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\"This book discusses \"culture\" and the origins of the Anglo-American special relationship (the AASR). The bitter dispute between ethnic groups in the US from 1914-17--a period of time characterized as the \"culture wars\"--laid the groundwork both for US intervention in the European balance of power in 1917 and for the creation of what would eventually become a lasting Anglo-American alliance. Specifically, the vigorous assault on English \"civilization\" launched by two large ethnic groups in America (the Irish-Americans and the German-Americans) had the unintended effect of causing Americas demographic majority at the time (the English-descended Americans) to regard the prospect of an Anglo-American alliance in an entirely new manner. The author contemplates why the Anglo-American \"great rapprochement\" of 1898 failed to generate the desired \"Anglo-Saxon\" alliance in Britain, and in so doing features theoretically informed inquiries into debates surrounding both the origins of the war in 1914 and the origins of the American intervention decision nearly three years later\"--Back cover.

Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada-U.S. Security Community focuses on three diasporas and their impact on North American security relations, the Irish and Germans, which were mainly in the U.S., and the Muslim diaspora, which is based in both countries.

This book focuses on the critical issues shaping the bilateral defense relationship of the U.S. and Canada, including the future of ballistic missile defense, the increased deployment of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and the growing debate within Canada over security relations with the US.

This article examines the place that “realism” occupies in the debates over International Relations theory and Canadian Foreign Policy. Argued here is the claim that realism is far from being a dominant paradigm in the Canadian academy, which in itself is hardly a surprising finding. However, realism’s relative absence from the scholarship on Canadian Foreign Policy disguises a more important finding: there has been a fairly longstanding Canadian approach to foreign policy analysis bearing many of the hallmarks of structural-realist formulations, an approach that puts great emphasis on Canada’s “relative capability” as a “middle power” in the international system. Although few in the country would embrace the realist label explicitly, many have heeded the structural-realist injunction that foreign policy analysis should start with an assessment of the country’s relative standing in the international pecking order. In the Canadian case, this empirical emphasis on relative capability has become suffused with normative significance of a decidedly “non-realist” kidney, summed up in the disputed concept “middlepowermanship.” The article concludes that, to the extent realism is to continue to be a presence in Canadian Foreign Policy scholarship, it will likely be the non-structural variant known today as “neoclassical realism,” in no small measure due to the logical inconsistencies of the earlier, structuralist, paradigm.

For decades the Republican Party has embraced America’s open, future-oriented nationalism. But when you nominate a Silvio Berlusconi you give up a piece of that.

“Strategic culture” is one of those conceptual bridges that link history with political science because, among other reasons, it reminds us of the hold that memories of past events can continue to exercise upon contemporary reality. But those memories are always subjective, sometimes downplayed to the point of nearly being forgotten altogether, at other times so overstated as to yield a highly distorted sense of the past and of its relationship to the present. This article constitutes a revisitation of contemporary Quebec strategic culture, from the perspective of historical memory. That strategic culture has of late been so strongly stamped with the impress of a “Pearsonian internationalism” that it becomes easy for analysts to confuse it with “pacifism.” Yet it has also been a strategic culture that stems from a great deal of historical amnesia. What has been effaced from the collective memory is the long period in which war was endemic in New France—the period that gives the lie to the notion of Quebeckers somehow being a “pacifistic” folk. This was the sanguinary era upon which the historian Francis Parkman focused such a large share of his prodigious intellectual energies. Only the closing act of this era seems to have escaped erasure from Quebec’s collective memory. Indeed, that act, which took place on the Plains of Abraham, has been “remembered” only too well. So well has it been recollected, in fact, that it has fostered within Quebec society the unshakable conviction that, for Quebeckers, war must always be a risky undertaking susceptible of leading to catastrophe.

This article addresses the role that ‘civilisation rallying’ (sometimes known as the ‘kin-country syndrome’) had in the orientation of both North American countries, Canada and the United States, towards the First World War, with special emphasis upon how France was being reconceptualised in debates taking place in each. France may have been ‘ousted’ from the geostrategic reality of North America back in 1763, but it had an uncanny way of failing to disappear. In fact, you could almost say that as strategic actors about to play an ‘independent’ role in global and European affairs, for both Canada and the US it was a case of France’s having been ‘present at their creation’. But while France figured in both North American countries’ kin-country rallying, it did so for different reasons. Notwithstanding the differences, the pull of a transatlantic ‘collective identity’ whose European point of reference for the North Americans was France (along, of course, with Britain) was packed with tremendous policy significance, and never more so than in the critical year, 1917.

Can states as well as non-state political 'actors' learn from the history of cognate entities elsewhere in time and space, and if so how and when does this policy knowledge get 'transferred' across international borders? This article deals with this question, addressing a short-lived Hungarian 'tutorial' that, during the early twentieth century, certain policy elites in Ireland imagined might have great applicability to the political transformation of the Emerald Isle, in effect ushering in an era of political autonomy from the United Kingdom, and doing so via a 'third way' that skirted both the Scylla of parliamentary formulations aimed at securing 'home rule' for Ireland and the Charybdis of revolutionary violence. In the political agenda of Sinn Féin during its first decade of existence, Hungary loomed as a desirable political model for Ireland, with the party's leading intellectual, Arthur Griffith, insisting that the means by which Hungary had achieved autonomy within the Hapsburg Empire in 1867 could also serve as the means for securing Ireland's own autonomy in the first decades of the twentieth century. This article explores what policy initiatives Arthur Griffith thought he saw in the Hungarian experience that were worthy of being 'transferred' to the Irish situation.

This article explores the argument that antisemitism and anti-Americanism in France are linked to each other in a causal manner. Specifically, it addresses the oft-encountered suggestion that the two prejudices move in tandem with each other, and in such a way that the anterior one (antisemitism) effectively “causes” the latter one (anti-Americanism) to emerge—a suggestion made inter alios by Markovits (J Israeli History 25 85 105 2006). We argue that while there certainly appears to be a correlation between antisemitism and anti-Americanism in France, there is no evidence of contemporary antisemitism being a constitutive feature of the former. While antisemitism may arguably have been part of what propelled anti-Americanism during certain periods of the twentieth century, recently it appears as if “causal” vectors have been reversed, with anti-Americanism contributing to the rise of a “new antisemitism” in France motivated by anger toward Israel and America’s support thereof.

Anticipating his advisers' assent to cooperating with a team of Mexicans who had been sent to Washington to try to obtain administration support for their country's plummeting currency, [Henry Morgenthau, Jr.] was stunned when an assistant secretary, Wayne Taylor, remarked of the emissaries, \"My recommendation is that the boys cool their heels for quite a period.\" Recovering his composure, the treasury secretary riposted: \"And give the Japs and Germans and Italians a chance to go in there?\" Should a lifeline not be extended, he was sure that \"[w]e're just going to wake up and find inside of a year that Italy, Germany, and Japan have taken over Mexico. I'll put money on it that those boys - it's the richest - the greatest source of natural resources close to the ocean of any country in the world. I mean it's perfectly amazing what they've got. They've got everything that those three countries need - everything.\"12 Take symbolism, an area in which [John MacCormac] distinguished himself in two ways: ?) he appears to have been the first writer (to my knowledge, at least) to employ the image of \"limited liability\" to Canadian strategic choices; and 2) he reminds us of the emotional commitment that many Canadians of an earlier generation invested in the once-powerful (but today forgotten) metaphor, the \"linchpin\" - a metaphor that in many ways served as a precursor to a contemporary ontological-security conceptualization sometimes referred to, figuratively, as \"the Anglosphere.\"19 Let us address these in turn. On no topic does MacCormac's pen show itself to greater effect than on the foreign policy (or, lack thereof) of Mackenzie King. It would be difficult to label MacCormac as a fan of the prime minister's, but he is nonetheless an admirer of King's political skill, even if in pursuit of ends that MacCormac held to be antithetical to Canadian interests. King, he writes, \"fascinates because there is no accounting for him. His tactics seem futile and footling; his strategy has almost never erred. He is the sort of leader of whom men say, in a tone of exasperated surprise: 'Hang it, he mustbe good!'\" (87-88). It is clear that MacCormac believed King's foreign policy to be anything but good. In fact, he regarded it as little short of disastrous, being responsible for Canada's having stumbled into the European conflict - and this notwithstanding all the brave talk about how Canada was going, under King's Liberals, to exercise an \"independent\" foreign policy, which would prevent its getting ensnared in European conflicts. What King wrought, instead, was a policy that served neither Canada's own interests, nor those of America or Britain. It was all so ironic, for one might have thought that since Canada had become, at the time of writing, Britain's most \"essential war partner,\" it should have been actively seeking, nay demanding, a voice in the shaping of British policy throughout the interwar period, so as to obviate a return to the situation that had confronted it in 1914 - of having to go off to fight in a European war. Yet rather than seek a voice in the policy of the Empire (by now increasingly being styled the Commonwealth), King chose to maintain the posture of the ostrich, with the paradoxical and perverse result that, on critical decisions relating to war and peace, this so-called independent Canada ended up voiceless, wielding \"no influence at all. For seventeen years she has refused not only to intervene in British foreign policy but even to be consulted about it. The poorest voter in London's East End has more control over Canada's foreign policy than a member of Canada's Parliament\" (52-53).