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SARS-CoV-2 emerged in late 2019 and caused a pandemic, whereas the closely related SARS-CoV was contained rapidly in 2003. Here, an experimental set-up is used to study transmission of SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 through the air between ferrets over more than a meter distance. Both viruses cause a robust productive respiratory tract infection resulting in transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to two of four indirect recipient ferrets and SARS-CoV to all four. A control pandemic A/H1N1 influenza virus also transmits efficiently. Serological assays confirm all virus transmission events. Although the experiments do not discriminate between transmission via small aerosols, large droplets and fomites, these results demonstrate that SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 can remain infectious while traveling through the air. Efficient virus transmission between ferrets is in agreement with frequent SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in mink farms. Although the evidence for virus transmission via the air between humans under natural conditions is absent or weak for SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2, ferrets may represent a sensitive model to study interventions aimed at preventing virus transmission. Some epidemiological data suggests that SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted through the air over longer distances. Here, Kutter et al. show in the ferret model that SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV can be transmitted through the air over more than a meter distance, however, data should be interpreted with care, as ferrets are likely more susceptible to coronavirus infections.

SARS-CoV-2, a coronavirus that emerged in late 2019, has spread rapidly worldwide, and information about the modes of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 among humans is critical to apply appropriate infection control measures and to slow its spread. Here we show that SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted efficiently via direct contact and via the air (via respiratory droplets and/or aerosols) between ferrets, 1 to 3 days and 3 to 7 days after exposure respectively. The pattern of virus shedding in the direct contact and indirect recipient ferrets is similar to that of the inoculated ferrets and infectious virus is isolated from all positive animals, showing that ferrets are productively infected via either route. This study provides experimental evidence of robust transmission of SARS-CoV-2 via the air, supporting the implementation of community-level social distancing measures currently applied in many countries in the world and informing decisions on infection control measures in healthcare settings. SARS-CoV-2 has rapidly spread globally and animal models to study transmission are needed. Here, Richard et al. show efficient transmission of SARS-CoV-2 between ferrets via direct contact and via the air, through respiratory droplets and/or aerosols.

Human influenza A viruses are known to be transmitted via the air from person to person. It is unknown from which anatomical site of the respiratory tract influenza A virus transmission occurs. Here, pairs of genetically tagged and untagged influenza A/H1N1, A/H3N2 and A/H5N1 viruses that are transmissible via the air are used to co-infect donor ferrets via the intranasal and intratracheal routes to cause an upper and lower respiratory tract infection, respectively. In all transmission cases, we observe that the viruses in the recipient ferrets are of the same genotype as the viruses inoculated intranasally, demonstrating that they are expelled from the upper respiratory tract of ferrets rather than from trachea or the lower airways. Moreover, influenza A viruses that are transmissible via the air preferentially infect ferret and human nasal respiratory epithelium. These results indicate that virus replication in the upper respiratory tract, the nasal respiratory epithelium in particular, of donors is a driver for transmission of influenza A viruses via the air. Here, the authors perform simultaneous inoculation of genetically tagged influenza A virus in ferrets and show that airborne transmissible viruses are preferentially transmitted from the upper respiratory tract, which correlates with high replication ability in the ferret and human nasal respiratory epithelium.

During circulation in humans and natural selection to escape antibody recognition for decades, A/H3N2 influenza viruses emerged with altered receptor specificities. These viruses lost the ability to agglutinate erythrocytes critical for antigenic characterization and give low yields and acquire adaptive mutations when cultured in eggs and cells, contributing to recent vaccine challenges. Examination of receptor specificities of A/H3N2 viruses reveals that recent viruses compensated for decreased binding of the prototypic human receptor by recognizing α2,6-sialosides on extended LacNAc moieties. Erythrocyte glycomics shows an absence of extended glycans providing a rationale for lack of agglutination by recent A/H3N2 viruses. A glycan remodeling approach installing functional receptors on erythrocytes, allows antigenic characterization of recent A/H3N2 viruses confirming the cocirculation of antigenically different viruses in humans. Computational analysis of HAs in complex with sialosides having extended LacNAc moieties reveals that mutations distal to the RBD reoriented the Y159 side chain resulting in an extended receptor binding site. Here, Broszeit et al. show that circulating A/H3N2 viruses have evolved binding specificity to α2,6-sialosides on extended LacNAc moieties and therefore cannot agglutinate erythrocytes. Applying glycan remodeling allows to install functional receptors on erythrocytes and promotes identification of newly circulating variants to facilitate vaccine design.

Wild birds may spread the H5N8 virus In November and December 2014, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5 subtype originating from China were detected in poultry and wild birds in various countries of Asia and Europe, and, for the first time, in North America. These incursions of newly emerging HPAI H5 viruses constitute a threat to animal and potentially human health and raise questions about the routes of transmission.

Influenza B virus primarily infects humans, causing seasonal epidemics globally. Two antigenic variants—Victoria-like and Yamagata-like—were detected in the 1980s, of which the molecular basis of emergence is still incompletely understood. Here, the antigenic properties of a unique collection of historical virus isolates, sampled from 1962 to 2000 and passaged exclusively in mammalian cells to preserve antigenic properties, were determined with the hemagglutination inhibition assay and an antigenic map was built to quantify and visualize the divergence of the lineages. The antigenic map revealed only three distinct antigenic clusters—Early, Victoria, and Yamagata—with relatively little antigenic diversity in each cluster until 2000. Viruses with Victoria-like antigenic properties emerged around 1972 and diversified subsequently into two genetic lineages. Viruses with Yamagata-like antigenic properties evolved from one lineage and became clearly antigenically distinct from the Victoria-like viruses around 1988. Recombinant mutant viruses were tested to show that insertions and deletions (indels), as observed frequently in influenza B virus hemagglutinin, had little effect on antigenic properties. In contrast, amino-acid substitutions at positions 148, 149, 150, and 203, adjacent to the hemagglutinin receptor binding site, determined the main antigenic differences between the Early, Victoria-like, and Yamagata-like viruses. Surprisingly, substitutions at two of the four positions reverted in recent viruses of the Victoria lineage, resulting in antigenic properties similar to viruses circulating ∼50 y earlier. These data shed light on the antigenic diversification of influenza viruses and suggest there may be limits to the antigenic evolution of influenza B virus.

Central nervous system (CNS) disease is the most common extra-respiratory tract complication of influenza A virus infections in humans. Remarkably, zoonotic highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus infections are more often associated with CNS disease than infections with seasonal influenza viruses. Evolution of avian influenza viruses has been extensively studied in the context of respiratory infections, but evolutionary processes in CNS infections remain poorly understood. We have previously observed that the ability of HPAI A/Indonesia/5/2005 (H5N1) virus to replicate in and spread throughout the CNS varies widely between individual ferrets. Based on these observations, we sought to understand the impact of entrance into and replication within the CNS on the evolutionary dynamics of virus populations. First, we identified and characterized three substitutions–PB1 E177G and A652T and NP I119M - detected in the CNS of a ferret infected with influenza A/Indonesia/5/2005 (H5N1) virus that developed a severe meningo-encephalitis. We found that some of these substitutions, individually or collectively, resulted in increased polymerase activity in vitro. Nevertheless, in vivo, the virus bearing the CNS-associated mutations retained its capacity to infect the CNS but showed reduced dispersion to other anatomical sites. Analyses of viral diversity in the nasal turbinate and olfactory bulb revealed the lack of a genetic bottleneck acting on virus populations accessing the CNS via this route. Furthermore, virus populations bearing the CNS-associated mutations showed signs of positive selection in the brainstem. These features of dispersion to the CNS are consistent with the action of selective processes, underlining the potential for H5N1 viruses to adapt to the CNS.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 virus can cause morbidity and mortality in humans but thus far has not acquired the ability to be transmitted by aerosol or respiratory droplet (\"airbome transmission\") between humans. To address the concern that the virus could acquire this ability under natural conditions, we genetically modified A/H5N1 virus by site-directed mutagenesis and subsequent serial passage in ferrets. The genetically modified A/H5N1 virus acquired mutations during passage in ferrets, ultimately becoming airborne transmissible in ferrets. None of the recipient ferrets died after airborne infection with the mutant A/H5N1 viruses. Four amino acid substitutions in the host receptor-binding protein hemagglutinin, and one in the polymerase complex protein basic polymerase 2, were consistently present in airborne-transmitted viruses. The transmissible viruses were sensitive to the antiviral drug oseltamivir and reacted well with antisera raised against H5 influenza vaccine strains. Thus, avian A/H5N1 influenza viruses can acquire the capacity for airborne transmission between mammals without recombination in an intermediate host and therefore constitute a risk for human pandemic influenza.

SARS-CoV-2 attaches to angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) to gain entry into cells after which the spike protein is cleaved by the transmembrane serine protease 2 (TMPRSS2) to facilitate viral-host membrane fusion. ACE2 and TMPRSS2 expression profiles have been analyzed at the genomic, transcriptomic, and single-cell RNAseq levels. However, transcriptomic data and actual protein validation convey conflicting information regarding the distribution of the biologically relevant protein receptor in whole tissues. To describe the organ-level architecture of receptor expression, related to the ability of ACE2 and TMPRSS2 to mediate infectivity, we performed a volumetric analysis of whole Syrian hamster lung lobes. Lung tissue of infected and control animals was stained using antibodies against ACE2 and TMPRSS2, combined with SARS-CoV-2 nucleoprotein staining. This was followed by light-sheet microscopy imaging to visualize their expression and related infection patterns. The data demonstrate that infection is restricted to sites containing both ACE2 and TMPRSS2, the latter is expressed in the primary and secondary bronchi whereas ACE2 is predominantly observed in the bronchioles and alveoli. Conversely, infection completely overlaps where ACE2 and TMPRSS2 co-localize in the tertiary bronchi, bronchioles, and alveoli.

The threat of an influenza A virus pandemic stems from continual virus spillovers from reservoir species, a tiny fraction of which spark sustained transmission in humans. To date, no pandemic emergence of a new influenza strain has been preceded by detection of a closely related precursor in an animal or human. Nonetheless, influenza surveillance efforts are expanding, prompting a need for tools to assess the pandemic risk posed by a detected virus. The goal would be to use genetic sequence and/or biological assays of viral traits to identify those non-human influenza viruses with the greatest risk of evolving into pandemic threats, and/or to understand drivers of such evolution, to prioritize pandemic prevention or response measures. We describe such efforts, identify progress and ongoing challenges, and discuss three specific traits of influenza viruses (hemagglutinin receptor binding specificity, hemagglutinin pH of activation, and polymerase complex efficiency) that contribute to pandemic risk.