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The events of September 11, 2001 sharply revived governmental and societal anxieties in many democratic countries concerning the threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, and other complex security threats. In many countries, public discourse of subjects traditionally considered part of social policy, such as immigration and asylum, have been securitized, while intelligence services have been granted greater resources and expanded powers. This comprehensive volume discusses the various challenges of establishing and maintaining accountable and democratically controlled intelligence services, drawing both from states with well-established democratic systems and those emerging from authoritarian systems and in transition towards democracy. It adopts a multidisciplinary and comparative approach, identifying good practices to make security services accountable to society and its democratic representatives. The volume will engage both academics and practitioners in the discussion of how to anchor these vital yet inherently difficult to control institutions within a firmly democratic framework. As such, it has clear relevance for these concerned with the control and oversight of intelligence and security issues in many countries.

This book examines how international intelligence cooperation has come to prominence post-9/11 and introduces the main accountability, legal and human rights challenges that it poses. Since the end of the Cold War, the threats that intelligence services are tasked with confronting have become increasingly transnational in nature – organised crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The growth of these threats has impelled intelligence services to cooperate with contemporaries in other states to meet these challenges. While cooperation between certain Western states in some areas of intelligence operations (such as signals intelligence) is longstanding, since 9/11 there has been an exponential increase in both their scope and scale. This edited volume explores not only the challenges to accountability presented by international intelligence cooperation but also possible solutions for strengthening accountability for activities that are likely to remain fundamental to the work of intelligence services. The book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, security studies, international law, global governance and IR in general. Foreword Helga Hernes Part 1: Introduction 1. Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation: Framing the Issue Ian Leigh 2. International Intelligence Cooperation in Practice Richard Aldrich Part 2: Challenges 3. Blacklisting and Financial Sanctions against Suspected Terrorists Iain Cameron 4. The Collateral Casualties of Collaboration: The Consequences for Civil and Human Rights of Transnational Intelligence Sharing Craig Forcese 5. Rendition, Torture and Intelligence Cooperation Silvia Borelli 6. Intelligence Cooperation in International Operations: Peacekeeping, Weapons Inspections, and the Apprehension and Prosecution of War Criminals Simon Chesterman Part 3: Oversight and Review 7. National Oversight of International Intelligence Cooperation Philippe Hayez 8. Fit for purpose? Accountability Challenges and Paradoxes of Domestic Inquiries Andrea Wright 9. International responses to the accountability gap: European inquiries into illegal transfers and secret detentions Hans Born and Aidan Wills Part 4: The Role of Law 10. National Courts and Intelligence Cooperation Ian Leigh 11. International Law: Human Rights Law and State Responsibility Martin Scheinin and Mathias Vermeulen Part 4: Conclusion 12. International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability: Formidable Challenges and Imperfect Solutions Aidan Wills and Hans Born Hans Born is a Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Switzerland. Ian Leigh is a Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Human Rights Centre at Durham University. Aidan Wills is Project Coordinator, Research Division at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Switzerland.

The objective of this article is to explore the role of parliament in police governance in selected countries in Asia and Europe, including Belgium, Germany, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. Based on a comparative framework of analysis, the country case studies demonstrate that parliaments apply their generic functions to the police, including the legislative, budget control and oversight function. Furthermore, parliaments in all case studies have a dedicated committee or sub-committee dealing with police affairs, endowed with subpoena and contempt powers to compel government and police officers to appear before committee meetings and to submit required documents. In addition, for police to be fully accountable, parliaments have legislated and set up independent oversight bodies, including independent police complaints bodies, ombudspersons and national human rights institutions as well as anti-corruption/financial audit bodies and data-protection commissioners.

While the use of force under international auspices has increased substantially, the same does not hold for the parliamentary accountability of troops committed to multinational peace support operations of the UN, NATO and EU. This article argues that a democratic deficit exists both at the international and national level, leading to a 'double democratic deficit'. Analysing the problematic nature of parliamentary accountability as regards the international use of force, the article concludes with recommendations for narrowing the accountability gap.

The recent shift of security duties from public to private actors has called into question whether existing laws apply to private security actors, leading to problems such as impunity, democratic accountability, and the awkward extraterritorial application of laws that were designed for domestic use. In response to this criticism, private security industry groups have taken it upon themselves to develop codes of conduct as a form of self-regulation. However, while this certainly represents a step in the right direction, these codes lack any real enforcement mechanisms. This situation has provoked national and international attempts to regulate these private actors. While some notable progress has been made on these fronts, there are still important 'grey areas' and gaps that need to be filled by effective national and international regulatory frameworks.

International intelligence cooperation is a long-established dimension of intelligence work but in recent years it has become a defining feature of intelligence services’ activities. The scope, scale and significance of cooperation have increased exponentially over the past two decades, and particularly since 2001. Globalisation has facilitated the proliferation of transnational threats which have induced intelligence services to cooperate with a broader range of international contemporaries on an evergreater range of issues. This volume has demonstrated that intelligence sharing remains the principal manifestation of international intelligence cooperation. Yet, within the past decade we have witnessed a dramatic increase in joint operations to collect intelligence, as well as the development of joint analysis centres. While international intelligence cooperation remains dominated by bilateral relationships, multilateral cooperation has become increasingly common; this is not only the case in the EuroAtlantic region, but also in Africa through forums such as the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa, and in Asia within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. These trends have been primarily evident in the fight against international terrorism, where intelligence cooperation between states has been elevated to the level of UN Security Council obligation.2 It is also in the context of counter-terrorism that intelligence cooperation has presented ever greater challenges to accountability, human rights and the rule of law. Revelations about the counter-terrorism activities of intelligence services have continued to emerge at a torrential rate. Many of the revelations which have left us in a state of ‘frozen scandal’ have involved intelligence cooperation.3 This volume has shown that various manifestations of intelligence cooperation give rise to concerns about accountability, human rights and the rule of law. However, the pre-eminent cause for concern is intelligence cooperation with so-called ‘non-traditional partners’ that do not uphold the same human rights standards, and are not subject to democratic oversight.

In Hungary, informational rights played a unique role in the inspiration and chronology of events that made up the 'constitutional revolution', the common term for the transformation from the communist political system to a democratic one. This chapter explores the role of intelligence oversight institutions through the experience of the Hungarian transition to democracy presenting a counterpoint to previously elaborated themes of parliamentary-y and executive-focused oversight. Hungary's first Commissioner for Data Protection first discusses the status of informational rights in Hungarian legislation before moving on to illustrate the potential limits of these norms using three relevant cases. Moreover, a parliamentary investigative committee had been established to investigate abuses related to deliveries of Russian oil as payments on Russia's outstanding national debt to Hungary. In a lucid and rather precise usage of the Secrecy Act, the justification of a 'state secret' is not the interest of the 'state' so much as it is the interest of the 'Republic of Hungary'.