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"Glosserman, Brad"
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Peak Japan : the end of great ambitions
The post-Cold War era has been difficult for Japan. A country once heralded for evolving a superior form of capitalism and seemingly ready to surpass the United States as the world's largest economy lost its way in the early 1990s. The bursting of the bubble in 1991 ushered in a period of political and economic uncertainty that has lasted for over two decades. There were hopes that the triple catastrophe of March 11, 2011--a massive earthquake, tsunami, and accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant--would break Japan out of its torpor and spur the country to embrace change that would restart the growth and optimism of the go-go years. But today Japan is still waiting for needed transformation, and Brad Glosserman concludes that the fact that even disaster has not spurred radical enough reform reveals something about Japan's political system. Glosserman explains why Japan will not change, concluding that Japanese horizons are shrinking and that the Japanese public has given up the bold ambitions of previous generations and its current leadership. This is an important insight into contemporary Japan and one that should shape our thinking about this vital country.
Peak Japan
2019
The post-Cold War era has been difficult for Japan. A country once heralded for evolving a superior form of capitalism and seemingly ready to surpass the United States as the world's largest economy lost its way in the early 1990s. The bursting of the bubble in 1991 ushered in a period of political and economic uncertainty that has lasted for over two decades. There were hopes that the triple catastrophe of March 11, 2011-a massive earthquake, tsunami, and accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant-would break Japan out of its torpor and spur the country to embrace change that would restart the growth and optimism of the go-go years. But several years later, Japan is still waiting for needed transformation, and Brad Glosserman concludes that the fact that even disaster has not spurred radical enough reform reveals something about Japan's political system and Japanese society. Glosserman explains why Japan has not and will not change, concluding that Japanese horizons are shrinking and that the Japanese public has given up the bold ambitions of previous generations and its current leadership. This is a critical insight into contemporary Japan and one that should shape our thinking about this vital country.
AS GOOD AS IT GETS?
2024
The US-Japan relationship may well be at its all-time best. Animated by a concordance of vision and interests, the two governments are closely coordinating across a wide range of issues in a variety of venues-bilateral and multilateral, political, economic, and military. Concern about the potential destabilizing effects of regional developments provides considerable motivation for the two to work together. The final reporting period of 2023 provided ample evidence of their convergence. If that past is prologue, the year ahead should be a good one. Unfortunately, however, the tide could be turning. A political funds scandal has ensnared Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the approval ratings of the government of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio are plummeting as a result. Even if the prime minister survives the scandal-and most indications are that he will-he will be tarred and distracted as the region and the world face new and mounting challenges.
Journal Article
THE \YEAR OF ELECTIONS\ (FINALLY) ENDS
2024
Cossa and Glosserman discuss the 2024 election season woldwide. The \"year of elections\" culminated in the allegedly (but not actually) \"too close to call\" US presidential elections on Nov. 5, which resulted in Donald Trump's scheduled return to the oval office on Jan. 20, 2025. Trump has wasted no time identifying his preferences for key leadership positions in his incoming administration, some surprising, some shocking, and a few somewhat disturbing, although most of his national security/foreign policy choices appear more mainstream. While elections elsewhere have gone largely as expected, two unexpected domestic political developments promise to impact US policy and regional stability; namely, the failed attempt by Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to declare martial law which resulted in his impeachment, and the political turmoil in Japan that has left the Liberal Democratic Party for the first time in decades finding itself at the helm of a minority government.
Journal Article
THE \YEAR OF ELECTIONS,\ TAKE TWO!
2024
The year of elections is upon everyone, with national leadership up for grabs (in some cases more than others) in seven of the world's 10 largest countries, all (technically speaking) in the Indo-Pacific region. Here, Cossa and Glosserman talks about the elections from the Indo-Pacific region.
Journal Article
THE \YEAR OF ELECTIONS\ IS UPON US!
2024
The major multilateral gatherings of the past year's final trimester-the East Asia Summit (EAS) and associated ASEAN-arranged summitry in Indonesia in early September, the India-hosted G20 Summit a week later (Sept. 9-10 in Delhi), the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Indonesia, and the concurrent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting in San Francisco on Nov. 16-17-were largely overshadowed by events (very) near and far away. The EAS and G20 Summits were most notable for who wasn't there. Russian President Vladimir Putin skipped both meetings, sparing the hosts of the challenge (or embarrassment) of honoring (or ignoring) the international arrest warrant issued for him stemming from the Kremlin's invasion and war against Ukraine. Those hoping for a fence-mending summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden at the EAS or G20 were doubly disappointed; Xi skipped both meetings, while Biden only attended the G20, leaving the EAS to Vice President Kamala Harris.
Journal Article
BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS AMIDST MAJOR POWER COMPETITION
2023
Major power competition was the primary topic du jour at virtually all of this trimester's major multilateral gatherings, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine continuing to serve as a litmus test-a test many participants struggled to avoid taking. It was clear which side of the fence the G7 leaders stood on; Putin's invasion was soundly condemned and Sino-centric warning bells were again gently sounded. At the BRICS Summit and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sans the US), those alarms were clearly muted, as they were at the ASEAN Regional Forum, at which foreign ministers from all three were present. Headlines from the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue focused on the meeting that did not occur, as China's defense minister pointedly refused to meet with his US counterpart. At the ASEAN-ISIS' Asia-Pacific Roundtable, participants lamented the impact of major power tensions on ASEAN unity, even though ASEAN's main challenges are internal ones that predate the downturn in China-US relations. Meanwhile, Beijing and Washington both expended considerable effort at these and other events throughout the reporting period fortifying and expanding their partnerships, even as many neighbors struggled not to choose sides or to keep a foot in both camps.
Journal Article
\LIKE-MINDED MINILATERALISM\ COMING OF AGE
2023
As broad-based multilateral organizations seem to be increasingly unable (or unwilling) to tackle the major security challenges of the day-Russia-Ukraine, China-Taiwan, North Korea, and Myanmar, to list but a few-more focused \"minilateral\" efforts involving \"like-minded\" allies and partners are coming to the fore. Foremost among the dysfunctional are the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and broader UN mechanisms, thanks to Russian and Chinese intransigence. Sadly, ASEAN-led mechanisms like the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, not to mention ASEAN itself, also fall into this category, as does the G20, whose foreign ministers failed to reach any meaningful conclusions at their early March 2023 meeting, their first with India at the helm. Enter the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or \"Quad,\" involving Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-US technical cooperation agreement), various minilateral cooperative efforts (including US-Japan-Philippines and US-Japan-Korea), and a resurgent like-minded G7, now that its (failed) experiment of drawing Russia and China into its process has come to an inglorious end. But not all new efforts are succeeding. President Biden hosted his second \"Summit of Democracies\" which drew little fanfare or attention.
Journal Article
WASHINGTON \PIVOTS\ TO ASIA
2022
The Biden administration has rediscovered Asia. And, for better or worse, so has the US Congress. While the administration's national security documents (or at least their unclassified sneak previews) have identified the Indo-Pacific as a priority theater vital to US national security and China as \"our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge,\" Europe continues to steal headlines and the lion's share of the administration's (and international media's) attention, thanks to Vladimir Putin and his unwarranted (and so far unsuccessful) invasion of Ukraine. While many eyes remain on Putin's war (and NATO's US-led solid support for Kyiv), this reporting period saw President Biden finally make his first trip to Asia to visit longstanding US allies and attend the second in-person Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (\"Quad\") Summit. Prior to his trip, Biden hosted his first US-ASEAN Summit in Washington. Meanwhile Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken were both in Southeast Asia, respectively for the Shangri-La Dialogue and for various ASEAN-driven ministerials. These administration trips were largely overshadowed, however, by US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's controversial trip to Taiwan, the first by a House Speaker in 25 years, which was sure to-and clearly did-draw Beijing's ire.
Journal Article