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SARS-CoV-2 was detected in three cats after they were cohoused with cats that had been experimentally inoculated with the virus. Cats may be a silent intermediate host of SARS-CoV-2.

At the end of 2019, a novel coronavirus (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; SARS-CoV-2) was detected in Wuhan, China, that spread rapidly around the world, with severe consequences for human health and the global economy. Here, we assessed the replicative ability and pathogenesis of SARS-CoV-2 isolates in Syrian hamsters. SARS-CoV-2 isolates replicated efficiently in the lungs of hamsters, causing severe pathological lung lesions following intranasal infection. In addition, microcomputed tomographic imaging revealed severe lung injury that shared characteristics with SARS-CoV-2−infected human lung, including severe, bilateral, peripherally distributed, multilobular ground glass opacity, and regions of lung consolidation. SARS-CoV-2−infected hamsters mounted neutralizing antibody responses and were protected against subsequent rechallenge with SARS-CoV-2. Moreover, passive transfer of convalescent serum to naïve hamsters efficiently suppressed the replication of the virus in the lungs even when the serum was administrated 2 d postinfection of the serum-treated hamsters. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that this Syrian hamster model will be useful for understanding SARS-CoV-2 pathogenesis and testing vaccines and antiviral drugs.

Only four mutations in H5N1 HA are required to enable ferret-to-ferret transmission of a reassortant virus containing the H5 HA and the remaining seven gene segments from a human pandemic H1N1 influenza virus. Elements involved in H5N1 transmission Whether avian H5N1 viruses can gain the ability to transmit between humans was uncertain. The viral haemagglutinin protein (HA) mediates virus binding to host-specific cellular receptors, but previous studies have shown that alterations in HA that enable binding to human-type receptors are not sufficient to enable respiratory droplet transmission of H5N1 viruses in ferrets, the best animal model for human-to-human transmission. Imai et al . show that only four mutations in H5N1 HA are required to enable ferret-to-ferret transmission of a reassortant virus containing H5 HA, with the remaining genes from human pandemic H1N1 influenza virus. It is probable that further adaptations in other avian virus genes would be required to mediate transmission of wholly avian H5N1 in mammals, but human H1N1 and H5N1 viruses are genetically compatible and the emergence of H5-HA-containing viruses might be expected to cause a pandemic because humans lack immunity to H5 viruses. Knowledge of the mutations involved in adapting H5 HA to mammalian transmission could help with surveillance and monitoring of H5N1 viruses adapting towards pandemic potential. Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza A viruses occasionally infect humans, but currently do not transmit efficiently among humans. The viral haemagglutinin (HA) protein is a known host-range determinant as it mediates virus binding to host-specific cellular receptors 1 , 2 , 3 . Here we assess the molecular changes in HA that would allow a virus possessing subtype H5 HA to be transmissible among mammals. We identified a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus—comprising H5 HA (from an H5N1 virus) with four mutations and the remaining seven gene segments from a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus—that was capable of droplet transmission in a ferret model. The transmissible H5 reassortant virus preferentially recognized human-type receptors, replicated efficiently in ferrets, caused lung lesions and weight loss, but was not highly pathogenic and did not cause mortality. These results indicate that H5 HA can convert to an HA that supports efficient viral transmission in mammals; however, we do not know whether the four mutations in the H5 HA identified here would render a wholly avian H5N1 virus transmissible. The genetic origin of the remaining seven viral gene segments may also critically contribute to transmissibility in mammals. Nevertheless, as H5N1 viruses continue to evolve and infect humans, receptor-binding variants of H5N1 viruses with pandemic potential, including avian–human reassortant viruses as tested here, may emerge. Our findings emphasize the need to prepare for potential pandemics caused by influenza viruses possessing H5 HA, and will help individuals conducting surveillance in regions with circulating H5N1 viruses to recognize key residues that predict the pandemic potential of isolates, which will inform the development, production and distribution of effective countermeasures.

Mutations accumulate in influenza A virus proteins, especially in the main epitopes on the virus surface glycoprotein hemagglutinin (HA). For influenza A(H3N2) viruses, in particular, the antigenicity of their HA has altered since their emergence in 1968, requiring changes of vaccine strains every few years. Most adults have been exposed to several antigenically divergent H3N2 viruses through infection and/or vaccination, and those exposures affect the immune responses of those individuals. However, animal models reflecting this ‘immune history’ in humans are lacking and naïve animals are generally used for vaccination and virus challenge studies. Here, we describe a ferret model to mimic the serial exposure of humans to antigenically different historical H3HA proteins. In this model, ferrets were sequentially immunized with adjuvanted recombinant H3HA proteins from two or three different H3HA antigenic clusters in chronological order, and serum neutralizing antibody titers were examined against the homologous virus and viruses from different antigenic clusters. For ferrets immunized with a single HA antigen, serum neutralizing antibody titers were elevated specifically against the homologous virus. However, after immunization with the second or third antigenically distinct HA antigen in chronological order, the ferrets showed an increase in more broadly cross-reactive neutralizing titers against the antigenically distinct viruses and against the homologous virus. Sequentially immunized animals challenged with an antigenically advanced H3N2 virus showed attenuated virus growth and less body temperature increase compared with naïve animals. These results suggest that sequential exposure to antigenically different HAs elicits broader neutralizing activity in sera and enhances immune responses against more antigenically distinct viruses Our findings may partly explain why adults who have been exposed to antigenically divergent HAs are less likely to be infected with influenza virus and have severe symptoms than children.

The evolutionary mechanisms by which SARS-CoV-2 viruses adapt to mammalian hosts and, potentially, undergo antigenic evolution depend on the ways genetic variation is generated and selected within and between individual hosts. Using domestic cats as a model, we show that SARS-CoV-2 consensus sequences remain largely unchanged over time within hosts, while dynamic sub-consensus diversity reveals processes of genetic drift and weak purifying selection. We further identify a notable variant at amino acid position 655 in Spike (H655Y), which was previously shown to confer escape from human monoclonal antibodies. This variant arises rapidly and persists at intermediate frequencies in index cats. It also becomes fixed following transmission in two of three pairs. These dynamics suggest this site may be under positive selection in this system and illustrate how a variant can quickly arise and become fixed in parallel across multiple transmission pairs. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in cats involved a narrow bottleneck, with new infections founded by fewer than ten viruses. In RNA virus evolution, stochastic processes like narrow transmission bottlenecks and genetic drift typically act to constrain the overall pace of adaptive evolution. Our data suggest that here, positive selection in index cats followed by a narrow transmission bottleneck may have instead accelerated the fixation of S H655Y, a potentially beneficial SARS-CoV-2 variant. Overall, our study suggests species- and context-specific adaptations are likely to continue to emerge. This underscores the importance of continued genomic surveillance for new SARS-CoV-2 variants as well as heightened scrutiny for signatures of SARS-CoV-2 positive selection in humans and mammalian model systems.

We analyzed the receptor-binding activity and infectivity of 6 representative SARS-CoV-2 lineages in cell lines expressing angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 proteins from 54 different animal species. All viruses demonstrated infectivity in a broad range of species. Susceptible animal species could serve as natural reservoirs or intermediate hosts for SARS-CoV-2.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 readily transmits between domestic cats. We found that domestic cats that recover from an initial infection might be protected from reinfection. However, we found long-term persistence of inflammation and other lung lesions after infection, despite a lack of clinical symptoms and limited viral replication in the lungs.

Avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 subtype pose a serious global health threat due to the high mortality (>60%) associated with the disease caused by these viruses and the lack of protective antibodies to these viruses in the general population. The factors that enable avian H5N1 influenza viruses to replicate in humans are not completely understood. Here we use a high-throughput screening approach to identify novel mutations in the polymerase genes of an avian H5N1 virus that confer efficient polymerase activity in mammalian cells. Several of the identified mutations (which have previously been found in natural isolates) increase viral replication in mammalian cells and virulence in infected mice compared with the wild-type virus. The identification of amino-acid mutations in avian H5N1 influenza virus polymerase complexes that confer increased replication and virulence in mammals is important for the identification of circulating H5N1 viruses with an increased potential to infect humans. Understanding the factors that enable some bird flu viruses to infect humans is important for the identification of circulating viruses with higher potential to infect us. Here, Taft et al. identify novel mutations in the polymerase of an avian H5N1 virus that help the virus to replicate in human cells and in mice

Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza A viruses have spread throughout Asia, Europe, and Africa, raising serious worldwide concern about their pandemic potential. Although more than 250 people have been infected with these viruses, with a consequent high rate of mortality, the molecular mechanisms responsible for the efficient transmission of H5N1 viruses among humans remain elusive. We used a mouse model to examine the role of the amino acid at position 627 of the PB2 viral protein in efficient replication of H5N1 viruses in the mammalian respiratory tract. Viruses possessing Lys at position 627 of PB2 replicated efficiently in lungs and nasal turbinates, as well as in cells, even at the lower temperature of 33 degrees C. Those viruses possessing Glu at this position replicated less well in nasal turbinates than in lungs, and less well in cells at the lower temperature. These results suggest that Lys at PB2-627 confers to avian H5N1 viruses the advantage of efficient growth in the upper and lower respiratory tracts of mammals. Therefore, efficient viral growth in the upper respiratory tract may provide a platform for the adaptation of avian H5N1 influenza viruses to humans and for efficient person-to-person virus transmission, in the context of changes in other viral properties including specificity for human (sialic acid alpha-2,6-galactose containing) receptors.

The spread of avian H5N1 influenza viruses around the globe has become a worldwide public health concern. To evaluate the pathogenic potential of reassortant viruses between currently cocirculating avian H5N1 and human H3N2 influenza viruses, we generated all the 254 combinations of reassortant viruses between A/chicken/South Kalimantan/UT6028/06 (SK06, H5N1) and A/Tokyo/Ut-Sk-1/07 (Tok07, H3N2) influenza viruses by reverse genetics. We found that the presence of Tok07 PB2 protein in the ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complex allowed efficient viral RNA transcription in a minigenome assay and that RNP activity played an essential role in the viability and replicative ability of the reassortant viruses. When the pathogenicity of 75 reassortant H5 viruses was tested in mice, 22 were more pathogenic than the parental SK06 virus, and three were extremely virulent. Strikingly, all 22 of these viruses obtained their PB2 segment from Tok07 virus. Further analysis showed that Tok07 PB1 alone lacked the ability to enhance the pathogenicity of the reassortant viruses but could do so by cooperating with Tok07 PB2. Our data demonstrate that reassortment between an avian H5N1 virus with low pathogenicity in mice and a human virus could result in highly pathogenic viruses and that the human virus PB2 segment functions in the background of an avian H5N1 virus, enhancing its virulence. Our findings highlight the importance of surveillance programs to monitor the emergence of human H5 reassortant viruses, especially those containing a PB2 segment of human origin.