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The renewed engagement with Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom in management and organization studies is reflective of the wider turn towards practice sweeping across many disciplines. In this sense, it constitutes a welcome move away from the traditional rationalist, abstract, and mechanistic modes of approaching ethical decision-making. Within the current engagement, practical wisdom is generally conceptualized, interpreted or read as a form of deliberation or deliberative judgement that is also cognizant of context, situatedness, particularity, lived experience, and so on. We argue that while this way of conceptualizing practical wisdom moves closer to practice in accounting for the concrete and particular reality within which individuals enact ethics, it does not adequately account for practice in the ontological and relational sense posited in practice theories. Practical wisdom conceptualized on the deliberative dimension still retains a higher emphasis on distinct entities (individuals/institutions), reflexive agency, conscious mental states, goal-directed action, and intentionality. In other words, it puts a higher stress on individual wisdom, as opposed to practice or the relational interaction of the individual and social inhering in practice. We offer an alternative conceptualization of practical wisdom based on the dispositional mode of being in the world which is rarely deliberate, intentional, or reflective. Our conceptualization integrates Aristotle’s original ethical framework, which is already embedded in a practice-based ontology, with insights from practice theories to show how practical wisdom is intuitively channelled in the dispositional mode in a given social configuration of virtues/ends.

Algorithms, or rather algorithmic actions, are seen as problematic because they are inscrutable, automatic, and subsumed in the flow of daily practices. Yet, they are also seen to be playing an important role in organizing opportunities, enacting certain categories, and doing what David Lyon calls \"social sorting.\" Thus, there is a general concern that this increasingly prevalent mode of ordering and organizing should be governed more explicitly. Some have argued for more transparency and openness, others have argued for more democratic or value-centered design of such actors. In this article, we argue that governing practices—of, and through algorithmic actors—are best understood in terms of what Foucault calls governmentality. Governmentality allows us to consider the performative nature of these governing practices. They allow us to show how practice becomes problematized, how calculative practices are enacted as technologies of governance, how such calculative practices produce domains of knowledge and expertise, and finally, how such domains of knowledge become internalized in order to enact self-governing subjects. In other words, it allows us to show the mutually constitutive nature of problems, domains of knowledge, and subjectivities enacted through governing practices. In order to demonstrate this, we present attempts to govern academic writing with a specific focus on the algorithmic action of Turnitin.

This paper argues that the existing literature on participatory design (PD) tends to focus on frontstage design interactions (workshops, participants, methodologies, techniques, etc.) to facilitate PD ‘here and now’—referred to as the interactional approach . In contrast, the paper proposes to contribute to an evolving literature, referred to as the transformational approach , that takes a more longitudinal line and which attends to both the frontstage and backstage within an extended temporal frame. To do this the paper draws on the work of the social anthropologist Tim Ingold, in particular, his concept of the happening of ongoing life as a bundle of flowing lines. The paper argues that PD becomes possible when ongoing participation is conceived of as a set of corresponding (or coalescing) and conditioning lines of flow—each line with its own history, attentionality, rhythms, tempos and so forth. To illustrate what this reorientation might mean for PD the paper draws on an in-depth action research study of a PD initiative that sought to develop a digital service to address loneliness and social isolation in a rural location in the UK. The paper explores how project members, individual participants, non-governmental organisation, government representatives, evaluators and funders co-responded to each other (or not) as they engaged, or became implicated, in the PD process. The paper concludes with some practical implications of what such an Ingoldian reorientation might mean for the ongoing development of PD as a transformational methodology.

In this article, we consider how the notion of the negotiated order can be reinterpreted by drawing on ideas from sociomateriality. We argue that the negotiated order is an ongoing accomplishment in which a heterogeneous set of situated sociomaterial practices (or actors) are implicated. To do this, we draw upon an in-depth study of the use of a computerised physician order entry system in a hospital in Saudi Arabia. We explore how a computerised physician order entry system, as a new sociomaterial actor, performatively repositions the actors involved and hence offers the conditions of possibility for medical work practices to be renegotiated. We show that it is often contingent, mundane, situated sociomaterial practices that enact the conditions under which the negotiated order becomes re-established in terms of division of labour, legitimacy, collaboration, and social capital. We argue that as the social and material are co-constitutive, or intra-actional, it makes more sense to talk about the negotiated intra-actional order rather than the negotiated order. Importantly, such a change in conceptual vocabulary reveals the empirical and ontological issues at stake; essential for a more nuanced understanding of change/becoming.

In this paper, we argue that any effort to understand the state of the Information Systems field has to view IS research as a series of normative choices and value judgments about the ends of research. To assist a systematic questioning of the various ends of IS research, we propose a pragmatic framework that explores the choices IS researchers make around theories and methodologies, ethical methods of conduct, desirable outcomes, and the long-term impact of the research beyond a single site and topic area. We illustrate our framework by considering and questioning the explicit and implicit choices of topics, design and execution, and the representation of knowledge in experimental research — research often considered to be largely beyond value judgments and power relations. We conclude with the implications of our pragmatic framework by proposing practical questions for all IS researchers to consider in making choices about relevant topics, design and execution, and representation of findings in their research.

This paper will address the question of the morality of technology. The author believes this is an important question for contemporary society in which technology, especially information technology, is increasingly becoming the default mode of social ordering. The conventional manner of conceptualising the morality of technology is inadequate - even dangerous. The conventional view of technology is that technology represents technical means to achieve social ends. Thus, the moral problem of technology, from this perspective, is the way in which the given technical means are applied to particular (good or bad) social ends. In opposition to this the assumed separation of this approach between technical means and social ends are inappropriate. It only serves to hide the most important political and ethical dimensions of technology. The morality of technology is much more embedded and implicit than such a view would suggest. In order to critique this approach the author will draw on phenomenology and the more recent work of Bruno Latour.

This paper is an attempt to present disclosive ethics as a framework for computer and information ethics - in line with the suggestions by Brey, but also in quite a different manner. The potential of such an approach is demonstrated through a disclosive analysis of facial recognition systems. The paper argues that the politics of information technology is a particularly powerful politics since information technology is an opaque technology - i.e. relatively closed to scrutiny. It presents the design of technology as a process of closure in which design and use decisions become black-boxed and progressively enclosed in increasingly complex socio-technical networks. It further argues for a disclosive ethics that aims to disclose the nondisclosure of politics by claiming a place for ethics in every actual operation of power - as manifested in actual design and use decisions and practices. It also proposes that disclosive ethics would aim to trace and disclose the intentional and emerging enclosure of politics from the very minute technical detail through to social practices and complex social-technical networks.

This paper provides a critical discussion of the ongoing concern of Information Systems (IS) academics on the status of IS as an academic discipline. The focal claim of the argument is that the status of IS as an 'academic discipline' is not an ontological or an epistemological question but rather a political one. In defending this claim the paper will draw on the work of Foucault, in particular his discussion on the relation between power and knowledge. The paper will conclude that the advice given by Paul (2002) and others may be appropriate but for very different reasons. It will claim that it is equally important, if not more so, to know the reasons why claims to legitimacy may succeed or not, for such claims to be effective as a political programme.

Privacy is a relational and relative concept that has been defined in a variety of ways. In this paper we offer a systematic discussion of potentially different notions of privacy. We conclude that privacy as the freedom or immunity from the judgement of others is an extremely useful concept to develop ways in which to understand privacy claims and associated risks. To this end, we develop a framework of principles that explores the interrelations of interests and values for various stakeholders where privacy concerns have risen or are expected to rise. We argue that conflicts between the interests and values of different stakeholders may result in legitimate claims of privacy/transparency being ignored or underrepresented. Central to this analysis is the notion of a stakeholder. We argue that stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests, of intrinsic value, in the procedural and/or substantive aspects of the privacy/transparency claim and subsequent judgements on that basis. Using the principles of access, representation, and power, which flow from our framework of analysis, we show how they can facilitate the identification of potential privacy/transparency risks using examples from the British National Health Service.

This paper reports on longitudinal research into the implementation and use of the first mobile vehicle mounted data system (VMDS) at a UK fire service. Using insights from Claudio Ciborra's work, the paper develops a phenomenological ontology for conceptualising the co-constitutive relation between organisational practices and information technology mediated practices. The paper sets out how the brigade's mobile data system can be understood in terms hospitality, improvisation and Gestell. It is argued that despite the seemingly innocent and potentially mundane replacement of paper-based practices by electronically mediated mobile information and communication, the VMDS is associated with significant and far-reaching outcomes, both empirical and ontological, within the brigade and for the modernisation of fire service provision across the UK. We suggest that the dynamic of hospitality between guest and host provides a way to think through and beyond the deployment information infrastructures as enframed by a technological mood. The paper concludes with some general implications for a phenomenology of information technology.