Explore the vast range of titles available.

The proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) technology has brought both innovative opportunities and unprecedented challenges to the education sector. Although AI makes education more accessible and efficient, the intentional misuse of AI chatbots in facilitating academic cheating has become a growing concern. By using the indirect questioning technique via a list experiment to minimize social desirability bias, this research contributes to the ongoing dialog on academic integrity in the era of AI. Our findings reveal that students conceal AI-powered academic cheating behaviors when directly questioned, as the prevalence of cheaters observed via list experiments is almost threefold the prevalence of cheaters observed via the basic direct questioning approach. Interestingly, our subsample analysis shows that AI-powered academic cheating behaviors differ significantly across genders and grades, as higher-grade female students are more likely to cheat than newly enrolled female students. Conversely, male students consistently engage in academic cheating throughout all grades. Furthermore, we discuss potential reasons for the heterogeneous effects in academic cheating behavior among students such as gender disparity, academic-related pressure, and peer effects. Implications are also suggested for educational institutions to promote innovative approaches that harness the benefits of AI technologies while safeguarding academic integrity.

In Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), community-based health insurance (CBHI) is the only voluntary insurance scheme; it typically targets self-employed people, most of whom reside in rural areas and are dependent on agricultural activities for subsistence. However, until very recently, the enrollment rate has fallen short and failed to reach a large percentage of the target group. To promote the CBHI scheme and increase demand, some supporting components should be considered for inclusion together with the health infrastructure component. This paper provides empirical evidence that the benefit package components of hypothetical CBHI schemes have causal effects on enrollment probabilities. Furthermore, we examine the distribution of willingness to pay (WTP) in response to policy changes based on a sample of 5,800 observations. A randomized conjoint experiment is conducted in rural villages in Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR, to elicit stated preference data. Each respondent ranks three options-two hypothetical alternatives and the CBHI status quo scheme. The levels of seven attributes-insurance coverage for medical consultations, hospitalizations, traffic accidents, pharmaceuticals and transportation; premiums; and prepaid discounts-are randomly and simultaneously assigned to the two alternatives. The findings suggest that the average WTP is at least as large as 10.9% of the per capita income of those who live in rural areas, which is higher than the WTP for health insurance averaged across low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in the literature. The component of round-trip transportation insurance coverage has a significant effect on WTP distribution, particularly increasing the share of the highest bin. Therefore, the low CBHI scheme enrollment rate in Lao PDR does not necessarily imply low demand among the targeted population, as the finding from the WTP analysis illustrates potential demand for the CBHI scheme. Specifically, if transportation is addressed, enrollment is likely to significantly increase.

In a recent publication in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Poyago-Theotoky (2007) developed a three-stage game model and also derived theoretical findings and important policy implications for environmental R&D under a time-consistent emission tax. Among the conclusions presented in that paper, it was stated that with inefficient environmental R&D technology and small environmental damage, cooperative environmental R&D engenders larger environmental R&D efforts and greater social welfare than non-cooperative environmental R&D does. This note describes that the results of Poyago-Theotoky's works are still robust in a relaxed wider parameter range of the environmental damage coefficient. Furthermore, the author's provide the generalized sufficient condition of damage coefficient to guarantee an interior solution for R&D in an extended framework. Furthermore, Poyago-Theotoky provides a corrigendum, showing that the negative emission tax can improve the market inefficiency caused by Cournot duopolists. However, an unnecessarily strict assumption related to the environmental damage coefficient has remained. The purpose of this note is to point out that oversight.

This paper presents examination of environmental R&D of Cournot duopolists with end-of-pipe technology under a regulator's precommitment to an emissions tax. Results show that, in the presence of technological spillover effect, the government invariably prefers environmental R&D cartelization to environmental R&D competition. In addition, this paper, in stark contrast to those presenting earlier studies, reveals that consumer surplus is not necessarily maximized by environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization, although there invariably exist private incentives to firms for ERJV cartelization as well as social incentives for it.

This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially efficient. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm's R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more efficient than the other three scenarios (i.e., environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition, and ERJV cartelization), although R&D competition is the case of \"NO information sharing and NO R&D coordination.\"

This paper presents an examination of the socially desirable formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emissions tax. The results reveal that if environmental damage is sufficiently small, alternatively if there is severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) carteliza- tion is socially desirable. However, if environmental damage is sufficiently extensive, and if a firm's environmental R&D costs are sufficiently limited, then, in contrast to previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more desirable than environmental R&D cartelization and ERJV cartelization, although R&D competition is the case of \"NO information sharing\" and \"NO R&D coordination.\"

This paper reexamines the Poyago-Theotoky model and provides additional investigation that was conducted under a corrected environmental damage parameter. As new findings, we obtain the following. First, social welfare under a time-consistent emission tax (emission subsidy) policy is always welfare-enhancing rather than the case of laissez-faire. Second, if the environmental damage parameter is sufficiently small, then the equilibrium emission tax rate is invariably negative. It is therefore an emission subsidy. Moreover, total emissions under the emission subsidy become smaller than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is low. However, total emissions under the emission subsidy become greater than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is high.

In a recent publication in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Poyago-Theotoky (2007) developed a three-stage game model, and also derived theoretical findings and important policy implications for environmental R&D under a time-consistent emission tax. Among the conclusions presented in that paper, it was stated that with inefficient environmental R&D technology and small environmental damage, cooperative environmental R&D engenders larger environmental R&D efforts and greater social welfare than noncooperative environmental R&D does. This note describes that the results of Professor Poyago-Theotoky's (2007, 2010) works are still robust in a relaxed wider parameter range of the environmental damage coefficient. Furthermore, we provide the generalized sufficient condition of damage coefficient to guarantee an interior solution for R&D in an extended framework.

Mountainous hinterland in rural Nepal lacks fundamental social infrastructure. Lack of electricity causes difficulty of water provision, especially in mountainous area where villagers, especially ladies, youths and children, often spends large amount of time just to convey water. To overcome this challenge, installation of solar water pumping system (SWPS) is recently being implemented nation-wide in Nepal. Confrontation of the Nepali government with her tight financial constraint requires the installation process be both economically and technologically sound. By collecting original field data from 38 wards (i.e., villages) in all seven regions in the entire Nepal, this paper thus identifies the technically efficient cases of SWPS, and then investigates any potential economic policy that will enhance the performance of SWPS. Our results show, inter-alia, that abundant financial support from the government results in inefficient systems, and that charging user fees significantly discourages villagersf participation to SWPS and hence undermines the potential benefit of SWPS.