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Individuals often choose between remembering information using their own memory ability versus using external resources to reduce cognitive demand (i.e. 'cognitive offloading'). For example, to remember a future appointment an individual could choose to set a smartphone reminder or depend on their unaided memory ability. Previous studies investigating strategic reminder setting found that participants set more reminders than would be optimal, and this bias towards reminder-setting was predicted by metacognitive underconfidence in unaided memory ability. Due to the link between underconfidence in memory ability and excessive reminder setting, the aim of the current study was to investigate whether metacognitive training is an effective intervention to a) improve metacognitive judgment accuracy, and b) reduce bias in strategic offloading behaviour. Participants either received metacognitive training which involved making performance predictions and receiving feedback on judgment accuracy, or were part of a control group. As predicted, metacognitive training increased judgment accuracy: participants in the control group were significantly underconfident in their memory ability, whereas the experimental group showed no significant metacognitive bias. However, contrary to predictions, both experimental and control groups were significantly biased toward reminder-setting, and did not differ significantly. Therefore, reducing metacognitive bias was not sufficient to eliminate the bias towards reminders. We suggest that the reminder bias likely results in part from erroneous metacognitive evaluations, but that other factors such as a preference to avoid cognitive effort may also be relevant. Finding interventions to mitigate these factors could improve the adaptive use of external resources.

When we produce actions we predict their likely consequences. Dominant models of action control suggest that these predictions are used to ‘cancel’ perceptual processing of expected outcomes. However, normative Bayesian models of sensory cognition developed outside of action propose that rather than being cancelled, expected sensory signals are represented with greater fidelity (sharpened). Here, we distinguished between these models in an fMRI experiment where participants executed hand actions (index vs little finger movement) while observing movements of an avatar hand. Consistent with the sharpening account, visual representations of hand movements (index vs little finger) could be read out more accurately when they were congruent with action and these decoding enhancements were accompanied by suppressed activity in voxels tuned away from, not towards, the expected stimulus. Therefore, inconsistent with dominant action control models, these data show that sensorimotor prediction sharpens expected sensory representations, facilitating veridical perception of action outcomes. Our brains predict the likely sensory consequences of actions we take; one theory is that these sensory responses are suppressed, but another theory is that they are sharpened. Here, the authors show using fMRI evidence consistent with the sharpening account for sensory consequences of hand movements.

Background Cognitive offloading is the use of physical action to reduce the cognitive demands of a task. Everyday memory relies heavily on this practice; for example, when we write down to-be-remembered information or use diaries, alerts, and reminders to trigger delayed intentions. A key goal of recent research has been to investigate the processes that trigger cognitive offloading. This research has demonstrated that individuals decide whether or not to offload based on a potentially erroneous metacognitive evaluation of their mental abilities. Therefore, improving the accuracy of metacognitive evaluations may help to optimise offloading behaviour. However, previous studies typically measure participants’ use of an explicitly instructed offloading strategy, in contrast to everyday life where offloading strategies must often be generated spontaneously. Results We administered a computer-based task requiring participants to remember delayed intentions. One group of participants was explicitly instructed on a method for setting external reminders; another was not. The latter group spontaneously set reminders but did so less often than the instructed group. Offloading improved performance in both groups. Crucially, metacognition (confidence in unaided memory ability) guided both instructed and spontaneous offloading: Participants in both groups set more reminders when they were less confident (regardless of actual memory ability). Conclusions These results show that the link between metacognition and cognitive offloading holds even when offloading strategies need to be spontaneously generated. Thus, metacognitive interventions are potentially able to alter offloading behaviour, without requiring offloading strategies to be explicitly instructed.

This study explored under what conditions young children would set reminders to aid their memory for delayed intentions. A computerized task requiring participants to carry out delayed intentions under varying levels of cognitive load was presented to 63 children (aged between 6.9 and 13.0 years old). Children of all ages demonstrated metacognitive predictions of their performance that were congruent with task difficulty. Only older children, however, set more reminders when they expected their future memory performance to be poorer. These results suggest that most primary school-aged children possess metacognitive knowledge about their prospective memory limits, but that only older children may be able to exercise the metacognitive control required to translate this knowledge into strategic reminder setting.

Adapting behavior to accommodate changes in the environment is an important function of the nervous system. A universal problem for motile animals is the discovery that a learned route is blocked and a detour is required. Given the substantial neuroscience research on spatial navigation and decision-making it is surprising that so little is known about how the brain solves the detour problem. Here we review the limited number of relevant functional neuroimaging, single unit recording and lesion studies. We find that while the prefrontal cortex (PFC) consistently responds to detours, the hippocampus does not. Recent evidence suggests the hippocampus tracks information about the future path distance to the goal. Based on this evidence we postulate a conceptual model in which: Lateral PFC provides a prediction error signal about the change in the path, frontopolar and superior PFC support the re-formulation of the route plan as a novel subgoal and the hippocampus simulates the new path. More data will be required to validate this model and understand (1) how the system processes the different options; and (2) deals with situations where a new path becomes available (i.e., shortcuts).

People often use external tools to offload cognitive demands associated with remembering future intentions. While previous research has established a causal role of metacognition in cognitive offloading, the neural basis of white matter tracts supporting this metacognitive control process remains unclear. To address this, we conducted a study with 34 participants using diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) to examine how white matter connectivity supports metacognition driven cognitive offloading. Behaviorally, we replicated prior findings showing that under-confidence in internal memory predicts a bias toward using external reminders. At the neural level, we used diffusion tensor imaging to quantify fractional anisotropy (FA), a measure of microstructural integrity in white matter. We found the microstructural integrity of the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) and cingulum bundle (CB) predicted deviations from the optimal use of reminders. The microstructural integrity of the fornix negatively predicted participants’ confidence in performing the task when restricted to internal memory. Our findings reveal the microstructural organization of the white-matter tracts in the fronto-temporal-parietal network are related to metacognition driven cognitive offloading. We discuss several aspects of metacognition driven cognitive offloading from a white matter microstructural perspective.

Cognitive offloading refers to the use of physical actions and the external environment to reduce cognitive demand. Offloading strategies such as creating external reminders instead of relying on internal memory are highly effective and play a key role in supporting real-world cognition. Previous work has shown that people have systematic biases in their offloading strategies, which are related to biased metacognitive evaluations of cognitive ability. While metacognitive interventions could potentially mitigate these biases, research investigating their effects has produced mixed results. Here, we examined the influence of a brief metacognitive intervention comprising just five trials during an initial practice session. After the intervention, participants performed a memory task where they decided between using internal memory (for maximum reward) or external reminders (for reduced reward), allowing us to determine the optimality of offloading strategies. Experiment 1 ( N  = 164) showed that making metacognitive predictions and subsequently receiving feedback led to improved metacognitive calibration and more optimal reminder-setting strategies. Experiment 2 ( N  = 416) replicated this pattern and found that making predictions alone was ineffective. These findings suggest that a metacognitive intervention combining prediction with feedback could potentially optimise cognitive offloading in everyday life.

Recent research suggests certain neuropsychological deficits occur in anorexia nervosa (AN). The role of starvation in these deficits remains unclear. Studies of individuals without AN can elucidate our understanding of the effect of short-term starvation on neuropsychological performance. Using a within-subjects repeated measures design, 60 healthy female participants were tested once after fasting for 18 hours, and once when satiated. Measures included two tasks to measure central coherence and a set-shifting task. Fasting exacerbated set-shifting difficulties on a rule-change task. Fasting was associated with stronger local and impaired global processing, indicating weaker central coherence. Models of AN that propose a central role for set-shifting difficulties or weak central coherence should also consider the impact of short-term fasting on these processes.

We propose that rostral prefrontal cortex (PFC; approximating area 10) supports a cognitive system that facilitates either stimulus-oriented (SO) or stimulus-independent (SI) attending. SO attending is the behaviour required to concentrate on current sensory input, whereas SI attending is the mental processing that accompanies self-generated or self-maintained thought. Regions of medial area 10 support processes related to the former, whilst areas of lateral area 10 support processes that enable the latter. Three lines of evidence for this 'gateway hypothesis' are presented. First, we demonstrate the predicted patterns of activation in area 10 during the performance of new tests designed to stress the hypothetical function. Second, we demonstrate area 10 activations during the performance of established functions (prospective memory, context memory), which should hypothetically involve the proposed attentional system. Third, we examine predictions about behaviour-activation patterns within rostral PFC that follow from the hypothesis. We show with meta-analysis of neuroimaging investigations that these predictions are supported across a wide variety of tasks, thus establishing a general principle for functional imaging studies of this large brain region. We then show that while the gateway hypothesis accommodates a large range of findings relating to the functional organization of area 10 along a medial-lateral dimension, there are further principles relating to other dimensions and functions. In particular, there is a functional dissociation between the anterior medial area 10, which supports processes required for SO attending, and the caudal medial area 10, which supports processes relating to mentalizing.

Introduction The generation of creative visual imagery contributes to technological and scientific innovation and production of visual art. The underlying cognitive and neural processes are, however, poorly understood. Methods This review synthesizes functional neuroimaging studies of visual creativity. Seven functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 19 electroencephalography (EEG) studies were included, comprising 27 experiments and around 800 participants. Results Activation likelihood estimation meta‐analysis of the fMRI studies comparing visual creativity to non‐rest control tasks yielded significant clusters in thalamus, left fusiform gyrus, and right middle and inferior frontal gyri. The EEG studies revealed a tendency for decreased alpha power during visual creativity compared to baseline, but comparisons of visual creativity to non‐rest control tasks revealed inconsistent findings. Conclusions The findings are consistent with suggested contributions to visual creativity of prefrontally mediated inhibition, evaluation, and working memory, as well as visual imagery processes. Findings are discussed in relation to prominent theories of the neural basis of creativity. This review synthesizes 7 fMRI and 19 EEG studies of visual creativity, the generation of novel and useful visual imagery. Activation likelihood estimation meta‐analysis of six fMRI studies which compared visual creativity to non‐rest control conditions revealed significant clusters in thalamus, left fusiform gyrus, and right middle and inferior frontal gyri. Qualitative synthesis of EEG studies revealed reduced alpha and theta power, but increased beta power during visual creativity compared to baseline rest conditions.