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26 result(s) for "Gilson, Stuart C."
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Do analysts add value when they most can? Evidence from corporate spin-offs
This article investigates how securities analysts help investors understand the value of diversification. By studying the research that analysts produce about companies that have announced corporate spin-offs, we gain unique insights into how analysts portray diversified firms to the investment community. We find that while analysts' research about these companies is associated with improved forecast accuracy, the value of their research about the spun-off subsidiaries is more limited. For both diversified firms and their spun-off subsidiaries, analysts' research is more valuable when information asymmetry between the management of these entities and investors is higher. These findings contribute to the corporate strategy literature by shedding light on the roots of the diversification discount and by showing how analysts' research enables investors to overcome asymmetric information.
CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis
This paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987. Almost one-third of all CEOs are replaced, and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions. Newly appointed CEOs with ties to previous management are typically paid 35% less than the CEOs they replace. In contrast, outside replacement CEOs are typically paid 36% more than their predecessors, and are often compensated with stock options. On average, CEO wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts. However, managers' compensation is sometimes tied to the value of creditors' claims.
Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms
This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one-in-three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.
Analyst Specialization and Conglomerate Stock Breakups
This paper examines whether firms emerging from conglomerate stock breakups are able to affect the types of financial analysts that cover their firms as well as the quality of information generated about their performance. Our sample comprises 103 focus-increasing spin-offs, equity carve-outs, and targeted stock offerings between 1990 and 1995. We find that, after these transactions, sample firms experience a significant increase in coverage by analysts that specialize in subsidiary firms' industries, and a 30-50% increase in analyst forecast accuracy for parent and subsidiary firms. The improvement in forecast accuracy is partially attributable to expanded disclosure. However, forecast improvements for specialists exceed those for non-specialists, leading us to conclude that corporate focus can facilitate improved capital market intermediation by financial analysts with industry expertise.
Valuation of Bankrupt Firms
This study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management's published cash flow projections. We estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value. We find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value, but the dispersion of valuation errors is very wide-the sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20% to greater than 250%. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders' incentives to overstate or understate the firm's value.
Analysts and Information Gaps: Lessons from the UAL Buyout
In addition to earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, analysts provide potentially useful information to investors in the form of written commentary and analysis. But how such fundamental research affects stock prices has been little studied. I investigate the role analysts' research played in the 1994 restructuring of UAL Corporation (parent of United Air Lines), in which employees acquired 55 percent of UAL stock in exchange for $4.9 billion in wage/benefit concessions. Focusing on the critical first two years of the buyout, my analysis suggests that analysts and investors, on average, initially gave the company little credit for the concessions. The transaction was controversial and complicated. Most analysts were negative or indifferent in their assessment of the deal. Some analysts also misinterpreted key terms of the deal. UAL managers responded by reporting an unconventional earnings measure that highlighted the financial concessions. UAL's stock price relative to the market and industry eventually doubled, but analysts's opinions of the deal did not change.