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The U.S., Brazil and a number of European and other countries worldwide have introduced various support schemes for bioethanol and biodiesel. The advantage of these biofuels is that they are relatively easily integrated with the current fossil fuel-based transport sector, at least up to a certain point. However, recent studies point to various negative effects of expanding the production of first generation (1G) biofuels further. 1G biofuels’ problems can be overcome by a transition to second generation (2G) biofuels. So far, 2G biofuels are much more costly to produce. We therefore ask: to what extent is targeted support to 2G biofuels likely to bring costs down? Additionally, are current support schemes for biofuels well designed in order to promote the development of 2G biofuels? We find that the prospects for cost reduction look better for 2G bioethanol than for 2G biodiesel. Bioethanol made from cellulose is far from a ripe technology, with several cost-reducing opportunities yet to be developed. Hence, targeted support to cellulosic ethanol might induce a switch from 1G to 2G biofuels. However, we find little evidence that production and use of 1G bioethanol will bridge the conversion to 2G bioethanol. Hence, to the extent that private investment in the development of 2G bioethanol is too low, current support schemes for 1G biofuels may block 2G bioethanol instead of promoting it.

AsbstractWe model the value chain of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) by focusing on the decisions taken by actors involved in either capture, transport or storage of CO2. Plants emitting CO2 are located apart. If these invest in carbon capture facilities, the captured CO2 is transported to terminals, which again transport the received amount of CO2 to a storage site. Because of network effects, we may have three equilibria: one with no CCS, one with low investments in CCS, and one with high investments in CCS. In a numerical specification of the model, we find that the market for CCS may be in a state of excess inertia, i.e., even if the social cost of carbon is sufficiently high to justify investment from a social point of view, the market actors may not succeed in coordinating their efforts to reach the equilibrium with high investment. The government should then consider offering economic incentives to investments. In addition to the network effect, several other market imperfections exist, such as market power, economics of scale and the environmental externality from CO2 emissions. We identify policy instruments—in addition to a correctly set carbon tax—that will correct for the remaining market imperfections and bring private investments in line with the first-best levels. Without correction, too many terminals are set up and too few plants invest in capture facilities in our reference market structure.

Should governments direct research and development (R&D) away from \"dirty\" technologies towards \"clean\" ones? How important is this compared to carbon pricing? We address these questions with the introduction of two model features to the literature on directed technological change and the environment. We introduce decreasing returns to R&D, and allow future carbon taxes to influence current R&D decisions. Our results suggest that governments should prioritize clean R&D. Dealing with major environmental problems requires an R&D shift towards clean technology. However, in the case where most researchers are working with clean technology, both productivity spillovers and the risks of future replacement increase. Consequently, the gap between the private and social values of an innovation is greatest for clean technologies.

Our point of departure is that a group of industrialized countries invest in research and development (R&D) of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement technologies. R&D investments influence the future GHG abatement choices of both industrialized and developing countries. We distinguish between investments that reduce industrialized countries’ abatement costs and investments that reduce developing countries’ abatement costs. Unlike earlier contributions, we include global trading in emission permits. This changes the nature of the game. With global permit trading, industrialized countries should in many cases invest strategically in technologies that only reduce abatement costs at home. This comes in addition to investments abroad. Second, we show that R&D investments always decrease total emissions. Finally, we find that the developing region receiving investments always benefits.

A government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first-best level of public spending. When involved in emission trading, a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales. This fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries. Our theory explains how, and when, fiscal externalities may be expected to arise. Moreover, we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities, the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect: (1) the price of emission permits, (2) the global distribution of abatement effort, and (3) total greenhouse gas mitigation costs. This is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets. Our findings are especially relevant for the EU which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between EU member countries for all emissions outside the European Emissions Trading System.

According to IEA (2018), there is a huge gap between the first-best social optimal utilization of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies to lower global CO₂ emissions and the current, negligible diffusion of this technology. This calls for a financial support mechanism for CCS. We study to what extent promotion of CCS in Europe should be through subsidizing development and production of CCS technologies—an upstream subsidy—or by subsidising the purchasers of CCS technologies—a downstream subsidy. This question is examined theoretically in a stylized model and numerically by using a new approach that integrates strategic trade policy with an economic model of the European energy markets. The theory model suggests that upstream subsidies should clearly be preferred, and this is confirmed by the numerical simulations. For the European power market, the numerical simulations suggest that subsidies to CCS coal power should exceed subsidies to CCS gas power.

Eco-labels are suspected to serve protectionist purposes. We analyze the choice between an environmental standard and a voluntary eco-label scheme in a partial trade model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm. The environmental standard will only apply to the domestic firm, while both firms can adopt the eco-label. Pollution is production related, and domestic consumers demand products that are produced in an “environmentally friendly” way. Our results show that it may be optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco-label and get both firms to adopt the label, instead of setting an environmental standard. However, to what extent this policy serves protectionist purposes is ambiguous. In particular, if the willingness to pay for green products is sufficient to cover the pollution abatement costs of the foreign firm, foreign firm profit will increase while domestic firm profit will decrease compared to the outcome with a domestic environmental standard. On the other hand, if the willingness to pay for green products is insufficient, the foreign firm would be better off with a domestic environmental standard. Copyright Springer 2006

Many European politicians argue that the EU should set tougher emission targets than what is required by the Kyoto protocol, and moreover, that emission trading with other countries outside EU should be limited so as to keep emission quota prices high. One of the arguments, frequently cited for such a policy, is the need for technological development. However, the literature on climate change and technological innovation does not unambiguously support the need for setting high emission taxes today. In this paper we investigate the relationship between emission taxes and technological change further by modeling innovation activity explicitly. In our model both the amount of R&D and the amount of carbon abatement are decided in a decentralized way by the market as a response to an emission tax. Moreover, we introduce several distinct failures in the market for new innovations, among others, insufficient patent protection and intertemporal knowledge spill-overs. Our findings suggest that governments should under some circumstances set a higher carbon tax today if we have technological change driven by R&D than if we have pure exogenous technological change. Based on numerical simulations these circumstances are (a) positive intertemporal knowledge spillovers and/or (b) weak patent protection.

The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comply without consequence. The alternative compliance enforcement systems that have been proposed in the literature also face substantial problems. A simple, flexible, potent, and credible compliance enforcement system for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, based on deposits, is proposed here: at ratification, each country deposits a significant amount of money, and continues to do so in the preparation stage each year until the start of the commitment period. At the end of this period, those countries that meet their emissions limitation targets receive a full refund of their deposit, while those that fail to do so forfeit part or all of it. A simplified two-country model of the deposit system and a numerical example of an agreement involving the US, Japan, Russia, and Europe is also provided. If each country's deposit is no less than its abatement costs, there is a strong incentive for participating countries to avoid non-compliance.