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"Graver, Margaret"
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Letters on ethics : to Lucilius
The Roman statesman and philosopher Seneca (4 BCE-65 CE) recorded his moral philosophy and reflections on life as a highly original kind of correspondence, which included vivid descriptions of town and country life in Nero's Italy, discussions of poetry and oratory, and philosophical training for his friend Lucilius. Written as much for a general audience as for Lucilius, his engaging letters offer advice on how to deal with everything, from nosy neighbours to sickness, pain and death. Seneca also uses the informal format of the letter to present the central ideas of Stoicism, for centuries the most influential philosophical system in the Mediterranean world.
Book
Stoicism and emotion
On the surface, stoicism and emotion seem like contradictory terms. Yet the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome were deeply interested in the emotions, which they understood as complex judgments about what we regard as valuable in our surroundings. Stoicism and Emotion shows that they did not simply advocate an across-the-board suppression of feeling, as stoicism implies in today’s English, but instead conducted a searching examination of these powerful psychological responses, seeking to understand what attitude toward them expresses the deepest respect for human potential. In this elegant and clearly written work, Margaret Graver gives a compelling new interpretation of the Stoic position. Drawing on a vast range of ancient sources, she argues that the chief demand of Stoic ethics is not that we should suppress or deny our feelings, but that we should perfect the rational mind at the core of every human being. Like all our judgments, the Stoics believed, our affective responses can be either true or false and right or wrong, and we must assume responsibility for them. Without glossing over the difficulties, Graver also shows how the Stoics dealt with those questions that seem to present problems for their theory: the physiological basis of affective responses, the phenomenon of being carried away by one’s emotions, the occurrence of involuntary feelings and the disordered behaviors of mental illness. Ultimately revealing the deeper motivations of Stoic philosophy, Stoicism and Emotion uncovers the sources of its broad appeal in the ancient world and illuminates its surprising relevance to our own.
eBook
The Development of Character
This chapter evaluates how emotive dispositions develop over time within the life history of the individual. It assesses the process by which the misevaluation of one or another object type becomes entrenched or “deep-rooted” in the emotive personality of the individual. The Stoic developmental account becomes most closely entwined with issues of long-term responsibility for one's own character and actions. Calcidius states clearly that what Stoics call “the twofold cause” is meant to explain how false values become established among people whose nature is to pursue the good. It is noted that honor is derived from virtue, and popular esteem is then confused with honor. The Chrysippan “twofold cause” yields a comprehensive account of human development in that it gives thought to every stage in a person's intellectual growth. The role for luck in moral development is finally described.
Book Chapter
The Tears of Alcibiades
This chapter considers that the Stoic system not only allows but actually requires the retention of many dimensions of affectivity in ordinary persons, including even the painful feelings of sorrow and remorse. It also describes the response called by Greek Stoics metameleia; a near English equivalent is “remorse.” It also evaluates the role of remorse in Stoic philosophy. A suggestion made by Chrysippus concerning practical strategies for consolation is then elaborated. The material presented on remorse and shame gives rise to further reflections on the old ideal of apatheia or the disappearance of the pathē. It is noted that even those who are not wise will sometimes respond affectively to integral objects. The emotions described for Alcibiades, and for Serenus, are true to life, and there are other reactions, too, that are a mix: times when grief is compounded with remorse, desire with aspiration, fear with moral shame.
Book Chapter
Feelings without Assent
This chapter investigates the feelings that sometimes occur in the absence of assent. The Stoic founders devised nonprejudicial terms like “bitings” and “troubling” for responses which do not have the moral significance of genuine emotions. Cicero suggested that “biting and contraction” occur with some regularity in the wise person's experience. The view that feelings sometimes occur in the absence of assent is developed to its fullest extent in the works of Seneca. The discussion in On Anger clarifies that because the feelings of which Seneca speaks do not depend on assent, they are nonculpable, and there is no reason why the person of perfect understanding should not experience them just like anyone else. The existence of the pre-emotion concept helps to understand how Stoic views on emotion can have seemed compelling to so many intelligent persons in antiquity.
Book Chapter
The Manhandling of Maecenas: Senecan Abstractions of Masculinity
Graver argues that Seneca's reductive treatment of Gaius Maecenas' work demonstrates that the philosopher is less interested in Maecenas himself than using the work to create an abstract priciple of gender. Virtus, an ideal condition associated with male gender norms and masculine behavior, is discussed.
Journal Article
Mania and Melancholy
The moral psychology of the early Stoa might seem an odd place to look for a sensitive analysis of the phenomena now usually called mental illness. For Stoics are notorious for claiming that “all fools are insane,” and notorious, also, for asserting that the vast majority of humans, clever as they might be by ordinary standards, are still, properly speaking, fools. Hence the objection of one Diogenianus, an Epicurean of perhaps the second century C.E.:
How is this? You say that except for the wise person, there is no human being who is not equally as insane as Orestes and
Book Chapter