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80 result(s) for "Hope, Ian C"
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A Scientific Way of War
While faith in the Enlightenment was waning elsewhere by 1850, at the United States Military Academy at West Point and in the minds of academy graduates serving throughout the country Enlightenment thinking persisted, asserting that war was governable by a grand theory accessible through the study of military science. Officers of the regular army and instructors at the military academy and their political superiors all believed strongly in the possibility of acquiring a perfect knowledge of war through the proper curriculum. A Scientific Way of Waranalyzes how the doctrine of military science evolved from teaching specific Napoleonic applications to embracing subjects that were useful for war in North America. Drawing from a wide array of materials, Ian C. Hope refutes earlier charges of a lack of professionalization in the antebellum American army and an overreliance on the teachings of Swiss military theorist Antoine de Jomini. Instead, Hope shows that inculcation in West Point's American military curriculum eventually came to provide the army with an officer corps that shared a common doctrine and common skill in military problem solving. The proliferation of military science ensured that on the eve of the Civil War there existed a distinctly American, and scientific, way of war.
Antebellum Military Science
The decade before the Civil War was one of relative security for the West Point academy. Its purpose was confirmed in Mexico, and respect for its graduates steadily increased. Outside of the academy, tensions existed between the army and the navy concerning the relative value of ships over coastal fortifications. Army engineers argued about whether Vaubanian fortifications could withstand bombardment from improved ordnance.¹ The remainder of the army was absorbed with Indian wars and Indian policy and with policing a vastly expanded territory. Military science, however, still dominated professional military thinking, albeit with modifications. A new five-year program of study
West Point’s Scientific Curriculum
The Thayer system subjected cadets to a rigorous and rather un- American daily routine that reinforced the rigor of the “complete course” of military science delivered in the curriculum. The subjects and program of study were the same for every cadet. The Academic Board allowed neither electives nor deviations. The routine and curriculum instilled basic skill and knowledge in all branches of military activity and created officers who could perform any number of line or staff functions in the small and highly dispersed army or in the vastly expanded military establishment envisioned during mobilization. In this respect, West Point was
Army Reforms, 1815–1820
The majority of citizens of the United States in the Jeffersonian era belonged to the Atlantic world. Wealth and well-being relied on maritime security. However, the War of 1812 exposed the vulnerability of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts to invasion. First and Second system defensive works proved adequate for local defense but did nothing to prevent the Royal Navy from wreaking havoc on unprotected points in Maine, the Chesapeake, Georgia, and the Gulf. The independent-mindedness of each state and a highly decentralized war management system prevented a coordinated effort to counter this threat. Tired of such inefficiencies, President James Madison
Military Science in the Civil War
One can only truly understand the Civil War through an appreciation of military science. I do not suggest a particular decisive effect or that military science determined the war’s outcome, only that the West Point graduates serving in key positions on both sides used the doctrine they had learned at West Point in conducting operations from the beginning to the end of the fighting. Demonstrating this for every operation of the Civil War would be a massive undertaking. Not beyond the depth of my research, such an effort is however beyond the scope of this book. Therefore, it must suffice
Internal Improvements
Military science had barely become doctrine in Sylvanus Thayer’s academy when faculty began to modify it to meet the changing requirements of the United States in the 1820s and 1830s. The content of the 1820 curriculum pertained tola grande guerre, emphasizing fortifications and artillery applications that might counter an amphibious threat from a European power. The Atlantic perspective that dominated ideas of national defense began to change in the mid-1820s when peace with Europe allowed Americans to focus their energies inward. Public desire to improve transportation infrastructure and westward expansion created competing demands for engineering and survey skills. The
Colonial and Early National Military Science
When fighting began in earnest during the American Revolution, military and political leaders realized that the methods ofla petite guerrewere not sufficient to beat the might of England, and they sought to acquire European engineering, administration, and artillery expertise to instruct the Continental Army. However, attempts to institutionalize military science ceased with the end of hostilities. Lack of clear threat and changing political and economic circumstances, together with Whig traditions and an accepted narrative of the militia’s effectiveness, beclouded the need for professional military forces or education. Appreciation for military science stagnated. Change came with the renewed threats
Military Science during and after the Mexican War
Graduates of West Point applied all aspects of their military science in the war with Mexico, something unacknowledged in the historiography. The consensus sees the Mexican War as a training ground for future Civil War commanders, reinforcing the school of belief that experience is the only teacher in war and that experience mixed with natural talent, not study, makes the great commander. This reading backward of history ignores the application of doctrine and attributes none of the success in Mexico to military science. Political and military leaders acknowledged the contribution of West Point graduates at war’s end, a point overshadowed
Jacksonian Military Science
In the 1820s American military science expanded to include elements of civil engineering needed for internal improvements. During the 1830s and 1840s new demands led to further modifications. While the Third System continued to be the centerpiece of defense policy, the army became heavily burdened by Indian wars and removals in the course of western expansion. And while military and political leaders were still dedicated to preparing the nation for war against a European foe, some regular army officers questioned the continued validity of permanent fortifications and the Atlantic focus of defense policy. Advocates of steam technology wanted to modify