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We develop and test a theory to address a puzzling pattern that has been discussed widely since the 2016 U.S. presidential election and reproduced here in a post-election survey: how can a constituency of voters find a candidate \"authentically appealing\" (i.e., view him positively as authentic) even though he is a \"lying demagogue\" (someone who deliberately tells lies and appeals to non-normative private prejudices)? Key to the theory are two points: (1) \"common-knowledge\" lies may be understood as flagrant violations of the norm of truth-telling; and (2) when a political system is suffering from a \"crisis of legitimacy\" (Lipset 1959) with respect to at least one political constituency, members of that constituency will be motivated to see a flagrant violator of established norms as an authentic champion of its interests. Two online vignette experiments on a simulated college election support our theory. These results demonstrate that mere partisanship is insufficient to explain sharp differences in how lying demagoguery is perceived, and that several oft-discussed factors—information access, culture, language, and gender—are not necessary for explaining such differences. Rather, for the lying demagogue to have authentic appeal, it is sufficient that one side of a social divide regards the political system as flawed or illegitimate.

We examine how signals of a candidate’s capability affect perceptions of that person’s commitment to an employer. In four experimental studies that use hiring managers as subjects, we test and show that managers perceive highly capable candidates to have lower commitment to the organization than less capable but adequate candidates and, as a result, penalize high-capability candidates in the hiring process. Our results show that managers have concerns about a high-capability candidate’s future commitment to the organization because they view highly capable candidates as having lower levels of organizational interest—meaning they care less about the mission and values of the organization and exert a lower level of effort toward those ends—and because they assume highly capable candidates have more outside job options, increasing their flight risk. Our findings highlight that capability signals do not necessarily afford candidates an advantage in selection, suggesting an upper limit on credentials and other signals of capability in helping candidates get jobs. Our study contributes to research on labor markets, human capital, and credentialing by offering a theory for why and when capability signals can negatively influence job candidate selection decisions.

This paper addresses why customers at times prefer traditional practices deemed more authentic to a domain, particularly where these practices had previously been discarded as inferior. I argue that customer demand for authenticity can be triggered when extrinsic rewards (i.e., fame or money) increase in prominence in a market, causing audiences to doubt the motives of the market’s producers. I examine this dynamic in the context of Major League Baseball, where appreciation for traditional stadium features seemingly arose after the advent of free agency heightened awareness and coverage of the economic rewards in the sport. Experimental analysis validates the proposed mechanism, whereby increased fan exposure to extrinsic rewards increases concern about player inauthenticity, which increases preference for traditional stadium features. Quantitative analysis of attendance patterns provides external validation for these experimental findings by showing that authenticity was more highly preferred, in the form of higher relative attendance in traditional-style ballparks, by those fans more exposed to free agency. Conclusions are drawn about the role that perceptions about motives play in market perceptions of authenticity and valuation of authentic cultural objects.

Work in organization theory has highlighted that diversification triggers concerns over the newly diversified firm’s capability or commitment to serve its audience. Although this work has shown that perceived lack of commitment may be an important problem for diversifying firms, it has not been established what might resolve these commitment concerns and reduce demand-side penalties for diversifying to serve new customers. We argue that a firm’s ability to signal authenticity will increase perceptions of commitment and resolve ambiguities about commitment generated by diversification. We use a multimethod approach including qualitative evidence from a case in the behavioral health industry and experimental methods to isolate these observed effects. In a qualitative study, we examine a case in which two firms saw divergent outcomes when they tried to engage in the exact same diversification activity and show that when a firm signals that they are highly authentic (i.e., when stakeholders perceive the firm to be willing to fulfill commitments even while sacrificing short-term rewards), diversification does not threaten perceived commitment. However, those who cannot signal authenticity are less likely to be selected in the market because diversification is seen as a threat to perceived commitment. We then test these findings in two experiments using the primary customer audience, addiction recovery therapists, as participants. In a final experiment, we test some key boundary conditions of our argument, finding support in the context of markets for car mechanics, which suggests that our argument may be applicable more broadly than healthcare into markets for various types of credence goods.

Work in organization theory has highlighted that diversification triggers concerns over the newly diversified firm's capability or commitment to serve its audience. Although this work has shown that perceived lack of commitment may be an important problem for diversifying firms, it has not been established what might resolve these commitment concerns and reduce demand-side penalties for diversifying to serve new customers. We argue that a firm's ability to signal authenticity will increase perceptions of commitment and resolve ambiguities about commitment generated by diversification. We use a multimethod approach including qualitative evidence from a case in the behavioral health industry and experimental methods to isolate these observed effects. In a qualitative study, we examine a case in which two firms saw divergent outcomes when they tried to engage in the exact same diversification activity and show that when a firm signals that they are highly authentic (i.e., when stakeholders perceive the firm to be willing to fulfill commitments even while sacrificing short-term rewards), diversification does not threaten perceived commitment. However, those who cannot signal authenticity are less likely to be selected in the market because diversification is seen as a threat to perceived commitment. We then test these findings in two experiments using the primary customer audience, addiction recovery therapists, as participants. In a final experiment, we test some key boundary conditions of our argument, finding support in the context of markets for car mechanics, which suggests that our argument may be applicable more broadly than healthcare into markets for various types of credence goods.

We develop and test the idea that public appreciation for authentic lowbrow culture affords an effective way for certain elites to address feelings of authenticity-insecurity arising from \"high status denigration\" (Hahl and Zuckerman 2014). This argument, which builds on recent sociological research on the \"search for authenticity\" (e.g., Grazian 2005) and on Bourdieu's (1993) notion of artistic \"disinterestedness,\" is validated through experiments with U.S. subjects in the context of \"outsider\" art (Fine 2004). The first study demonstrates that preference for lowbrow culture perceived to be authentic is higher when individuals feel insecure in their authenticity because they attained status in a context where extrinsic incentives are salient. The second study demonstrates that audiences perceive the members of erstwhile denigrated high-status categories to be more authentic if they consume lowbrow culture, but only if the cultural producer is perceived as authentic. We conclude by noting how this \"authenticity-by-appreciation\" effect might be complementary to distinction-seeking as a motivation for elite cultural omnivorousness, and we draw broader implications for when and why particular forms of culture are in demand.

This article develops and tests a theory to explain the common tendency to \"denigrate heroes,\" whereby high-status actors are suspected of being inconsiderate and inauthentic relative to low-status counterparts. This tendency is argued to reflect two conditions typical of status attainment processes: (a) assertions of superiority over others and (b) the presence of incentives to pursue status. The latter is key since awareness of such incentives breeds suspicions of inauthenticity, which in turn undermine perceptions of prosocial intentions. This theory is validated in a series of online experiments, in which categorical status hierarchies emerge either via deference on a coordinated task or via competitive interactions. Results show that high-status actors may also be \"celebrated\" as authentic and considerate when the observable incentive structure is such that assertions of superiority appear as unintended by-products of prosocial action. Implications are drawn regarding the sources of instability and insecurity in status hierarchies.

This article develops and tests a theory to explain the common tendency to “denigrate heroes,” whereby high-status actors are suspected of being inconsiderate and inauthentic relative to low-status counterparts. This tendency is argued to reflect two conditions typical of status attainment processes: (a) assertions of superiority over others and (b) the presence of incentives to pursue status. The latter is key since awareness of such incentives breeds suspicions of inauthenticity, which in turn undermine perceptions of prosocial intentions. This theory is validated in a series of online experiments, in which categorical status hierarchies emerge either via deference on a coordinated task or via competitive interactions. Results show that high-status actors may also be “celebrated” as authentic and considerate when the observable incentive structure is such that assertions of superiority appear as unintended by-products of prosocial action. Implications are drawn regarding the sources of instability and insecurity in status hierarchies.

This article develops and tests a theory to explain the common tendency to “denigrate heroes,” whereby high-status actors are suspected of being inconsiderate and inauthentic relative to low-status counterparts. This tendency is argued to reflect two conditions typical of status attainment processes: (a) assertions of superiority over others and (b) the presence of incentives to pursue status. The latter is key since awareness of such incentives breeds suspicions of inauthenticity, which in turn undermine perceptions of prosocial intentions. This theory is validated in a series of online experiments, in which categorical status hierarchies emerge either via deference on a coordinated task or via competitive interactions. Results show that high-status actors may also be “celebrated” as authentic and considerate when the observable incentive structure is such that assertions of superiority appear as unintended by-products of prosocial action. Implications are drawn regarding the sources of instability and insecurity in status hierarchies.