Explore the vast range of titles available.

The expanding literature on growth regimes has recently been applied to explain the growth of populist movements across the OECD. Such applications posit a stand-off between debtors and creditors as the core conflict that generates populism. While insightful, the theory has problems explaining why, in some European countries, such movements pre-date both the global financial crisis and the austerity measures that followed, factors that are commonly seen as causing the rise of populism. This article takes a different tack. It derives shifts in both political parties and party systems from the growth regime framework. In doing so it seeks to explain the evolution of the cartel form of party that dominated the political systems of Europe from the late 1990s through to the current period and why that form proved unable to respond meaningfully to both the financial crisis and the political crisis that followed it.

Arthur Okun famously argued that \"effciency is bought at the cost of inequalities in income and wealth\". Okun's trade-off represents the antithesis to Karl Polanyi's view of the relationship that the more embedded markets are in society, the better the social and economic outcomes they produce. This paper refines both these views. We argue that not all forms of market embeddedness are created equal, and that the relationship between equality and efficiency can be both positive and negative. We show this by examining how different ways of embedding economic activity in society through market regulation produce different combinations of efficiency and equality. We identify empirically three broad patterns: market liberal regulatory frameworks that promote competitive markets without decommodifying institutions; embedded liberal regulations that allow markets to work efficiently, but within the framework of decommodification and equality; and embedded illiberalism, where regulations hinder markets in favor of powerful social groups and where decommodification undermines both efficiency and equality. Okun's trade-off emerges as a special case limited to the English-speaking democracies: other OECD countries tend to exhibit either efficiency and equality together, or inefficiency and inequality together. These findings suggest a corrective to both nave market liberal views of the incompatibility of efficiency and equality, but also to the more sophisticated Varieties of Capitalism framework, which pays insufficient attention to the ways in which markets can be embedded in stable but apparently dysfunctional institutional arrangements.

The article addresses how Britain's major statewide political parties—Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats—adapted to political devolution in Scotland and Wales. It explores party organization, programs, and policymaking. It argues that the Labour Party experienced the most territorial intraparty conflict but fairly rapidly achieved a new balance between British and Scottish/Welsh party interests. The Conservative Party struggled after its 1997 UK election defeat and failed to adapt to multilevel politics with any consistency. The Liberal Democrats experienced the smoothest adjustment, largely on account of their own federal party constitution. The article concludes that the findings provide some backing to “rational choice institutionalist” hypotheses of party change but that a “historical institutionalist” approach can provide a fuller understanding of how parties adapt to devolution reforms.

This article examines the conditions under which the United States foreign military bases become a contentious political issue in democratic base-hosting countries. Democratic consolidation, and in particular the institutionalization of the party system, reduces the incentives for political elites to mobilize domestic political support in opposition to foreign military presence. In the Spanish case, changes in the pattern of party competition explain why the basing issue was particularly contentious in domestic politics from 1981 to 1988, despite long-standing and profound public opposition to the use of the bases by the United States, and most recently in the 2003 Iraq campaign. Neither a public opinion explanation, focusing on anti-Americanism, nor a security-based explanation, focusing on the nature of bilateral security relations, can explain these same trends. The argument illuminates long-neglected important interactions in emerging democracies between party system dynamics and foreign policy positions and has important implications for determining the domestic political conditions under which overseas democratic countries will contest United States security hegemony. Cet article examine les conditions dans lesquelles les bases militaires des États-Unis à l'étranger deviennent une question politique litigieuse dans les pays démocratiques accueillant ces bases. La consolidation démocratique, en particulier l'institutionnalisation du système de parti, réduit l'intérêt des élites politiques à mobiliser un soutien politique intérieur autour de l'opposition à une présence militaire étrangère. Dans le cas espagnol, les changements de modèle de compétition partisane expliquent pourquoi la question des bases était particulièrement litigieuse dans la politique intérieure en 1981—1988, malgré l'opposition publique profonde et de longue date à l'utilisation de bases militaires par les États-Unis, notamment récemment lors de la campagne irakienne en 2003. Ni l'explication par l'opinion publique, se concentrant sur l'anti-américanisme, ni l'explication par la sécurité, se concentrant sur la nature des relations de sécurité bilatérales, ne peuvent expliquer ces tendances identiques. La question présente d'importantes implications pour déterminer quand et pourquoi des pays démocratiques étrangers en viennent à contester l'hégémonie de la sécurité américaine. Este artículo investiga las condiciones bajo las cuales la política militar exterior de Estados Unidos llega a convertirse en un tema políticamente contencioso en países democráticos anfitriones. El argumento central es que la consolidación democrática, y más concretamente la institucionalización del sistema de partidos, desincentiva a las élites políticas a la hora de movilizar una oposición política contra la presencia militar extranjera. En el caso de España, los cambios en el modelo de competición de partidos explican por qué la presencia de bases militares fue un tema especialmente contencioso en la política nacional durante el período 1981—1988 pero no más recientemente — como por ejemplo durante la campaña de Irak de 2003 — a pesar de una fuerte y prolongada oposición por parte de la opinión pública a la utilización estadounidense de las bases. Ni la tesis de la existencia de una opinión pública anti-americanista, ni la tesis basada en características de las relaciones bilaterales de seguridad son capaces de explicar estas dos mismas pautas. El argumento que desarrolla este artículo tiene implicaciones importantes para determinar cuándo y por qué los países democráticos extranjeros combaten la hegemonía de Estados Unidos en cuestiones de seguridad.

Donald Trump is a departure from the conventions of the US presidential politics, but from a comparative perspective, he is far from an outlier on the global stage. Instead, Trump is a manifestation of a global phenomenon that this chapter seeks to understand as a new type of politics: Global Trumpism. The backlash the Western democracies are witnessing is best understood as a reaction against a specific set of political and economic arrangements, which combine decreased competition in the political sphere and enhanced competition in the economic sphere. These arrangements have left many, perhaps most, citizens in Western democracies exposed to greater economic risk while reducing the scope for political action to cope with those risks. In circumstances of such sustained economic insecurity, any politician who offers to ‘root out’ the politicians responsible for producing it, and offers protection from the unpredictability of globalized markets while doing so, has just cornered a ready electoral market. Global Trumpism is the distinctive pattern of backlash against advanced neoliberal capitalism.