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"Gibson, Edward L"
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Boundary control : subnational authoritarianism in federal democracies
\"This book explains how subnational authoritarianism is part of normal democratic politics and strategic interactions between local authoritarians and national democratic leaders\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries
This article considers the political situation of an authoritarian province in a nationally democratic country. The objective is to uncover strategies that incumbents (in this article, governors) pursue to perpetuate provincial authoritarian regimes, as well as dynamics that can undermine such regimes. A central insight is that controlling the scope of provincial conflict (that is, the extent to which it is localized or nationalized) is a major objective of incumbents and oppositions in struggles over local democratization. Authoritarian incumbents will thus pursue “boundary control” strategies, which are played out in multiple arenas of a national territorial system. The articlefleshesout these processes via comparative analysis of two conflicts over subnational democratization in 2004: the state of Oaxaca in Mexico and the province of Santiago del Estero in Argentina.
Journal Article
Boundary Control
The democratization of a national government is only a first step in diffusing democracy throughout a country's territory. Even after a national government is democratized, subnational authoritarian 'enclaves' often continue to deny rights to citizens of local jurisdictions. Gibson offers new theoretical perspectives for the study of democratization in his exploration of this phenomenon. His theory of 'boundary control' captures the conflict pattern between incumbents and oppositions when a national democratic government exists alongside authoritarian provinces (or 'states'). He also reveals how federalism and the territorial organization of countries shape how subnational authoritarian regimes are built and how they unravel. Through a novel comparison of the late nineteenth-century American 'Solid South' with contemporary experiences in Argentina and Mexico, Gibson reveals that the mechanisms of boundary control are reproduced across countries and historical periods. As long as subnational authoritarian governments coexist with national democratic governments, boundary control will be at play.
eBook
Federalized Party Systems and Subnational Party Competition: Theory and an Empirical Application to Argentina
Comparative scholarship conceives of party systems nationally. This has created a situation of conceptual and measurement incompleteness in the study of party systems. The effects of subnational variations in party competition on national politics and the quality of democracy cannot
be understood if subnational party systems continue to be erased from the theoretical mapping of party politics. The concept of \"federalized party systems\" denotes systems composed of national and subnational party subsystems. Its value for the comparative and longitudinal study
of party politics can be demonstrated through an analysis of Argentina's federalized party system.
Journal Article
Federalism and low-maintenance constituencies: Territorial dimensions of economic reform in Argentina
This paper examines the electoral dynamics of market reform in Argentina between 1989 and 1995. It provides insights into the way that the distribution of economic and institutional resources in federal systems shapes policy making and coalition building options for reformist governments. The electoral viability of the governing Peronist Party during the economic reform period was facilitated by the regional phasing of the costs of market reform. Structural reforms were concentrated primarily on economically developed regions of the country, while public spending and patronage in economically marginal but politically overrepresented regions sustained support for the governing party. Statistical analyses contrast patterns of spending and public sector employment in metropolitan and peripheral regions of the country during the reform period, as well as the social bases of electoral support in those regions.
Journal Article
The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina
Governing parties face two fundamental tasks: they must pursue policies effectively, and they must win elections. Their national coalitions, therefore, generally include two types of constituencies—those that are important for policy-making and those that make it possible to win elections. In effect, governing parties must bring together a policy coalition and an electoral coalition. This distinction sheds light on how the transitional costs of major economic policy shifts can be made sustainable in electoral terms. It also provides a starting point for analysis of how two of Latin America's most important labor-based parties, the Peronist party in Argentina and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, maintained electoral dominance while pursuing free-market reforms that adversely affected key social constituencies. Peronism and the PRI are conceived of as having encompassed historically two distinctive and regionally based subcoalitions: a metropolitan coalition that gave support to the parties' development strategies and a peripheral coalition that carried the burden of generating electoral majorities. This framework permits a reconceptualization of the historic coalitional dynamics of Peronism and the PRI and sheds light on the current process of coalitional change and economic reform.
Journal Article
Boundary Control: Federalism and Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries
The democratization of a national government is only a first step in diffusing democracy throughout a country's territory. Even after a national government is democratized, subnational authoritarian 'enclaves' often continue to deny rights to citizens of local jurisdictions. Gibson offers new theoretical perspectives for the study of democratization in his exploration of this phenomenon. His theory of 'boundary control' captures the conflict pattern between incumbents and oppositions when a national democratic government exists alongside authoritarian provinces (or 'states'). He also reveals how federalism and the territorial organization of countries shape how subnational authoritarian regimes are built and how they unravel. Through a novel comparison of the late nineteenth-century American 'Solid South' with contemporary experiences in Argentina and Mexico, Gibson reveals that the mechanisms of boundary control are reproduced across countries and historical periods. As long as subnational authoritarian governments coexist with national democratic governments, boundary control will be at play.
eBook
Illiberal practices : territorial variance within large federal democracies
What drives the uneven distribution of democratic practices at the subnational level?
Within subunits of a democratic federation, lasting political practices that restrict choice, limit debate, and exclude or distort democratic participation have been analyzed in recent scholarship as subnational authoritarianism. Once a critical number of citizens or regions band together in these practices, they can leverage illiberal efforts at the federal level.
This timely, data-driven book compares federations that underwent transitions in the first, second, and third waves of democratization and offers a substantial expansion of the concept of subnational authoritarianism. The eleven expert political scientists featured in this text examine the nature and scope of subnational democratic variations within six large federations, including the United States, India, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Russia. Illiberal Practices makes the case that subnational units are more likely to operate by means of illiberal structures and practices than as fully authoritarian regimes. Detailed case studies examine uneven levels of citizenship in each federal system. These are distributed unequally across the different regions of the country and display semi-democratic or hybrid characteristics. Appropriate for scholars and students of democratization, authoritarianism, federalism, decentralization, and comparative politics, Illiberal Practices sheds light on the uneven extension of democracy within countries that have already democratized.
Contributors: Jacqueline Behrend, André Borges, Julián Durazo Herrmann, Carlos Gervasoni, Edward L. Gibson, Desmond King, Inga A.-L. Saikkonen, Celina Souza, Maya Tudor, Laurence Whitehead, Adam Ziegfeld
eBook
Federalized Party Systems and Subnational Party Competition: Theory and an Empirical Application to Argentina
Comparative scholarship conceives of party systems nationally. This has created a situation of conceptual and measurement incompleteness in the study of party systems. The effects of subnational variations in party competition on national politics and the quality of democracy cannot be understood if subnational party systems continue to be erased from the theoretical mapping of party politics. The concept of \"federalized party systems\" denotes systems composed of national and subnational party subsystems. Its value for the comparative and longitudinal study of party politics can be demonstrated through an analysis of Argentina's federalized party system. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Journal Article
Subnational Authoritarianism in the United States
On the fundamental issue, only the Federal Government was to be feared.V. O. KeyTHE UNITED STATES AS A COMPARATIVE CASEIn the years following the Civil War of 1861–65, the United States experienced a “transition to democracy.” Sweeping national legislation granted full citizenship to four million people and enfranchised more than a million. However, this was not a transition to democracy in the sense used traditionally by democratization scholars. The national government had been democratic for more than 80 years, and most men living in the country already enjoyed these rights. What the United States experienced during that period was the most extensive case of territorial democratization in history. Clusters of voting and civil rights long available to inhabitants of other jurisdictions of the country were extended to inhabitants of a group of states that held more than one-third of the national population. Most of these had been slaveholding states before the Civil War and had formed part of the short-lived secessionist experiment known as the Confederate States of America (Figure 3.1). As a result, competitive state-party systems, linked to a national competitive party system, emerged throughout the region.
Book Chapter