is anachronism. How can one avoid making them-then too much like us-now? The motivation for doing the history of philosophy is, therefore, basically ethical and political. In a society characterised by the division of labour, it is perfectly permissible for individual philosophers to pursue different goals, and deploy different parts of the huge corpus of knowledge which we have at our disposal. There is no need for each individual philosopher to integrate the study of the history of philosophy into each of their individual projects. The essay leaves it to the judgment of the reader to decide to what extent the active, sympathetic engagement with the alien is an ethical and political goal which is desirable — perhaps even so desirable as to count as a demand. In any case, this is a demand on the institution, not on individuals. Even if one thought that it was highly advisable that the history of philosophy form an integral part of the discipline of philosophy, it is hard to see this as a “necessity”.
Reification : a new look at an old idea
In the early 20th century, Marxist theory was enriched and rejuvenated by adopting the concept of reification, introduced by the Hungarian theorist Georg Lukács to identify and denounce the transformation of historical processes into ahistorical entities, human actions into things that seemed part of an immutable “second nature.” For a variety of reasons, both theoretical and practical, the hopes placed in de-reification as a tool of revolutionary emancipation proved vain. This book attempts to rescue the concept of reification by recasting it in terms of the philosophy of recognition that has been developed over the past two decades. Three political and social theorists: Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, and Jonathan Lear, respond with hard questions about the central anthropological premise of the book's main argument, the assumption that prior to cognition there is a fundamental experience of intersubjective recognition that can provide a normative standard by which current social relations can be judged wanting.