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199 result(s) for "Immerman, Richard H"
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Intelligence and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
Commenting in 1950 on the accuracy of intelligence reports and assessments that the U.S. public expected the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to produce, newly appointed director Walter Bedell Smith purportedly remarked that Americans “expect you to be on a communing level with God and Joe Stalin, and I’m not sure they are so much interested in God.” Smith exaggerated, but not by much. Americans’ expectations (both within and beyond the Beltway) about the value of intelligence for conducting foreign policy and promoting national security are uniformly unrealistic. Collecting intelligence is hard, and analyzing it is even harder. The most one can expect from intelligence, in the words of a veteran official, is to “reduce uncertainty, identify risks and opportunities, and by doing so, deepen understanding so that those with policymaking responsibilities will make ‘better’ decisions.” Done right, intelligence can provide policymakers with a “decision advantage.”
The hidden hand
This is an accessible history of the Central Intelligence Agency that takes the reader from its early days of intelligence gathering and analysis to its more recent execution of foreign policy by covert operations.
Intelligence Studies: The British Invasion
Originating as a panel at the 2011 meeting of the Society for Historians of American Historians (SHAFR), this fine set of articles and a commentary reminds us how much we owe to the 'British Invasion' as we investigate contributions of intelligence agencies to the history of the Cold War. It took two British historians, Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, to explicity challenge American historians to fill in a gaping hole--what they called the 'missing dimension' of intelligence--in Cold War history to prompt the (largely) US historians featured in this edition of History to make intelligence gathering, spies and intelligence agencies the focus of their research into Cold War history. (Author abstract)
Intelligence and Strategy: Historicizing Psychology, Policy, and Politics
Since 2003, there have been multiple reports on and reforms of the intelligence community. Conceivably, their consequences for the CIA and the other agencies and bureaus now enveloped within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will be dramatic and positive. Yet even if they are, the effect on policy is likely to be slight so long as the makers of that policy remain cognitively impaired and politically possessed.
Waging peace : how Eisenhower shaped an enduring cold war strategy
Waging Peace offers the first fully comprehensive study of Eisenhower’s “New Look” program of national security, which provided the groundwork for the next three decades of America’s Cold War strategy. Though the Cold War itself and the idea of containment originated under Truman, it was left to Eisenhower to develop the first coherent and sustainable strategy for addressing the issues unique to the nuclear age. To this end, he designated a decision-making system centered around the National Security Council to take full advantage of the expertise and data from various departments and agencies and of the judgment of his principal advisors. The result was the formation of a “long haul” strategy of preventing war and Soviet expansion and of mitigating Soviet hostility. Only now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, can Eisenhower’s achievement be fully appreciated. Waging Peace will be of interest to scholars and students of the Eisenhower era, diplomatic history, the cold war, and contemporary foreign policy.