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This article provides an update of the Theory of Event Coding (TEC), which claims that perception and action are identical processes operating on the same codes – event files consisting of integrated networks of sensorimotor feature codes. The original version of the theory emphasized its representational underpinnings, but recent theoretical developments provide the basis for a more integrated view consisting of both the codes that are shared between perception and action in the control processes operating on these codes. Four developments are discussed in more detail: The degree to which the integration and retrieval of event files depends on current goals, how metacontrol states impact the handling of event files, how feature binding relates to event learning, and how the integration of non-social events relates to the integration of social events. Case examples using various versions of the Simon task are used to explain how the new version of TEC explains interactions between perception and action in non-social and social situations.

Commonsense and theorizing about action control agree in assuming that human behavior is (mainly) driven by goals, but no mechanistic theory of what goals are, where they come from, and how they impact action selection is available. Here I develop such a theory that is based on the assumption that GOALs guide Intentional Actions THrough criteria (GOALIATH). The theory is intended to be minimalist and parsimonious with respect to its assumptions, as transparent and mechanistic as possible, and it is based on representational assumptions provided by the Theory of Event Coding (TEC). It holds that goal-directed behavior is guided by selection criteria that activate and create competition between event files that contain action-effect codes matching one or more of the criteria—a competition that eventually settles into a solution favoring the best-matching event file. The criteria are associated with various sources, including biological drives, acquired needs (e.g., of achievement, power, or affiliation), and short-term, sometimes arbitrary, instructed aims. Action selection is, thus, a compromise that tries to satisfy various criteria related to different driving forces, which are also likely to vary in strength over time. Hence, what looks like goal-directed action emerges from, and represents an attempt to satisfy multiple constraints with different origins, purposes, operational characteristics, and timescales—which among other things does not guarantee a high degree of coherence or rationality of the eventual outcome. GOALIATH calls for a radical break with conventional theorizing about the control of goal-directed behavior, as it among other things questions existing cognitive-control theories and dual-route models of action control.

Creativity is a complex construct that would benefit from a more comprehensive mechanistic approach. Two processes have been defined to be central to creative cognition: divergent and convergent thinking. These two processes are most often studied using the Alternate Uses Test (heavily relying on divergent thinking), and the Remote Associates Test (heavily relying on convergent thinking, at least with analytical solutions). Although creative acts should be regarded compound processes, most behavioral and neuroimaging studies ignore the composition of basic operations relevant for the task they investigate. In order to provide leverage for a more mechanistic, and eventually even comprehensive computational, approach to creative cognition, we compare findings from divergent and convergent thinking studies and review the similarities and differences between the two underlying types of processes, from a neurocognitive perspective with a strong focus on cortical structures. In this narrative review, we discuss a broad scope of neural correlates of divergent and convergent thinking. We provide a first step towards theoretical integration, by suggesting that creative cognition in divergent- and convergent-thinking heavy tasks is modulated by metacontrol states, where divergent thinking and insight solutions in convergent-thinking tasks seem to benefit from metacontrol biases towards flexibility, whereas convergent, analytical thinking seems to benefit from metacontrol biases towards persistence. These particular biases seem to be reflected by specific cortical brain-activation patterns, involving left frontal and right temporal/parietal networks. Our tentative framework could serve as a first proxy to guide neuroscientific creativity research into assessing more mechanistic details of human creative cognition. •Creative cognition is classically regarded to involve a trade-off of divergent/flexible, and convergent/persistent processes.•Mechanisms of divergent or convergent thinking are often studied in isolation, offering little chance for direct comparison.•We highlight important (cortical) neurocognitive mechanisms of divergent and convergent thinking, to facilitate comparison.•We offer theoretical integration, assuming that divergent and convergent thinking rely on differences in metacontrol states

People are assumed to represent themselves in terms of body ownership and agency. Studies using the rubber- or virtual-hand illusion have assessed ownership and agency by means of explicit ownership and agency ratings and implicit measures, like proprioceptive drift in the case of ownership. These measures often show similar effects but also some discrepancies, suggesting that they rely on data sources that overlap, but not completely. To systematically assess commonalities and discrepancies, we adopted an immersed virtual hand illusion (VHI) design, in which three independent factors were manipulated: the synchrony between the movement of real and virtual effector, the type of effector, which was a virtual hand or triangle, and the spatial congruency between the real and virtual effector. Commonalities and discrepancies in the effects of these factors were assessed by crossing explicit and implicit measures for ownership and agency. While standard ratings were used as explicit measures, implicit ownership was assessed by means of proprioceptive drift and implicit agency by means of intentional binding. Results showed similar effect patterns for the two agency measures, which, however, were not correlated, different effect patterns for the two ownership measures, and a strong correlation between the two explicit measures. Taken altogether, our findings suggest that explicit and implicit measures of ownership and agency partly rely on shared informational sources, but seem to differ with respect to other sources that are integrated or with respect to the processed dimension (shape vs. time). The findings also suggest that some findings obtained with RHI designs might reflect more the unnatural situation that that design puts individuals into rather than generalizable mechanisms of computing perceived ownership and agency.

For as long as half a century the Simon task – in which participants respond to a nonspatial stimulus feature while ignoring its position – has represented a very popular tool to study a variety of cognitive functions, such as attention, cognitive control, and response preparation processes. In particular, the task generates two theoretically interesting effects: the Simon effect proper and the sequential modulations of this effect. In the present study, we review the main theoretical explanations of both kinds of effects and the available neuroscientific studies that investigated the neural underpinnings of the cognitive processes underlying the Simon effect proper and its sequential modulation using electroencephalogram (EEG) and event-related brain potentials (ERP), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Then, we relate the neurophysiological findings to the main theoretical accounts and evaluate their validity and empirical plausibility, including general implications related to processing interference and cognitive control. Overall, neurophysiological research supports claims that stimulus location triggers the creation of a spatial code, which activates a spatially compatible response that, in incompatible conditions, interferes with the response based on the task instructions. Integration of stimulus-response features plays a major role in the occurrence of the Simon effect (which is manifested in the selection of the response) and its modulation by sequential congruency effects. Additional neural mechanisms are involved in supporting the correct and inhibiting the incorrect response.

Metacontrol, the regulation of cognitive strategies to balance persistence and flexibility, has been theorized to operate either as a tonic state, maintaining a consistent neural bias, or as a phasic mechanism, dynamically adjusting to situational demands. This study tested these scenarios by examining the relationship between metacontrol biases and changes in the aperiodic exponent of EEG activity. Behavioral results replicated well-established effects. Neural analyses revealed significant post-stimulus increases in the aperiodic exponent during incongruent trials, reflecting enhanced persistence in response to high-conflict conditions. Crucially, the absence of pre-stimulus effects supports the phasic hypothesis, suggesting metacontrol biases emerge dynamically rather than maintaining a stable tonic state. Correlational analyses showed task-specific and transient metacontrol biases. Persistence aligned with high-conflict demands in incongruent trials, while flexibility remained general across conditions. The lack of cross-task correlations between creativity and Flanker tasks further supports the phasic view, where biases adapt to immediate task requirements rather than representing stable traits. These findings align with reactive control theories, emphasizing transient, context-dependent neural adjustments. This study provides evidence for a phasic account of metacontrol, where cognitive control states dynamically shift to meet task-specific demands. This adaptive flexibility underscores the importance of real-time adjustments in human cognition.

•We delineate fundamental neurophysiological mechanisms for how people can act intentionally.•We show that the ability to foresee the effects of action is a role of a theta activity.•There is bi-directional communication between temporo-frontal cortices is essential.•The results conceptually broaden the relevance of theta band activity. The ability to plan and carry out goal-directed behavior presupposes knowledge about the contingencies between movements and their effects. Ideomotor accounts of action control assume that agents integrate action-effect contingencies by creating action-effect bindings, which associate movement patterns with their sensory consequences. However, the neurophysiological underpinnings of action-effect binding are not yet well understood. Given that theta band activity has been linked to information integration, we thus studied action-effect integration in an electrophysiological study with N = 31 healthy individuals with a strong focus on theta band activity. We examined how information between functional neuroanatomical structures is exchanged to enable action planning. We show that theta band activity in a network encompassing the insular cortex (IC), the anterior temporal lobe (ATL), and the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) supports the establishment of action-effect bindings. All regions revealed bi-directional effective connectivities, indicating information transfer between these regions. The IC and ATL create a loop for information integration and the conceptual abstraction of it. The involvement of anterior regions of the IFC, particularly during the acquisition phase of the action-effect, likely reflects episodic control mechanisms in which a past event defines a “template” of what action-effect is to be expected. Taken together, the current findings connect well with major cognitive concepts. Our study suggests a functional relevance of theta band activity in an IC-ATL-IFC network, which in turn implies that basic ideomotor action-effect integration is implemented through theta band activity and effective connectivities between temporo-frontal structures.

•Neural oscillatory dynamics of metacontrol is examined.•Especially theta band activity is relevant for metacontrol.•Alpha and beta band activity show more general modulations in resetting the neural system.•Directed functional connectivity in prefrontal-parietal networks is modulated by metacontrol. Understanding the neural mechanisms underlying metacontrol and conflict regulation is crucial for insights into cognitive flexibility and persistence. This study employed electroencephalography (EEG), EEG-beamforming and directed connectivity analyses to explore how varying metacontrol states influence conflict regulation at a neurophysiological level. Metacontrol states were manipulated by altering the frequency of congruent and incongruent trials across experimental blocks in a modified flanker task, and both behavioral and electrophysiological measures were analyzed. Behavioral data confirmed the experimental manipulation's efficacy, showing an increase in persistence bias and a reduction in flexibility bias during increased conflict regulation. Electrophysiologically, theta band activity paralleled the behavioral data, suggesting that theta oscillations reflect the mismatch between expected metacontrol bias and actual task demands. Alpha and beta band dynamics differed across experimental blocks, though these changes did not directly mirror behavioral effects. Post-response alpha and beta activity were more pronounced in persistence-biased states, indicating a neural reset mechanism preparing for future cognitive demands. By using a novel artificial neural networks method, directed connectivity analyses revealed enhanced inter-regional communication during persistence states, suggesting stronger top-down control and sensorimotor integration. Overall, theta band activity was closely tied to metacontrol processes, while alpha and beta bands played a role in resetting the neural system for upcoming tasks. These findings provide a deeper understanding of the neural substrates involved in metacontrol and conflict monitoring, emphasizing the distinct roles of different frequency bands in these cognitive processes.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) BOLD signal is commonly localized by using neuroanatomical atlases, which can also serve for region of interest analyses. Yet, the available MRI atlases have serious limitations when it comes to imaging subcortical structures: only 7% of the 455 subcortical nuclei are captured by current atlases. This highlights the general difficulty in mapping smaller nuclei deep in the brain, which can be addressed using ultra-high field 7 Tesla (T) MRI. The ventral tegmental area (VTA) is a subcortical structure that plays a pivotal role in reward processing, learning and memory. Despite the significant interest in this nucleus in cognitive neuroscience, there are currently no available, anatomically precise VTA atlases derived from 7 T MRI data that cover the full region of the VTA. Here, we first provide a protocol for multimodal VTA imaging and delineation. We then provide a data description of a probabilistic VTA atlas based on in vivo 7 T MRI data.