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This book documents and delves into the reign and rule of the Siad Barre regime that ruled Somalia from 1969 up to 1991. It traces what went wrong with the post-colonial Somali State once colonial rule passed to the Somali hands.

The existing academic literature on the Somali conflict confounds state violence with clan violence. The thin line between the two forms of violence has perplexed—if not puzzled—pundits and political scientists studying the Somali state and society. This reflection raises two sets of questions: does state violence have a more distinctive character (in)visibility than clan violence? If so, what are the causes and consequences of these separate wars? This paper interrogates the persistent violence and the connections between state and clan violence. To fill this gap, the article offers a detailed discussion of Somali violence by arguing that state violence in the 1970s and 1980s created conditions for clan violence in the 1990s. In doing so, the article makes a clear conceptual distinction between state and clan violence. State violence carried out on a clan level, but instigated by state authorities, constituted a constant feature of the state during the era of the military regime of General Mohamed Siad Barre (1969–91).

Abstract Despite the growing body of academic literature that seeks to explain the evolution of Al-Shabaab, the movement remains one of the least understood on the continent. This article explores the relationship between the militant movement and the twentieth-century anti-colonial Somali insurgency movement of the Dervishes, examining the extent to which Al-Shabaab imitates the Dervishes. It argues that Al-Shabaab is not unique when considered as a contemporary re-incarnation of the Dervishes. Approaching Al-Shabaab as a heterogeneous insurgency movement established and sustained by emulation, the article compares Al-Shabaab to the Dervishes in terms of their leadership characteristics, war strategies and ideological foundations. In doing so, it uses interviews and focus group discussions carried out in Mogadishu and Afgooye (Somalia) as well as a variety of under-explored sources such as visual data. It concludes that Al-Shabaab draws directly and indirectly from the Dervishes in crucial ways, but that there are also differences between the two movements in terms of mobilization and utilizing political and cultural dynamics.

This article is driven by an empirical paradox over where Somalia came from (pre-colonial clan-states) and where it ended up (return to pre-colonial clano-territorial conflicts). Existing academic studies on contemporary Somalia, which were supposed to provide critical analysis, continue to applaud the creation of clan-states within the failed state of Somalia. Based on a variety of unique primary sources, this article offers a new perspective on the current state formation processes occurring in the purview of the Somali State. Somali clans are determined to come to terms with the state collapse by averting the return to political power of the detested military regime, which was led by one clan-based leadership that tended to terrorize other rival clans and denied any equal power- and resource-sharing framework. Conceptualizing the contemporary Somali state as similar to pre-colonial clan-sultanates, this article argues that contemporary Somalis are reverting to a pre-colonial realm where each clan had its clan sultan seeking for a clan-state of its own right. Where else do clan-states compete against each other in entering into “treaties” with external entities intent on exploiting war-torn Somalia as tabula rasa? It is towards the objective of answering this question and of providing a better understanding of the Somali conflict that this article is offered to add a comparative empirical understanding of the different trajectories of state formations in Somalia. Le paradoxe empirique de la provenance de la Somalie (États-clans précoloniaux) et de sa trajectoire finale (retour aux conflits de clans-territoriaux précoloniaux) est le guide conducteur de cet article. Les études académiques actuelles sur la Somalie contemporaine, qui étaient censées fournir une analyse critique, continuent d’applaudir la création d’États-clans dans le cadre de l’État de Somalie défaillant. Cet article qui s’appuie sur une variété de sources primaires uniques, offre une nouvelle perspective sur les processus actuels de construction d’état se produisant dans le cadre de l’État somalien. Les clans somaliens sont déterminés à parvenir à accepter l’effondrement de l’État en évitant le retour au pouvoir politique du régime militaire détesté, qui a été contrôlé par la direction d’un clan monopolisateur avec une tendance à terroriser les autres clans rivaux et a nié tout schéma d’égalité du pouvoir et de partage des ressources. En conceptualisant l’État somalien contemporain comme semblable au clan-sultanats précoloniaux, cet article fait valoir que les Somaliens contemporains reviennent à un schéma précolonial où le Sultan de chaque clan était forcé d’être à la recherche d’un État-clan de plein droit. Existe-t-il ailleurs des États-clans qui rivalisent entre eux en concluant des « traités » avec des puissances extérieures qui ont la pleine intention d’exploiter la Somalie déchirée par la guerre en tant que tabula rasa ? Ayant pour objectif de répondre à cette question ainsi que d’apporter une meilleure compréhension du conflit somalien cet article se propose d’apporter une compréhension empirique comparative des différentes trajectoires de la construction des états en Somalie.

External intervention has frustrated and continues to frustrate peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and Somalia, adding various adverse layers to an already complicated and complex conflict. The level of forceful military engagement intended for regional domination has profoundly affected negatively the efforts of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia. This article examines how the earlier Ethiopian policies towards Somalia has reshaped the (post)-Cold War politics of the Horn. In doing so, it traces the roots of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia vis-à-vis new non-state armed groups to chart the changing political dynamics of the conflict in Somalia. By using historical approach, the article argues that Ethiopia's agenda is central to understanding why the 'War on Terror' has strengthened and subsequently midwifed armed militant movements (e.g. new insurgency groups) in Somalia, starting from Al-Itihaad to today's Al-Shabaab. In focusing upon various regional actors and groups, the article moves from the emphasis of internal systems to external power structures, considering the wider historical and political factors in the region that must be closely examined if the regional and local conflicts are to be deeply understood. While it is a context-specific study, the article aims to contribute fresh perspectives and insights to ongoing discussions on the consequences of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.

In the existing academic literature on Somalia, the armed opposition movements that emerged at the height of the Cold War are treated as unidirectional and uniform. This article challenges this tendency by tracing the emergence and evaporation of the once popular mass armed opposition movement, the United Somali Congress (USC). The article provides comparisons with the experiences of Somali and other regional armed opposition movements to argue for a case of institutional and organisational faults in the USC. Most armed movements across the African continent became successful in overthrowing authoritarian regimes during the end of the Cold War, but few of them succeeded in their attempts to seize state power. Unlike the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in Ethiopia in May 1991, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda in April 1994 and, a bit earlier, the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda in January 1986, the USC leadership in January 1991 failed to form a stable state and, instead, turned their weapons on each other. Why did the USC fail in 1991 to reconstitute the state which it had fought to rule? What was the power configuration of the USC? How did power contestation of the movement, from the outset, set the stage for chronic conflicts? In seeking answers to these questions, the article explores the internal USC political dynamics by utilising extensive oral interviews with key figures (players, protagonists, proponents and political brokers), visual sources, intelligence reports and the movement's pamphlets.

In the existing academic literature on Somalia, the armed opposition movements that emerged at the height of the Cold War are treated as unidirectional and uniform. This article challenges this tendency by tracing the emergence and evaporation of the once popular mass armed opposition movement, the United Somali Congress (USC). The article provides comparisons with the experiences of Somali and other regional armed opposition movements to argue for a case of institutional and organisational faults in the USC. Most armed movements across the African continent became successful in overthrowing authoritarian regimes during the end of the Cold War, but few of them succeeded in their attempts to seize state power. Unlike the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in Ethiopia in May 1991, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda in April 1994 and, a bit earlier, the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda in January 1986, the USC leadership in January 1991 failed to form a stable state and, instead, turned their weapons on each other. Why did the USC fail in 1991 to reconstitute the state which it had fought to rule? What was the power configuration of the USC? How did power contestation of the movement, from the outset, set the stage for chronic conflicts? In seeking answers to these questions, the article explores the internal USC political dynamics by utilising extensive oral interviews with key figures (players, protagonists, proponents and political brokers), visual sources, intelligence reports and the movement’s pamphlets.