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Pre-plant methods for managing soil-borne pests and diseases are an important priority for many agricultural production systems. This study investigates whether the application of steam is an economically sustainable pre-plant soil disinfestation technique for organic and conventional strawberry (Fragaria ananassa) production in California’s Central Coast region. We analyze net returns from field trials using steam and steam + mustard seed meal (MSM) as pre-plant soil disinfestation treatments. ANOVA tests identify statistically significant differences in net revenues by treatment and trial. Multivariate regressions estimate the magnitude of these effects. Predictive polynomial models identify relationships between net returns and two treatment characteristics: maximum temperature (°C) and time at ≥60 °C (minutes). For organic production, net returns are statistically similar for the steam and steam + MSM treatments. For conventional production, the steam + MSM treatment has significantly higher net returns than the steam treatment. Cross-validated polynomial models outperform the sample mean for prediction of net returns, except for the steam + MSM treatment in conventional production. The optimal degree of the polynomial ranges from 1–4 degrees, depending on the production system and treatment. Results from two of three organic models suggest that maximum soil temperatures of 62–63 °C achieved for 41–44 min maximizes net returns and may be a basis for further experiments.

Most agricultural policy analysis assumes that markets are perfectly competitive, despite increasing evidence to the contrary. We demonstrate that the interaction of market power and government intervention may lead to outcomes that are counter to key results of policy analysis for perfectly competitive markets. We show that market power may reduce or eliminate entirely the net welfare benefits from removing two traditional support mechanisms, price floors and deficiency payments, and may increase considerably the government's cost of implementing either of them. Accordingly, optimally designed price support measures may improve welfare in the presence of downstream oligopoly and/or oligopsony power.

Over the last two decades, the number of honey bee colonies performing pollination services for the California almond industry has grown steadily and now equals a substantial share of all colonies in the United States. Most US beekeeping operations have not expanded their colony numbers at the current levels of almond pollination fees. Thus, as almond acreage has increased, the marginal supplier of colonies has moved further away from California, increasing interstate shipments. We provide a conceptual representation of the supply and demand of U.S. colonies for almond pollination, and utilize the relatively inelastic demand for colonies to explore spatial elasticities of supply. We combine colony shipment data from 2007 to 2018 provided by the California Department of Food and Agriculture with projected prices from the California State Beekeeper’s Association pollination fee survey. We use a geographically weighted regression to estimate supply elasticities for each state, and provide supporting regional estimates. The eastern United States, where beekeepers have hesitated to participate in almond pollination due to relatively high transportation costs and the potential for local honey production at the time of almond bloom, have some of the highest price elasticities of supply. This suggests that beekeepers in areas with low transportation and/or opportunity costs have supplied all available colonies, and increases in almond pollination fees have had little effect. We estimate that Florida, Georgia, and Texas had the largest number of colonies that did not participate in almond pollination in 2017, so further increases in supply are likely to come from those states.

Predaceous and parasitic insects provide control of important citrus pests. However, many pesticides are toxic to these beneficials. Using California citrus grower survey data, this article tests whether landscape-level use of pesticides affects the presence of and reliance on Aphytis melinus, an important beneficial insect. Results show that landscape-level pesticide use decreases the presence of A. melinus and increases reliance on insecticides. Pesticide use on non-citrus crops has a significant negative effect on the presence of Aphytis melinus, suggesting a cross-crop spatial externality. Our findings illustrate that regulations designed to address cross-crop effects on beneficial insects can increase social welfare.

Governments, nonprofit organizations, and grower groups have expended considerable resources on agricultural extension and education programs, even though the evidence regarding the impact of these programs on farmers’ technology choices and productivity is mixed. Many of the studies finding substantial effects have methodological problems. We control for these methodological problems by using a panel selection model to examine the effect of the Biologically Integrated Orchard Systems program on California almond growers’ replacement of organophosphate pesticides with alternatives considered less environmentally harmful. We find that the program significantly decreased organophosphate use, suggesting that grower education programs can be an effective policy tool.

The broiler industry presents two puzzles regarding production contracts: why do processors control growers' inputs, and why do they use a statistically insufficient estimator to calculate growers' compensation? This paper provides an agency theoretic framework that explains these puzzles in terms of processors' response to grower heterogeneity and production risk and to grower risk aversion. Processors control inputs to reduce the information rents paid to agents. By forcing agents to bear additional income risk through the use of an imprecise estimator, processors can increase profits, due to the combined moral hazard-adverse selection nature of the informational problem.

Quality considerations are increasingly important drivers of production and coordination choices for players in the agrofood chain. Incentive contracts between farmers and processors, shippers, and other buyers are an increasingly popular means of coordinating to improve food quality. This review examines the economic literature regarding incentive contracts and the provision of food quality, with a focus on empirical analyses. Studies of specific value chains find that a desire for higher quality or specific quality attributes increases the likelihood that a contract, rather than the spot market, is used. Consistent with economic theory, studies regarding the selection of contract provisions find that financial incentives are used when an attribute is easily observable at the time of sale, whereas requirements for specific inputs and actions tend to be used when an attribute is not easily observable.

Private sugar processors in Andhra Pradesh, India use an unusual form of vertical coordination. They issue 'permits' to selected cane growers a few weeks before harvest. These permits specify the amount of cane to be delivered during a narrow time period. This article investigates why processors create uncertainty among farmers using ex post permits instead of ex ante production contracts. The theoretical model predicts that ex post permits are more profitable than ex ante contracts or the spot market under existing government regulations in the sugar sector, which include a binding price floor for cane and the designation of a reserve area for each processor wherein it has a legal monopsony for cane. The use of ex post permits creates competition among farmers to increase cane quality, which increases processor profits and farmer costs. Empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that farmers operating in private factory areas have higher unit production costs than do their counterparts who patronize cooperatives.

Contracting and other forms of vertical coordination are important parts of the supply chains for many agricultural products. Often the buyer cares about multiple product attributes affected by a grower's actions. Using data that are insulated from common methodological problems, we test whether or not price incentives for two processing tomato quality attributes exhibit complementarity in improving delivered quality. Price incentives for the two attributes are substitutes for the provision of one and complements for the other. This finding has consequences for the profit-maximizing choice of incentive instruments for processors, and contributes to the literature regarding tests for complementarities.

This paper analyses the determinants of planting decisions, and evaluates the importance of demand uncertainty for genetically modified (GM) crops as a decision factor. It uses data obtained from a survey of 389 farmers in Iowa, USA, in 9 February and 1 March 2000. The demand uncertainty as an uncertain price penalty for GM crops is modelled. A theoretical model of the acreage allocation decision for a risk-averse producer is paired with producers assessments of relative production risks and returns of GM and conventional crops. Prior to the 2000 planting season, some industry observers predicted acreage of genetically modified crops would decline dramatically. However, it is indicated that farmers reduced their acreage of genetically modified maize, but concurrently increased their acreage of genetically modified soyabeans. We demonstrate that it may be theoretically optimal for risk-averse farmers to reduce their maize acreage but not their soyabean acreage. However, past experience, attitudes, and farm size explained planting decisions to a larger degree than did risk preferences.