Search Results Heading

MBRLSearchResults

mbrl.module.common.modules.added.book.to.shelf
Title added to your shelf!
View what I already have on My Shelf.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to add the title to your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Oops! Something went wrong.
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
    Done
    Filters
    Reset
  • Discipline
      Discipline
      Clear All
      Discipline
  • Is Peer Reviewed
      Is Peer Reviewed
      Clear All
      Is Peer Reviewed
  • Series Title
      Series Title
      Clear All
      Series Title
  • Reading Level
      Reading Level
      Clear All
      Reading Level
  • Year
      Year
      Clear All
      From:
      -
      To:
  • More Filters
      More Filters
      Clear All
      More Filters
      Content Type
    • Item Type
    • Is Full-Text Available
    • Subject
    • Publisher
    • Source
    • Donor
    • Language
    • Place of Publication
    • Contributors
    • Location
38 result(s) for "Groeling, Tim J"
Sort by:
When politicians attack : party cohesion in the media
\"Fostering a positive brand name is the chief benefit parties provide for their members. They do this both by coordinating their activities in the legislative process and by communicating with voters. Whereas political scientists have generally focused on the former, dismissing partisan communication as cheap talk, this book argues that a party's ability to coordinate its communication has important implications for the study of politics. The macro-level institutional setting of a party's communication heavily influences that party's prospects for cohesive communication. Paradoxically, unified government presents the greatest challenge to unified communication within the president's party. As this book argues, the challenge stems primarily from two sources: the constitutional separation of powers and the intervening role of the news media. In this setting, internal disputes with the president or within the congressional majority are more likely to arise; these disputes are disproportionately likely to be featured by the news media, and stories of intra-party strife become the most credible and damaging type of partisan story\"-- Provided by publisher.
War stories
How does the American public formulate its opinions about U.S. foreign policy and military engagement abroad?War Storiesargues that the media systematically distort the information the public vitally needs to determine whether to support such initiatives, for reasons having more to do with journalists' professional interests than the merits of the policies, and that this has significant consequences for national security. Matthew Baum and Tim Groeling develop a \"strategic bias\" theory that explains the foreign-policy communication process as a three-way interaction among the press, political elites, and the public, each of which has distinct interests, biases, and incentives. Do media representations affect public support for the president and faithfully reflect events in times of diplomatic crisis and war? How do new media--especially Internet news and more partisan outlets--shape public opinion, and how will they alter future conflicts? In answering such questions, Baum and Groeling take an in-depth look at media coverage, elite rhetoric, and public opinion during the Iraq war and other U.S. conflicts abroad. They trace how traditional and new media select stories, how elites frame and sometimes even distort events, and how these dynamics shape public opinion over the course of a conflict. Most of us learn virtually everything we know about foreign policy from media reporting of elite opinions. InWar Stories, Baum and Groeling reveal precisely what this means for the future of American foreign policy.
Reality Asserts Itself: Public Opinion on Iraq and the Elasticity of Reality
Prevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of “reality” very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration's preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from more than 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.
Politics across the Water’s Edge
Speaking in St. Louis on July 5, 2008, then-Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama outlined his plans for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq: “The tactics of how we ensure our troops are safe as we pull out, how we execute the withdrawal, those are things that are all based on facts and conditions. I am not somebody—unlike George Bush—who is willing to ignore facts on the basis of my preconceived notions” (Loven 2008). In his statement, Obama accused President Bush, in effect, of ignoring reality in his Iraq policies, and implied that his own promised timetable for withdrawal might
Back to the Future
In February 1968,CBS Evening Newsanchor Walter Cronkite gave what is often regarded as the most important commentary of his long and distinguished career. In his first broadcast since concluding a fact-finding tour of Vietnam following the shocking 1968 Tet Offensive, Cronkite somberly editorialized that, while not on the “edge of defeat,” the United States was “mired in stalemate,” and that “the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could” (Cronkite 1968). In the halls
Reality Asserted Itself
Marshalling what he called “simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense,” Thomas Paine once decried what he observed to be stubborn and wrongheaded resistance to the American war for independence: “A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom.” Paine, however, claimed to be optimistic that his cause would prevail in the fullness of time, as “Time makes more converts than reason” (Paine 1776).¹ At the time of this writing, in winter 2008, it seems clear in retrospect that in 2007
Tidings of Battle
Just before the 2004 presidential election, theNew York Times Magazinepublished an article by veteran reporter Ron Suskind titled “Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush.” In it, the author recounted being criticized by an unnamed member of the Bush administration for overvaluing “judicious study of discernible reality” in the evaluation of policy options. The administration source argued, “That’s not the way the world really works anymore. . . . We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating
Elite Rhetoric, Media Coverage, and Rallying ’Round the Flag
In the 1930s, Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) was one of the most consistent and powerful foreign policy isolationists in the Senate. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor that prompted America to enter the Second World War, Vandenberg steadfastly opposed President Franklin Roosevelt’s attempts to increase American involvement in the conflict and actively worked to constrain Roosevelt’s foreign policy through legislation, including the Neutrality Acts. In contrast Vandenberg increasingly came to advocate “bipartisanship” in the conduct of foreign policy during and after the war, by which he meant “mutual effort, under our indispensable two-Party system, to unite our official voice
War Meets the Press
What makes it into the news? Longtime CBS anchor Walter Cronkite neatly summarized the widely shared perspective of journalists when he said, “Our job is only to hold up the mirror—to tell and show the public what has happened.”¹ In sharp contrast, journalist Walter Lippmann (1922) famously said the press was “like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of darkness into vision.” Chapter 1 began with an anecdote in which the media offered tremendously different coverage of the remarks by two seemingly similar Republican senators who appeared together on