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Economic projections by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) were very inaccurate in the years during and after the Great Recession. Relying on a model of collective prediction that weighs the “wisdom of crowds” against shared biases, we examine GDP forecast errors in a panel dataset of FOMC projections from 1992 through 2016. Consistent with the model, we find that diversity of projections reduces collective error, while shared bias magnifies collective error. Collective error is associated strongly with errors by the Federal Reserve Board staff. The benefits of diversity often are statistically significant, especially for projections with terms longer than 1 year.

This paper examines the potential effects of the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 on banks’ noninterest expenses. Using data on U.S. bank holding companies from 1995 through 2016, we test whether noninterest expenses increase following the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act or in relation to the number of banking regulations implemented after Dodd–Frank. We analyze subsamples of banks above and below $10 billion in total assets and consider total noninterest expenses, salaries, non-salary expenses, and specific subcategories of non-salary expenses: legal, consulting, auditing, and data processing. Non-salary expenses for both large and small banks show a one-time increase after Dodd–Frank, while salary expenses tend to increase with regulations. The results indicate that total noninterest expenses for the banking system are higher on average by more than $50 billion per year compared to before the Dodd–Frank Act.

Many economists, including former Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, believe that the gold standard generates poor economic outcomes including output volatility, price instability, financial panics, the spread of recessions via the exchange rate, and speculation-induced collapse. These problems, however, do not by themselves demonstrate the superiority of central banks over the gold standard. Comparative institutional analysis requires demonstrating that the relevant alternative, in this case a central bank, can improve upon these outcomes in practice. We use this standard to compare central banking and the gold standard in the United States. Recent theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the Fed has not been able to measurably improve upon the gold standard even when it comes to these deficiencies.

We provide an initial assessment of the Federal Reserve's policy response to the COVID-19 contraction. We briefly review the historical episode and consider the standard textbook treatment of a pandemic on the macroeconomy. We summarize and then evaluate the Fed's monetary and emergency lending policies through the end of 2020. We credit the Fed with promoting monetary stability while maintaining that it could have done more. We argue that the Fed could have achieved stability without employing its emergency lending facilities. Although some facilities likely helped to promote general liquidity, others were primarily intended to allocate credit, which blurs the line between monetary and fiscal policy. These credit allocation facilities were unwarranted and unwise.

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has claimed that the Fed's bank bailouts during the 2008 financial crisis were consistent with Walter Bagehot's rules for a lender of last resort. This paper demonstrates Bernanke's claims to be mistaken. First, we outline Bagehot's doctrine for a classical lender of last resort. Next, we discuss Bernanke's theory of bank bailouts and his statements regarding the Fed's role in the 2008 bank bailouts. Finally, we examine the bailouts and demonstrate that, contrary to Bernanke's claims, the Fed's actions were not consistent with Bagehot's rules for a lender of last resort.

This paper reviews the cost-benefit analysis, or 'regulatory impact analysis' (RIA), in US bank regulators' risk-based capital (RBC) rule proposals. We review the principles of cost-benefit analysis and its application by US bank regulators. We provide a brief background on RBC rules and review the literature on their costs and benefits. We then evaluate 27 proposed RBC rules and related rules on bank liquidity. We find that nine of the 27 rules include RIAs. Five of the RIAs claim the proposed rule will create net benefits, but none provide quantitative evidence that the benefits exceed the costs. In two proposals, the evidence cited indicates the rules' net benefits may actually be negative.

Do the effects of wars influence our perceptions of U.S. economic performance? This paper compares the rates and volatilities of inflation and GDP growth under the Fed to those in the pre-Fed period adjusting for wars as exogenous shocks. Dividing the pre-Fed periods into subperiods based on changes in the monetary system, we find that performance in the pre-Fed periods is mostly the same as or better than in the post-War II Fed period and the Great Moderation. The rates of inflation under the Fed have generally been higher and the rates of GDP growth lower, but reductions in inflation and GDP volatility are smaller than in other studies and often not statistically significant after accounting for wartime shocks.

This paper considers the effects of changing expectations under macroeconomic policies that rely on targeting nominal variables, such as NGDP targeting. These proposals, in line with a dynamic conception of the equation of exchange, argue that the monetary authority can achieve any dynamic monetary equilibrium, provided favorable public expectations. The problem of changing public expectations, however, cannot be assumed away. Because the public may only find a subset of dynamic monetary equilibria attainable, attempts to coordinate around an equilibrium perceived to be unobtainable can have unintended consequences. We demonstrate in a New Keynesian model that demand-side stabilization policy can shift inflation expectations, resulting in supply-side difficulties. This problem serves as a warning against demand-side fundamentalism in macroeconomic policy.

This paper analyzes banks’ capital and risk-based capital (RBC) ratios as predictors of risk. Using quarterly data on U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 1997 through 2010, we regress the capital and RBC ratios against six balance-sheet and market-based indicators of risk. Although the capital and RBC ratios are statistically significant predictors of BHCs’ levels of risk, we find the capital ratio is a statistically significantly better predictor of risk than the RBC ratio. This difference is strongest since the recent financial crisis beginning in 2007.

We use a simple model to illustrate that nominal GDP targeting might produce a suboptimal equilibrium if there is a growth-maximizing rate of inflation. Following a shock, we find that targeting nominal GDP might result in lower real GDP growth than the economy could sustainably produce given its long-run potential. Our argument does not depend on problems with forecasting or implementation. We assume the monetary authority has no trouble hitting its nominal GDP target. So long as a growth-maximizing rate of inflation exists, the suboptimal outcome results when the rule is followed.